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abstract.  A generation ago, it was common and uncontroversial for federal judges to rely 
upon legislative history when interpreting a statute. But since the 1980s, the textualist 
movement, led by Justice Scalia, has urged the banishment of legislative history from the judicial 
system. The resulting debate between textualists and their opponents—a debate that has 
dominated statutory interpretation for a generation—cannot be truly understood unless we 
know how legislative history came to be such a common tool of interpretation to begin with. 
This question is not answered by the scholarly literature, which focuses on how reliance on 
legislative history became permissible as a matter of doctrine (in the Holy Trinity Church case in 
1892), not on how it became normal, routine, and expected as a matter of judicial and lawyerly 
practice. The question of normalization is key, for legislative history has long been considered 
more difficult and costly to research than other interpretive sources. What kind of judge or 
lawyer would routinize the use of a source often considered intractable? 
 Drawing upon new citation data and archival research, this Article reveals that judicial use 
of legislative history became routine quite suddenly, in about 1940. The key player in pushing 
legislative history on the judiciary was the newly expanded New Deal administrative state. By 
reason of its unprecedented manpower and its intimacy with Congress (which often meant 
congressmen depended on agency personnel to help draft bills and write legislative history), the 
administrative state was the first institution in American history capable of systematically 
researching and briefing legislative discourse and rendering it tractable and legible to judges on a 
wholesale basis. By embracing legislative history circa 1940, judges were taking up a source of 
which the bureaucracy was a privileged producer and user—a development integral to judges’ 
larger acceptance of agency-centered governance. Legislative history was, at least in its origin, a 
statist tool of interpretation.  
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When a legislature enacts a statute, it leaves behind a history: the revisions 
that lawmakers made to the bill, the things they said about it during committee 
deliberations and floor debates, and the public input they officially received on 
it from experts and other witnesses. Should a court, when interpreting the act, 
consider that history? 
For a generation, the field of American statutory interpretation has burned 
with controversy over this question. The controversy is a novelty of the last 
twenty-five years. In the 1980s, legislative history was uncontroversial and very 
common. It appeared in more than half the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on 
federal statutes.1 In the high courts of leading states like New York, it likewise 
appeared frequently.2 Using this material meant that judges were accustomed 
to engaging actively and openly with legislators’ discourse and policy 
reasoning. Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a movement of judges and 
lawyers—led by Antonin Scalia—began to argue that this familiar interpretive 
resource was pernicious and should be banished from the judicial system. They 
urged a textualist method of statutory interpretation that would ignore an act’s 
legislative history and focus more narrowly on its words. The legislative history 
of an act, warned Scalia and his allies, was a devil’s playground: it contained 
such a huge number of assertions about the act’s meaning, and those assertions 
were so contradictory and so easily inserted by manipulative politicians or 
lobbyists, that willful judges could always find support for whatever personal 
preferences they wished to impose. Adherence to the ordinary meaning of the 
text—the words on which lawmakers formally voted according to 
constitutional procedures—would do better at keeping judges accountable to 
the democratic will. Critics responded that Scalia was a false prophet. His 
method, they said, would not deliver the determinacy he promised, for text was 
often ambiguous (or became ambiguous when overtaken by events unforeseen 
by lawmakers), so textualist judges could just as easily impose their 
preferences, and all the more insidiously, since they would do so under the 
apolitical cloak of “ordinary meaning.” Besides, added the critics, legislation 
 
1.  David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1716 fig.5 (2010). 
2.  For example, in 1990, New York’s high court cited such material 57 times in its 123 cases, 
and not all those cases were even statutory. William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the 
New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121, 143-44, 150 tbl.1, 163 tbl.23 (1995). 
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was meaningless without reference to policy, and what better source for 
understanding a statute’s policy than legislative history?3 
Whichever side is right, there is no doubt that judicial practice has moved 
dramatically in Scalia’s direction (even if his colleagues have not formally 
converted to his principle of complete exclusion). The proportion of U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions citing legislative history in statutory cases has fallen 
by more than half since the 1980s.4 The number of citations per statutory case 
has fallen even more steeply.5 At the state level—where legislatures have 
recently begun publishing legislative history far more extensively than in the 
past—courts have drawn upon textualist ideas to limit the new material’s use.6 
Even leading defenders of legislative history concede parts of the textualist 
critique and look back with some embarrassment on how freely and easily the 
federal courts used such material twenty-five years ago.7 “[M]any 
 
3.  For two recent reviews of this debate, from opposing stances, see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 369-90 (2012); and 
Robert A. Katzmann, Madison Lecture: Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 661-82 (2012). In 
terms of citation practices, actual use of legislative history by the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not begin to decline until after 1985. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining 
Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
369, 385 tbl.I (1999); Law & Zaring, supra note 1, at 1716 fig.5. In terms of rhetoric and 
doctrine, however, some accounts suggest that the shift toward text began earlier, in the 
mid- to late 1970s, see Charles F. Lettow, Looking at Federal Administrative Law with a 
Constitutional Framework in Mind, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 5-9, 31 (1992); [Richard H. Pildes], 
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme 
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 894-98 (1982), though one leading observer contended at the 
time that the Justices’ opinions, as a whole, reflected no concerted shift toward text, see 
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court 
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 215-16 (1983). I thank Bill Eskridge for alerting me to the 
complexity of the timeline. 
4.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical 
and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 236 tbl.I (2010) (covering 2005-09); Law & 
Zaring, supra note 1, at 1715, 1716 fig.5 (covering through 2006). 
5.  Based on the data in Koby, supra note 3, at 385 tbl.I, I calculate that the Supreme Court 
averaged 7.8 citations to legislative history per statutory case in the years 1980-86, 4.4 in the 
years 1987-92, and 2.6 in the years 1993-98. There is no published data on number of 
citations after 1998. 
6.  Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus 
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1829-32, 1859-60 (2010). 
7.  Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 171 
(2009). 
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contemporary courts,” when they do cite legislative history, seem to 
“apologize” for doing so.8 
We are living through what appears to be an interpretive revolution. But 
we do not fully understand what (for better or worse) we are losing by it. That 
is because we do not have an adequate account of how and why judicial reliance 
upon legislative history—the once-dominant method that is now under 
attack—came to dominance in the first place. Further, an account of legislative 
history’s rise would provide us with a better understanding of how interpretive 
revolutions happen, which may be useful knowledge for those who want to 
consummate the present revolution and for those who want to prevent its 
consummation. The task of this Article is to provide that account. 
To be sure, we do have a partial sense of the story, in some of its general 
outlines. Originally, English and American judges cited no legislative history, 
for none was available. In the early modern era, the English Houses of 
Parliament not only refrained from recording or publishing their debates but 
actually prohibited their publication, for the members feared the scrutiny of the 
crown and viewed themselves as an elite body that should be insulated from 
immediate popular pressure.9 With no tradition of legislative openness in the 
mother country, the American colonial assemblies also did not publish their 
deliberations.10 
Eventually, however, English and American judges did have to confront the 
question of whether to use legislative history, for as both societies became more 
democratic, such material came to be published copiously. In 1771, Parliament 
began permitting publication of its debates, and by the mid-1800s, the famous 
Hansard company received public subsidies to publish them in great detail.11 In 
the United States, Congress published its journal (a skeletal procedural 
record)12 from 1789 onward and soon began allowing private printers to 
publish its floor debates. These early reports were sometimes incomplete, 
 
8.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous 
Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 526-27 (2005). 
9.  Kenneth Rose, The Growth of Freedom in the Reporting of Parliamentary Debates, 2 INT’L 
COMM. GAZETTE 223, 223-24 (1956). 
10.  Elizabeth Gregory McPherson, Reporting the Debates of Congress, 28 Q.J. SPEECH 141, 141-42 
(1942). 
11.  J.C. TREWIN & E.M. KING, PRINTER TO THE HOUSE: THE STORY OF HANSARD 241 (1952); see 
also Rose, supra note 9, at 225-26 (noting that in 1771 the House of Commons ceased 
enforcing the ban and “tacitly” allowed reporting from then on). 
12.  Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the 
Availability of Legislative History, DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L., Summer 2003, at 151, 165. 
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irregular, and even biased, but this changed in 1850 when the Congressional 
Globe became semi-official, publishing a complete and timely verbatim 
transcript, supported by a congressional subsidy.13 Eventually Congress started 
doing the same thing itself, establishing the in-house Congressional Record in 
1873.14 The Record of the 46th Congress (1879-81) ran to 10,000 pages; of the 
56th (1899-1901), to 10,000 again; of the 66th (1919-21), to 22,000; and of the 
76th (1939-41), to 38,000. Meanwhile, Congress’s committees began 
publishing reports on all the public bills they sent to the floor. The House 
made such reports mandatory in 1880, and Senate committees were issuing 
them on the majority of bills by about 1900.15 These committee reports, 
combined with informative documents that committees ordered printed, made 
up a “Serial Set” that totaled 2,000 volumes by 1880, added another 2,000 by 
1900, another 4,000 by 1920, and another 2,500 by 1940. And shortly after 
1900, the committees began frequently publishing their hearings: the annual 
number stood at about 100 in 1900 and jumped into the range of 500-650 per 
year for 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940.16 (The penchant for publishing did not 
extend to the state legislatures: even in the 1940s, almost none of them had 
ever recorded their floor debates or committee hearings, or issued substantive 
reports of standing committees.17) 
 
13.  McPherson, supra note 10, at 143-48. 
14.  Id. at 147-48. 
15.  Thomas F. Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 209, 231, 238 (1958). 
16.  My count of the number of published hearings for a given year is based on a search of the 
ProQuest Congressional database, limited to the category of “Hearings 1817-Present,” for 
the word “hearing” in all fields except full text. 
17.  On this point, consider the assessment of Frank E. Horack, Jr., editor of the standard 
treatise STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1943), which focused mostly on 
state courts. In 1950, he wrote: “It would be a fair guess to say that 99% of the state statutes 
. . . reach a court without the benefit of any adequate legislative history officially recorded in 
hearings, reports or journals.” Frank E. Horack, Jr., Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory 
Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 382, 388 (1950); see also ARTHUR S. BEARDSLEY & OSCAR C. 
ORMAN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 64-65 (2d ed. 1947) (noting that 
“reports and hearings of committees . . . are seldom available” and that “actual [floor] 
debates and discussions . . . are not recorded in a form available to the public”); Phillips 
Bradley, Legislative Recording in the United States, 29 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 74, 75-76 (1935) 
(noting that the substance of floor debates was published by no state except Pennsylvania 
and Maine and that reports of standing committees might be published in legislative 
journals but were skeletal, with no substantive discussion); Richard Cashman, Availability of 
Records of Legislative Debates, 24 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 153, 155-56 (1969) (noting that floor 
debates were published in no state except Pennsylvania and Maine, even in the 1960s); 
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Thus, English courts and U.S. federal courts had to decide whether to use 
the legislative history that was proliferating. The English judges shut their eyes 
to it. They had imposed an exclusionary rule in the era before 1771, when 
publication of parliamentary deliberations had been illegal, and they 
maintained that rule even as reports of the debates became lawful and 
available.18 American judges and treatise-writers followed the English rule 
from the late 1700s through the mid-1800s.19 Then, in the 1870s and 1880s, 
U.S. federal judges in a handful of cases made small, incremental departures 
from the rule. Next, in 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court in Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States20 relied upon committee reports (among other 
interpretive tools) to override what it admitted to be the literal meaning of an 
act of Congress.21 Holy Trinity would become the leading case for a new 
American rule that legislative history was permissible in statutory 
interpretation.22 Meanwhile, English judges—plus those of Commonwealth 
countries like Canada and Australia—held fast to the exclusionary rule. They 
 
Elizabeth Finley, Book Review, 24 IND. L.J. 328, 330 (1949) (reviewing BEARDSLEY & 
ORMAN, supra) (“Usually there are no written committee reports, published hearings or 
debates on state legislation.”); Note, Nonlegislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 
49 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 677 (1949) (noting that only “three state legislatures keep 
reasonably adequate records of committee hearings”). 
18.  PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 51-52 (W. Wyatt-Paine 
ed., 6th ed. 1920); Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical 
Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1991). 
19.  Baade, supra note 18, at 1008-11, 1025-28, 1031-32, 1065-68. There was one limited exception 
to this approach. Some U.S. attorneys general, beginning in the 1820s, consulted legislative 
history in official opinions interpreting private acts, and one attorney general said in 1837 
that such material could be used to interpret public acts, though nobody at the time 
followed him in going so far. By the 1840s, attorneys general backtracked from using 
legislative history even to construe private acts. Id. at 1029-32. One U.S. Supreme Court case 
in 1860 cited legislative history to construe a private act, id. at 1068-79, but no subsequent 
treatise cited the case for this point, id. at 1073. 
20.  143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
21.  On Holy Trinity and the small incremental steps in the preceding 20 to 30 years, see Baade, 
supra note 18, at 1079-83; and Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: 
Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 944-49 (2000). 
Chomsky also identifies three state cases citing federal legislative history as early as the 
1860s and 1870s. Id. at 944 n.213. 
22.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 209 (1994); WILLIAM D. 
POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
122 (1999). 
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relaxed it only in the 1980s or later, and even now, they do not use legislative 
history as much as American courts.23 
So much we know. What we lack is an account of how legislative history 
went from being a permissible tool of American statutory interpretation to being 
the normal, routine, and expected tool that it had become by the time of Scalia’s 
attack. One might assume that, in an adversary system, permissibility 
automatically leads to normalization. That is, once the judiciary says it will 
consider a certain kind of source, lawyers will instantly compete with each 
other to cite ever more of that source. But nobody has proven that assumption 
with respect to legislative history. And it may well be wrong. The opinion in 
Holy Trinity itself did not consciously reject the English rule; it simply ignored 
it without comment. And, as some leading present-day scholars point out, 
legislative history is more (perhaps far more) difficult and costly for lawyers to 
research than other legal sources, such as case law and statutory text.24 Given 
 
23.  On England, see James J. Brudney, Below the Surface: Comparing Legislative History Usage by 
the House of Lords and the Supreme Court, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). On Commonwealth 
countries, see Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Pepper v. Hart Revisited, 15 STATUTE L. REV. 10, 14-
15 (1994). 
24.  As Richard Posner has written: 
A year and a half of reading briefs in cases that often involve statutory 
interpretation has convinced me that many lawyers do not research legislative 
history as carefully as they research case law. They may not know how. It is more 
difficult to research legislative history than case law . . . . Research into U.S. 
government documents in general and legislative documents in particular is a 
formidable subspecialty of library science, and I would guess that not one lawyer 
in a thousand has a real proficiency in it. 
  Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 800, 804 (1983) (footnote omitted). For similar views, see REED DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 162-64 & n.68 (1975); and ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 107-15 (2006). Victoria Nourse argues that research in legislative history 
can potentially be rendered easy if the interpreter takes a parsimonious approach: isolate the 
discrete textual language on which the case turns, trace that language backward through the 
history to its moment of origin, and then interpret its origin using the bill texts and 
discourse that were produced at that moment (or shortly before or after), viewed in light of 
the legislature’s procedural rules. Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012). But American courts’ 
approach to legislative history, as it has developed over the past century, is not parsimonious 
like this. Indeed, Nourse presents her method as a novel alternative to the dominant 
approach, which she criticizes for taking an overly holistic, all-encompassing, and research-
intensive view of a statute’s legislative history. Id. at 136-38. The non-parsimony of 
American courts presumably has to do with the fact (demonstrated infra Part I) that 
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the offhand quality of Holy Trinity and the headaches of using the source it 
made permissible, we must ask: why did this case become a landmark—a 
license for a method that has cost millions of billable hours—instead of being 
forgotten as an obscurity? 
What we need is an account of legislative history’s rise as a matter of 
practical, workaday lawyering and opinion-writing. Or, to speak in more 
academic terms, we need an institutional account. Who were the lawyers and 
judges who started the pattern of routinely using a source often considered 
intractable? How did they manage to do it? What drove them? 
The existing literature does not answer this question, though it does 
provide some valuable background and a few pieces of the puzzle. There has 
been major work on the intellectual history (as distinct from the institutional 
history) of judicial use of legislative materials. This work focuses on leading 
cases, treatises, and law review articles from the first half of the 1900s. It shows 
how the federal judiciary widened the scope of permissibility on an incremental 
basis, to include more categories of legislative documents, and it traces changes 
in high theory about the value of legislative history in interpretive thinking.25 
 
legislative history became normal in the 1940s, simultaneously with an intellectual tendency 
to conceive of legislative intent at a high level of generality (discussed infra Part II). The 
non-parsimony may also have to do with the fact (demonstrated infra Part III) that the 
federal government—uniquely suited to take the holistic approach of exhaustively 
researching a statute’s full legislative history—was the main litigant that originally brought 
legislative history to the judiciary. (Even if the courts were to attempt Nourse’s approach, it 
might not deliver low-cost answers with much frequency. In any given case, the question 
might not turn on a discrete textual provision; or the decisive provision might have 
originated relatively early in the legislative process, perhaps in a prior bill; or the bill texts 
and discourse proximate to the provision’s origin might be opaque without context from 
elsewhere in the history. Under such circumstances—which may be frequent—the court 
would have to forswear inquiry into legislative history beyond an initial, circumscribed, 
low-cost foray, or revert to the more holistic approach. Nourse’s discussion rests on six 
leading cases, id. at 91 n.84, and she notes that she has yet “to defend the larger empirical 
proposition” that her approach “can in fact simplify the use of legislative history . . . at a 
systemic level,” id. at 90 n.79.) 
25.  The key intellectual and doctrinal history is ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 208-18, which 
distills and updates his earlier article, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365 (1990). Also important on doctrine is Baade, supra note 18, at 1079-
89, which also includes a brief but important institutional discussion (described infra note 
34). Also valuable, mainly on theory, is POPKIN, supra note 22, at 115-49, especially at 121-25, 
129, and 137. Holy Trinity itself—the main doctrinal turning point—has been the focus of 
two deeply researched articles. See Chomsky, supra note 21; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998). It should be noted, however, that Vermeule’s interest is not 
mainly in doctrine but in the institutional capacity (or incapacity) of courts to use legislative 
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These intellectual developments play a role in the institutional story that I tell 
below. 
In addition, there have been several quantitative studies of legislative 
history usage, though mostly confined to the period from the 1950s to the 
present.26 One of the most careful of these studies finds that the percentage of 
Supreme Court statutory opinions using legislative history rose between the 
1950s and 1980s and plummeted thereafter. Crucially, the level in the 1950s 
was substantially higher than it is today.27 Thus, our threshold question is how 
the Court even got to the level of the 1950s. By then, legislative history had 
already become normal. (Indeed, the first edition of a standard manual on 
appellate advocacy in 1950 said that “an advocate in the federal courts . . . 
cannot afford to ignore legislative history” and “should routinely check” it.28) 
There have been four quantitative studies of U.S. Supreme Court citations that 
reach back into the pre-1950 era and include legislative history.29 Taken 
together, these studies suggest a surge—perhaps a radical one—in the Court’s 
usage sometime in the 1930s or 1940s. But they do not allow us to state the 
point with confidence or precision. All four have major limitations in method 
 
history, and he uses the Court’s opinion in Holy Trinity (which he finds marred by research 
errors) as a case study of that incapacity. See id. at 1837-39. 
26.  See the literature cited in Danner, supra note 12, at 177 n.147. More recent studies include 
Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence 
on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 
(2009); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal 
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008); and James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of 
Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009). 
27.  Law & Zaring, supra note 1, at 1716. 
28.  FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 117, 119 (1st ed. 1950). 
29.  JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE DIMENSIONS OF NON-LEGAL EVIDENCE IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL 
PROCESS: THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF EXTRA-LEGAL MATERIALS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (1990); Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative Histories by the United 
States Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. LEGIS. 282 (1982) [hereinafter Carro & 
Brann], republished (with somewhat less information) as Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. 
Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 
JURIMETRICS J. 294 (1982); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909 (2005); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory 
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992). 
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or scope: two fail to control for the number of statutory cases,30 a third draws 
cases from only four years within the whole period 1925-50,31 and the fourth 
 
30.  One is Carro & Brann, supra note 29. The authors use a Lexis search to identify Supreme 
Court cases citing legislative history in 1938-79, and within the cases so identified, they 
count by hand the citations to legislative history. Id. at 284-85. They record a five-fold 
increase in the number of citations between the first year they cover (1938) and the fourth 
(1941), and the rest of their data indicate that the annual number of citations never again fell 
below the total for 1941, except for four years in the 1950s. Id. at 291. But the authors do not 
comment on the radical upsurge of 1938-41; instead they state, far more generally, that the 
Court’s use of legislative history has “continually increased.” Id. at 289. One might say that 
Carro and Brann record an interesting event even if they do not analyze it. But even the data 
they record has the limitation that they do not control for the number of statutory cases. 
Indeed, they do not control for the number of cases at all (statutory or otherwise), except to 
select a few time blocks (two blocks of three years each, plus two blocks of nine years each) 
and to note that differences in citation counts between the blocks cannot be explained by the 
blocks’ respective numbers of cases. Id. at 285-86. 
          The other is JOHNSON, supra note 29, which is a photoduplication of the typescript of 
Johnson’s 1974 Ph.D. thesis from the University of Minnesota. Johnson takes a 10% random 
sample of all U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1925-70 (20% in every odd year) and counts 
the proportion of those cases that included (in the majority opinion or a separate opinion) at 
least one citation to “non-legal” evidence, which includes congressional documents (i.e., 
legislative history) plus treatises, law-review articles, other academic works, “quasi-legal 
documents” (such as restatements), and other government documents. Id. at 178, 215-19. 
Johnson counts only whether a case included at least one cite to each kind of source, not the 
number of such citations per case, so he does not measure the intensity with which the 
Justices used any sources. Id. at 186-87. Nor does he control for changes in the types of cases 
the Court was hearing (i.e., cases about statutes versus other kinds of cases). He does 
include such a breakdown later in the chapter, but he does not interface that breakdown 
with the data earlier in the chapter on the rising proportion of cases citing legislative history. 
Id. at 243. Using this approach, Johnson does find that Justices appointed in 1937 and later 
had a stronger tendency to cite “non-legal” sources. Id. at 205-06, 220-34. And he finds that 
legislative history was the most common type of “non-legal” source, in that it showed up in 
more cases than any other kind. Id. at 219. (Note that Johnson, after completing the 
dissertation, published two works derived from that project covering the rise of legislative 
history, but these draw only slightly on his quantitative data and instead focus mainly on 
doctrine, jurisprudence, and the law schools. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1908-1940, at 73-92 (1981); John W. Johnson, Retreat from the Common Law?: The 
Grudging Reception of Legislative History by American Appellate Courts in the Early Twentieth 
Century, 3 DET. C. L. REV. 413 (1978).) 
31.  Zeppos, supra note 29. As I discuss infra note 50 and accompanying text, Zeppos randomly 
selects certain annual Terms of the Court from which to draw samples of Supreme Court 
statutory cases. In each of those cases, he goes through the majority opinion and counts all 
citations to all kinds of authority. His dataset includes samples of cases (about twenty per 
year, on average) from the following Terms: 1894, 1902, 1917, 1921, 1923, 1932, 1944, 1947, 
1950, 1952, 1959, 1962, 1966, 1969, 1979, 1981, and 1987. Id. at 1088-89. He finds that the 
proportion of “non-textual originalist” sources (almost synonymous with legislative history, 
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focuses exclusively on tax law.32 Also, only one of the four studies focuses 
mainly on legislative history, and only one (not the same one) focuses mainly 
on the pre-1950 period, so none of the four pay much attention to the pre-1950 
shift toward legislative history that seems to appear in their datasets.33 Further, 
all four studies focus mainly on the Court’s opinions, saying little to nothing 
about the role of lawyers in bringing this hard-to-use source to the fore.34 A 
satisfying institutional account demands more work. 
 
see id. at 1099, 1104-06) was below 2% in all the selected Terms up to 1932, but 10% in 1944, 
and always 7% or more (sometimes much more) in his selected Terms after 1944. Id. at 1105 
fig.7. This finding is more informative than those in the studies by Johnson or Carro and 
Brann, since it gauges the intensity of use and controls for the types of cases the Court was 
hearing. 
32.  Staudt et al., supra note 29. The authors identify all 922 tax cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1912-2000. Id. at 1927. They count the proportion of these cases that cited at least 
some legislative history. They report this proportion in six-year blocks: 0% in 1912-17; 13% 
in 1918-23; 2% in 1924-29; 18% in 1930-35; 22% in 1936-41; and 47% in 1942-47. The 
increase in the early 1940s is notable, but the study’s limitation is that tax may be 
exceptional, in part because congressional action in the area is unusually frequent, as the 
authors note. Id. at 1926 n.83. Also, the authors do not count the number of citations, so 
they do not measure the intensity with which the Justices used legislative history. 
33.  The study that focuses mainly on legislative history is Carro & Brann, supra note 29, which 
does not attempt to explain, or even comment on, the upsurge of 1938-41 that appears in its 
data. The study that focuses mainly on the pre-1950 period is JOHNSON, supra note 29, 
which does give an explanation for the rise of “non-legal” evidence (including legislative 
history), though not a satisfying one. Johnson argues the rise was caused mainly by the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, which empowered the Court to choose its cases, thus allowing it to 
focus on cases of public importance. Id. at 234-55. I think the Act of 1925 may have been a 
precondition for the change, but some other factor(s) must have been in play, for (as 
Johnson himself says) the rise did not occur till 1937 or later. Johnson suggests that the Act 
of 1925 contributed to the disappearance of common-law cases (which tended to include far 
less “non-legal” evidence), id. at 241-44, but common-law cases were not a significant 
portion of the Court’s business even at the start of the period that Johnson studies, id. at 
243, so this explains little. As for the study by Zeppos, supra note 29, he is not mainly 
interested in change over time, and he comments only briefly on the increase in legislative 
history, mainly to posit that little legislative history was available before the 1940s. Id. at 
1105. As for the study by Staudt et al., supra note 29, the authors discuss the increase in 
legislative history only briefly, positing that little legislative history may have been available 
before the increase. Id. at 1945 & n.136. I am skeptical of the supply-based explanations 
posited by Zeppos and Staudt et al. Note the copious publication of congressional material 
by the 1910s. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
34.  The only study covering legislative history in the pre-1950 period to include data on briefs is 
JOHNSON, supra note 29, and his analysis is limited. For legislative history (as for every other 
form of “non-legal” evidence), he checks the briefs in every case in his sample that included 
at least one legislative history citation to see whether any brief in that case included at least 
one of the legislative history citations that appeared in the opinion. Id. at 207-20, 265-66. 
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I begin that work in Part I, setting forth quantitative data on Supreme 
Court use of legislative history in every fifth year from 1900 to 1950, including 
(1) the number of cites per statutory case and (2) the proportion of statutory 
cases with any cites. The first metric is low through 1935, then suddenly 
increases four-fold in 1940, entering a range that becomes the “new normal” 
through 1950. Similarly, the second metric creeps up to 20% by 1935 but then 
more than doubles (to 44%) in 1940, again entering a range that becomes the 
“new normal” (and is comparable to the data from prior studies on the 1950s). 
In other words, the use of legislative history became normalized very suddenly, 
sometime in 1935-40. I then present comparable data on every single year from 
1930 through 1945, finding that the radical break can be pinpointed to the year 
1940 almost exactly. I then assemble qualitative evidence confirming a 
 
This test yields a positive result even when there is minimal overlap between the opinion 
and the brief, so it gives only a murky idea of how much the Justices depended on the 
lawyers for research. Also, Johnson does not break down his data on briefs between type of 
party (e.g., governmental versus private). He does make a brief comment that, while most 
attorneys probably did not increase their citation of “non-legal” sources (including 
legislative history) in 1925-70, government lawyers did. Id. at 208-13, 266-67. 
          It should also be noted that one of the intellectual histories, Baade, supra note 18, sets 
forth a crucial institutional point, albeit in a brief and speculative manner. In an extensive 
history of American doctrines of constitutional and statutory interpretation from the 
eighteenth century to the present, Baade spends two pages floating the idea—consistent 
with what I demonstrate in Part III of this Article—that administrative agencies drove the 
rise of legislative history in the federal courts in the 1940s, in part because agencies’ 
involvement in the legislative process advantaged them in briefing such material. Id. at 
1088-89. Baade does not much elaborate the point, and his presentation of it is largely 
speculative. His only evidence is the study by Carro & Brann, supra note 29, and the list of 
Supreme Court cases relying upon legislative history in 1939-48 set forth by Justice 
Frankfurter in his separate opinion in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 687 
app. A (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), in which Baade determines that federal agencies 
were parties 80% of the time. It must be noted, however, that Frankfurter did not say how 
he selected his list, or that it was representative. Also, as I have found, federal agencies 
submitted briefs in 78% of all cases on federal statutes in 1940-45, regardless of whether 
those cases relied on legislative history, see infra text accompanying note 144, so we cannot 
rely upon their 80% presence as parties in the cases listed by Frankfurter to prove their 
dominance in briefing legislative history. 
          One other study containing a historical and institutional discussion of legislative history 
is Danner, supra note 12. Danner’s institutional analysis focuses on the increasing 
publication and widening dissemination of congressional documents, particularly in the 
1890s. Id. at 185-90. He does not focus on lawyerly or judicial practice. The developments 
traced by Danner may have been a long-term precondition for the normalization of 
legislative history, but they could not have been an immediate trigger, since (as I 
demonstrate in Part I) the judiciary did not begin using such material routinely until about 
1940. 
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transformative shift toward legislative history as a matter of everyday practice 
just around 1940. 
This finding has three implications. First, it shows that legislative history 
remained rare for decades after Holy Trinity. Permissibility did not 
automatically lead to normalization. Second, it establishes that the American 
turn to legislative history as a routine interpretive source originated at the 
federal level, not the state level, for scholars in the 1940s universally found that 
state courts’ use of legislative history was minimal, largely because the state 
legislatures at the time published so little of it.35 Third, identification of the 
years 1940-45 as the opening years of the “new normal” points us to the next 
step in our inquiry: we must analyze those years intensively to see which 
judges and lawyers were most responsible for the advent of the new regime. 
In the remainder of the Article, I argue that normalization was caused 
simultaneously by two interrelated factors. First was the appointment of new 
Justices with a new openness to legislative history. Second was the rapid 
growth of a federal administrative state with unprecedented institutional 
capacity to use legislative history to its advantage. 
Part II discusses the appointment of new Justices with new intellectual 
attitudes. The surge of legislative history in 1940 coincided fairly closely with 
the appointment of several new progressive Justices by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Progressive Justices generally cited legislative history at a much 
higher rate than Justices with more classical views. This makes sense: as the 
literature on the intellectual history of statutory interpretation indicates, 
progressive legal ideology counseled that judges should recognize the 
inevitable indeterminacy of traditional legal sources—whether common-law 
doctrinal formulas or statutory texts—and engage consciously and 
transparently in the policy choices that were inevitable in legal decision-
making. As progressive academics began arguing around 1940, legislative 
history could be of great value in guiding and deepening a judge’s policy 
 
35.  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1238 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (manuscript written in 1958); Glendon M. Fisher, Jr. & William J. Harbison, Trends 
in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 586, 588, 591 (1950); 
Horack, supra note 17, at 387-88; Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Disintegration of Statutory 
Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 341 (1949); Harry Willmer Jones, Statutory Doubts and 
Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 969 n.43 (1940). A study of the New York 
Court of Appeals finds that during the calendar year 1940 it cited legislative history twice 
(excluding one cite to a constitutional convention) across 180 cases (not all of which were 
statutory). Manz, supra note 2, at 150 tbl.1, 163 tbl.23. By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court 
in that year cited legislative history in 40 of its 90 statutory cases. 
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reasoning, particularly if the judge used the history to reason at a high level of 
generality—discerning the legislature’s overall objective and then reasoning 
“downward” to find a disposition of the specific case that best implemented 
that objective. Based on my reading of numerous cases from the period, I do 
think these progressive academic views informed the Justices’ increasingly 
copious use of legislative history during the early 1940s. 
Still, the period’s theoretical innovations are not a complete explanation for 
the change in workaday judicial practice. While there were many opinions that 
conformed to the academic focus on general intent, there were many others 
that went in a different direction, reflecting a more old-fashioned tendency to 
consult the history in search of lawmakers’ specific preference for how to 
dispose of the fact situation at issue, without much policy reasoning. Another 
difficulty with attributing the change entirely to the fresh ideas of new Justices 
is that even the old Justices greatly increased their citations to legislative history 
between the pre-1940 and post-1940 stages of their careers. 
For a true understanding of normalization, we must appreciate the crucial 
role of the newly expanded federal administrative state—the leviathan—in 
providing legislative history to the Court. Congress was such a complex body 
that neither the Justices nor ordinary lawyers were capable of analyzing its 
discourse routinely and systematically, no matter how intellectually committed 
they might have been to doing so. Only the federal bureaucracy had the 
intimacy with Congress and the institutional capacity to drive the interpretive 
revolution. Certain present-day scholars posit that the federal bureaucracy, 
when it litigates, uses legislative history more, and better, than does any other 
litigant,36 but this Article is the first to confirm that idea empirically. 
Part III traces the administrative state’s leading role in normalization. I 
begin by setting forth data, for a large sample of Supreme Court statutory 
opinions in the transformative years 1940-45, on “matches” between the 
legislative history citations appearing in the Court’s opinions and those 
appearing in the corresponding briefs.37 Of the Supreme Court’s statutory 
cases in 1940-45, 78% were briefed by the federal government, and these 
accounted for 86% of the legislative history citations. In the federally briefed 
statutory cases, the “matches” indicate that 33% of the legislative history 
 
36.  See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
37.  To my knowledge, this dataset constitutes—with one possible exception—the largest 
opinion/brief citation-matching study ever conducted. The one possible exception is 
William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 
LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002) (covering the 1996 Term). 
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citations came only from the federal brief, 22% from the federal brief and at 
least one non-federal brief, 10% from at least one non-federal brief and not 
from a federal brief, and 34% from no brief. In other words, it was 50% more 
common for the Justices to take a citation exclusively from the federal lawyers 
than to take one jointly from federal lawyers and non-federal lawyers. And it 
was more than three times more common for the Justices to take a citation 
exclusively from federal lawyers than to take one exclusively from non-federal 
lawyers. (Consistent with this, the data from the cases without federal briefs 
indicate that the Court had to do more work by itself in those cases. Only 45% 
of the citations matched any brief at all; the remaining 55% matched no brief.) 
The dominance of the federal government in providing legislative history 
to the Justices makes sense when we consider some background. First, 
researching legislative history was indeed more difficult, by a wide margin, 
than researching case law or statutory text. Telling which documents were 
relevant required sophisticated knowledge of the legislative process; the 
documents were often hard to obtain; and once obtained, they were 
voluminous, internally disorganized, and indexed poorly, if at all. In finding 
this material and translating it into legal argument, federal agencies and the 
Department of Justice—whose research underlay the briefs submitted by the 
Solicitor General to the Supreme Court—had major advantages. Their 
manpower (both in lawyers and law librarians) dwarfed all other organizations 
in the country. They each devoted themselves full-time to implementing one or 
a few statutes, so they could amortize the cost of researching the history of 
those statutes over many cases. Further, they had uses for legislative history 
beyond litigation (e.g., to guide program implementation). Most important, 
they were constantly communicating and negotiating with Congress over how 
to administer (and whether to amend) the statutes in their charge, which 
meant they were intimately engaged with the congressional process. Indeed, 
agency officials and Justice Department lawyers actually authored a large 
amount of legislative history—either in their own name (such as testimony at 
hearings) or as ghostwriters (of congressmen’s committee reports and floor 
speeches). Executive branch ghostwriting of congressional discourse has 
always been a feature of American government, but it appears that the 1930s 
and 1940s were the high point of this phenomenon: the volume of legislative 
activity was unprecedented, but Congress did not seriously begin building up 
its own internal staff until the late 1940s. Until then, congressmen were 
remarkably dependent on agency personnel for their words. Thus, the judiciary 
took up legislative discourse as a normal tool of interpretation at the very 
moment when the executive branch’s dominance of the legislature was at its 
height. 
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Part III also provides data on changes in the federal government’s briefing 
practices across the period 1930-45. The government briefed little legislative 
history up to the mid-1930s but then suddenly leaped into using such material. 
This timing is consistent with the idea that the government’s routine use of 
legislative history was a precondition for the Court’s routine use of it. Because 
the roots of the interpretive revolution seem to be found in the government’s 
dramatic increase in use, I consider how that increase happened. There were 
two stages. The first came in about 1936, when federal lawyers adopted 
legislative history as a weapon to defend New Deal statutes against 
constitutional challenges, citing congressional documents to show that 
Congress had made the factual findings requisite to the exercise of its 
enumerated powers (e.g., that the problem targeted by the statute truly 
affected interstate commerce). Interestingly, the Court picked up very few of 
these citations: conservative Justices eschewed legislative history because they 
clung to abstract, formalistic tests of constitutionality, while liberal Justices 
eschewed it because they considered judicial scrutiny of legislative findings to 
be improper judicial activism. Then came the second stage of the federal 
government’s leap into legislative history: in about 1939-40, federal lawyers 
began copiously using such material to argue “pure” questions of statutory 
interpretation, unconnected to constitutional issues. It seems that this second 
and more lasting shift in briefing practice arose from (1) the accumulation of a 
critical mass of institutional capacity by the agencies and DOJ and the 
consequent peak in Congress’s dependence on those organizations; (2) the 
great familiarity that agencies and DOJ had with legislative history, arising 
from their engagement with Congress; and (3) the incentive created by the 
adversary system to wield a weapon that is less available to one’s opponent. 
In addition, Part III considers the capacity (such as it was) of non-federal 
lawyers to brief legislative history. Non-federal lawyers generally briefed 
legislative material less than did the federal government, but a few of them 
used such material heavily. Who were these lawyers? For the most part, they 
were congressional lobbyists, and often they had lobbied Congress on the very 
bill that had become the statute at issue in the case. This makes sense: on any 
given statute, the relevant private lobbyists were the only people outside the 
federal bureaucracy who had knowledge of congressional activity rivaling that 
of the bureaucracy. 
Further, Part III examines the Court’s own internal capacity to research 
legislative history. As noted above, my sample indicates that 34% of the 
citations in federally briefed cases (plus 55% of the citations in other cases) 
matched no brief, suggesting the Court did the research itself. Consistent with 
this, the Court, in the years leading up to 1940, had rapidly acquired 
institutional capacity far exceeding that of any judicial tribunal in American 
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history. Though the Justices had long employed one clerk each, it was only in 
the 1930s that all of them began filling those positions with elite recent 
graduates capable of advanced research. Another reason for the Court’s high 
capacity was the paucity of its cases: the Judiciary Act of 1925 had empowered 
the Justices to decide what cases they would hear, and they immediately began 
hearing a lot fewer. This was a precondition for the 1940 surge in legislative 
history, though not the immediate trigger. That said, it should be noted that 
some part of the 34% figure represents not the Court’s internal capacity but the 
hidden influence of the federal leviathan: citations that matched no brief 
sometimes came from the administrative state through back channels (e.g., ex 
parte judicial requests for agency research, or agency donations of legislative 
history scrapbooks to the Court’s library). 
Altogether, the litigation process that normalized legislative history was 
radically modern. Whereas the Anglo-American judge was traditionally 
conceived as a passive referee choosing which of two formally equal parties had 
the better argument, the Supreme Court’s normalization of legislative history 
depended significantly on the Court’s independent research capacity. And 
when the Court did rely on the lawyers, it did not draw equally from “Doe” 
and “Roe” but instead depended heavily on an extraordinary kind of party: the 
now-fully-grown federal leviathan, which in 1940 had far more lawyers and 
legal researchers than any organization America had ever seen—plus an 
intense, ongoing relationship with Congress that gave it a uniquely systematic 
knowledge of legislative history. The extraordinary nature of the process helps 
explain why legislative history was never a major part of American statutory 
interpretation until far into the twentieth century. This is consistent with my 
finding, noted at the end of Part III, that the lower courts did not play a 
significant role in providing legislative history to the Supreme Court. Judicial 
use of legislative history did not “bubble up” from below. It was invented at 
the high court and then trickled down. 
In Part IV, I argue that legislative history was—at least in its origin—a 
statist tool of statutory interpretation. This was true not only because the 
bureaucracy was a privileged provider of such material to the judiciary, but also 
because the bureaucracy was a privileged participant in congressional 
discourse—a status that it could leverage in its briefs. Indeed, many of the 
government’s invocations of legislative history before the Court aimed to show 
that (1) congressmen intended for a bill to mean what the agency had told 
them it meant, or (2) congressmen, having been apprised of how an agency 
was interpreting a particular statute, acquiesced in the agency’s view. And these 
were only the explicit briefs; many other governmental invocations of 
legislative history rested on congressional utterances that had been ghost-
written (or at least influenced) by agencies and thus reflected the bureaucratic 
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agenda. Thus, legislative history frequently served to deliver the bureaucracy’s 
views to the judiciary clothed in the mantle of congressional authority, right at 
the moment when the Court had recognized such authority as virtually 
unlimited in the economic sphere. The Court’s acceptance of legislative history 
as a normal interpretive source was a key element of its larger acceptance of an 
agency-centered vision of governance. 
Though fitting, the “statist” label requires two qualifications. First, the 
Supreme Court did acquire some capacity to research and evaluate legislative 
history unilaterally, even though such material was outside the traditional 
judicial “comfort zone.” By acquiring this capacity, the Roosevelt Justices—
even as they acquiesced in an agency-centered regime—preserved a measure of 
the independence that has characterized the attitude of the federal judiciary 
toward the federal bureaucracy over the long run of U.S. history. Second, a 
small, emergent group of lawyer-lobbyists became highly proficient at 
influencing legislative history in the Capitol and briefing it at the Court. 
Through these lawyer-lobbyists, a select few corporate litigants could take 
advantage of legislative history to a degree that rivaled that of the agencies. The 
emergent corps of lawyer-lobbyists was not so much an alternative to the 
administrative state as an outgrowth and adjunct of that state: as the great 
“Washington law firms” became fully established in the postwar era, they 
staffed themselves with veterans of the bureaucracy and acquired libraries of 
legislative history that imitated those of the agencies. 
Part IV closes by considering the statist nature of legislative history 
through the eyes of Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson—progressive Justices 
who initially used legislative history with enthusiasm but then, by the late 
1940s, worried that they might have created a monster. To Frankfurter, it 
seemed that lobbying and litigation—particularly when done by federal 
bureaucrats and their lawyers—were collapsing into each other in a way that 
advantaged governmental litigants and others with privileged access to the 
legislative process. To Jackson, judicial reliance on legislative history made 
litigation more of an “insider’s game,” privileging the bureaucratic state and 
the few law firms able to approach that level of administrative capacity. He 
warned that legislative history put “knowledge of the law practically out of 
reach of all except the Government and a few law offices.”38 
 
*  *  * 
 
38.  Robert H. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 
A.B.A. J. 535, 538 (1948). 
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More than twenty years ago, Peter Strauss wrote an illuminating essay 
suggesting that agencies are peculiarly competent to use legislative history 
when interpreting statutes.39 His argument has not been tested or developed 
by other scholars as much as it deserves to be,40 particularly the possibility that 
the use of legislative history in litigation—a deeply controversial practice—is 
something the government does more, and more effectively, than anybody 
else.41 This Article is the first study to confirm that possibility empirically and 
to flesh it out through primary research. I see this as part of the scholarly effort, 
recently begun by others, to map the largely unknown territory of 
administrative interpretation of statutes.42 I also see it as a response to the 
fervent call by Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule for scholars of statutory 
interpretation to pay more attention to the varying institutional capacities of 
interpreters, particularly at the empirical level.43 In particular, I think the 
Article deepens our understanding of how the interpretive methods of agencies 
and of courts mutually constitute each other. The legal academy is accustomed 
 
39.  Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency 
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990), 
especially id. at 329, 334, 346-47. 
40.  The work that has gone farthest in building upon Strauss is VERMEULE, supra note 24, 
especially at 105, 115, 209, 213, though Vermeule’s discussion is more theoretical than 
empirical on the subject of agencies. For other suggestions of peculiar agency competence in 
using legislative history, see Katzmann, supra note 3, at 656-61; and Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889 (2007). 
41.  The possibility is raised, briefly, in Strauss, supra note 39, at 348-49; and William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2068-69 (2006) (reviewing 
VERMEULE, supra note 24). 
42.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501 (2005); Symposium on Administrative 
Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. 
43.  Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 
(2003). Richard Posner says Sunstein and Vermeule are too harsh in their view that scholars 
have done little institutional analysis of interpretation, though he agrees that empirical work 
in this vein is relatively lacking. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of 
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 953 (2003); see also 
Eskridge, supra note 41, at 2044-46 (noting earlier institutional analyses). For a valuable 
recent institutional analysis of interpretation, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and 
Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012). 
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to think that judges shape agencies’ methods,44 but this Article suggests that, at 
a crucial turning point in our history, it was more the other way round. 
i .   the timing of normalization 
A. Quantitative Evidence  
Here I set forth quantitative evidence that legislative history became a 
normal and routine interpretive source in federal statutory interpretation just 
around 1940. In tracing the process of normalization, I focus on the Supreme 
Court. Obviously the Supreme Court is only one part of a much larger federal 
judiciary, but my research and that of others has given me reason to think that 
the Court played a very dominant role in the federal judiciary’s shift toward 
legislative history—more dominant than in most other aspects of federal 
judicial practice.45 
To discern the general shape of the Supreme Court’s transition toward 
routine reliance on legislative history, I begin by measuring the Court’s use of 
legislative history in every fifth year from 1900 through 1950. I use two 
metrics. I calculate both metrics by focusing, for a given calendar year, on all 
federal statutory cases decided by the Court in that year. I define a federal statutory 
case as one that was decided with a full, signed opinion and involved the 
interpretation of a federal statute. I count any case involving a federal 
constitutional challenge to a federal statute as falling within this category. 
Figure 1 gives the number of federal statutory cases in every fifth year from 
1900 to 1950. The number fluctuates but almost always falls between 70 and 
125.46 
 
44.  One scholar suggests that agencies should—and practically must—follow the methods laid 
down by courts. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They 
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 204 (2007). In 
response, another argues that agencies can depart from the judiciary’s approach, but only 
because they can frequently escape judicial review altogether, not because the agencies may 
alter the courts’ approach. Mashaw, supra note 40, at 896. The prospect of judges imposing 
textualism on agencies is a central concern in Strauss, supra note 39. 
45.  For evidence that the lower federal courts did little to initiate the shift toward legislative 
history, see infra Section III.G. 
46.  There are two exceptions where the number falls outside this range. First, in 1915, the 
number rose to 150, which can be explained partly by the 1910 amendment to the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act, allowing appeals as of right to the Court—a provision that 
increased the Court’s caseload until Congress in 1916 amended it to lighten the Justices’ 
 
 








Working within this universe of federal statutory cases, let us consider the 
two metrics of legislative history use. The first is the ratio, for a given year, 
between (1) the total number of legislative history citations in all opinions 
(majority and separate) in federal statutory cases and (2) the number of federal 
statutory cases. Figure 2 graphs this ratio for every fifth year from 1900 to 
1950. It indicates a huge and lasting increase between 1935 and 1940. The 
lowest ratio after the break (in 1940) is 4.6 times the highest ratio before the 
break (in 1935). In general, the ratios before the break have their ups and 
downs, moving between zero (in 1905 and 1910) and 0.7 (in 1935); one might 
discern a vague, but hardly consistent, upward trend, at least before 1920. But 
that is minor compared to what happens between 1935 and 1940. There also 
appears to be a continuing upward trend after 1940, from 3.3 to 4.6, but the 




burden. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 166, 359 n.128 (1992). Second, in 1950, 
the number fell to 55, which accords with a general decrease in the Court’s total signed 
opinions at that time. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, 
DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 75 tbl.2-8 (3d ed. 2003). 
 









The second metric of legislative history usage is the percentage of federal 
statutory cases, for a given year, in which at least one opinion (majority or 
separate) contained at least one citation to legislative history. Figure 3 plots this 
percentage for the same years as in the preceding figure. Again, the most 
dramatic change is between 1935 and 1940, from 20% of the cases to 44%. This 
graph indicates a more pronounced (if not entirely consistent) upward trend 

























To get a closer look at the Court’s big transition, I now present the same 
two metrics, but this time for every year from 1930 through 1945. Figure 4 
presents the number of federal statutory cases per year during that period. The 
number is fairly constant, always between 76 and 116. 
 
Figure 4. 
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The first metric—legislative history citations per statutory case—exhibits a 
radical and permanent increase between the years 1939 and 1940. As plotted in 
Figure 5, this metric averages 0.9 for the years 1930-39, ending with a value of 
1.2 in 1939. It then shoots up to 3.3 in 1940, and it averages 3.5 for the years 
1940-45. In other words, the number of citations per case in 1940-45 was nearly 
quadruple the number in 1930-39. There is some fluctuation within both 
periods, but the highest value in 1930-39 (that of 1.7, in 1933) is still lower than 
the lowest value in 1940-45 (that of 2.2, in 1942). 
 
Figure 5. 




The second metric—the percentage of statutory cases containing at least 
some legislative history in at least one opinion—also exhibits a big increase 
leading up to 1940, though for this metric, the ramp-up begins slightly earlier. 
As plotted in Figure 6, the metric averages 22% for the years 1930-39, but it 
ends with a big uptick to 35% in 1939 (which is 11 percentage points higher 
than the next-highest year in 1930-39, that being 1934, at 24%). The percentage 
then shoots up to 44% in 1940, and it averages 45% for the years 1940-45. 
Thus, the average percentage for 1940-45 is more than double that for 1930-39. 
The lowest annual percentage in 1940-45 (that of 38%, in 1942) is still higher 
than the highest in 1930-39 (that of 35%, in 1939) and much higher than the 














Together, the metrics indicate a sudden break around 1940, perhaps 
beginning in 1939. The Court rapidly began to cite legislative history in more 
of its statutory cases and, in the cases where it did so, to cite it more 
copiously.47 
The rise of legislative history occurred broadly across several areas of 
federal statutory law rather than being concentrated in any single area, or even 
any couple of areas. On this point, consider the 139 opinions (majority or 
separate) during 1940-45 that each contained five or more legislative history 
citations. These opinions, together, accounted for 79% of the legislative history 
citations during the period. Of these, the most numerous opinions were those 
involving labor (most commonly the Fair Labor Standards Act, plus the 
Wagner Act, Railway Labor Act, and others), but these accounted for only 17% 
 
47.  The categories of legislative history documents cited by the Justices during the “take-off” 
period of 1940-45 were diverse, and their relative prevalence was about what one would 
expect. House and Senate committee reports were most prevalent, accounting for 35% of the 
citations. Next came the Congressional Record (28%), then House and Senate committee 
hearings (16%), then House and Senate bills (9%), then House and Senate documents 
(7%), then conference reports (1%). This leaves a miscellaneous category of 4%, consisting 
mainly of the old Congressional Globe and joint House/Senate hearings. The order of 
prevalence roughly matches that in Carro & Brann, supra note 29, at 291 tbl.2. 
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of the opinions. The next-most prevalent area was tax, at 11%. Next, arguably, 
was national security (at 10%), but only if one cobbles together several 
different subjects that are really quite diverse, including military 
appropriations, bonuses and relief for soldiers, trading with the enemy, foreign 
agents, espionage, and internment. After that, the next-most prevalent areas 
were antitrust (7%), Indian law (6%), electricity and natural gas regulation 
(5%), bankruptcy (4%), communications regulation (4%), and transportation 
regulation (4%). Even these nine categories do not cover the remaining 32% of 
the opinions, which ranged broadly across public lands, food and drugs, 
agriculture, immigration and naturalization, and violent crime (kidnapping, 
bank robbery, etc.). One might say legislative history was associated with the 
“economic-regulatory” area, but that area encompassed most of the federal 
government’s responsibilities in the 1940s.48 
The Court’s use of legislative history generally pertained to questions of 
“pure” statutory interpretation, unconnected to constitutional issues. To be 
sure, my definition of “statutory case” included all cases involving a 
constitutional challenge to a federal statute, but when I read all seventy of the 
Court’s cases containing at least one opinion with 10 or more citations to 
legislative history in 1940-45, I found only one case in which the legislative 
history pertained mainly to a constitutional issue.49 
One may wonder if the increase in citations to legislative history truly 
reflected an increase in the relative importance of such material. Perhaps the 
Court simply began including more citations to all kinds of legal sources at this 
point in time? If that were true, the surge in legislative history would merely 
reflect a general surge in citations, not anything about legislative history itself. 
I find this doubtful, largely because of the findings in a prior study by 
Nicholas Zeppos. Zeppos randomly selected twenty annual Terms of the Court 
from the period 1890 to 1990, which happened to include the 1944 Term, plus 
six Terms prior to 1944, the latest of those being 1932. He identified the federal 
statutory cases in all these Terms and, from that universe of cases, drew a 
random sample of 413 (about twenty per Term, on average). Zeppos’s team 
then counted, in each case, every source of authority cited in support of the 
decision (statutory texts, constitutional texts, cases, canons of construction, 
legislative history, treatises, etc.). He found that citations to legislative 
 
48.  This diversity still prevails if we focus on the opinions that were heaviest on legislative 
history. Of the 21 opinions in 1940-45 with 20 cites or more, 24% concerned labor, 14% 
antitrust, 10% tax, and no other category had more than 5%. 
49.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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history—as a percentage of the total citations to all kinds of sources—exceeded 
10% in 1944 but were below 2% in 1932 and in all previous Terms covered.50 
This suggests that the big increase in legislative history that I find in 1940 was 
an increase relative to other sources. 
Nor can the proliferation of legislative history be explained as a function of 
the proliferation of separate opinions during this period. To be sure, the 1940s 
did witness a large increase in the tendency of the Justices to write separately.51 
And the proportion of legislative history citations appearing in majority 
opinions did fall. But the fall was not very big: from 86% in 1930-39 to 81% in 
1940-45. Even if we focus solely on majority opinions and ignore all separate 
opinions, the number of legislative history citations per case is still 3.6 times 
greater in 1940-45 than in 1930-39, and the percentage of cases citing at least 
some legislative history is still more than double. The increase in separate 
opinions may have contributed to an “arms race,” in which the Justices piled 
up ever more citations to refute one another,52 but again, the Zeppos study 
indicates that legislative history grew in importance even relative to a more 
general increase in all kinds of citations. It should also be noted that the 
dramatic decline in unanimity began only in the winter of 1941-42,53 after the 
surge in legislative history was already quite evident. 
B. Qualitative Evidence  
Qualitative evidence confirms what the numbers suggest: legislative history 
went from obscure to routine around 1940. Observers who lived through the 
 
50.  Zeppos, supra note 29, at 1105 fig.7. On Zeppos’s methods, see id. at 1088-89. For “non-text 
originalist” sources as a proportion of total citations during the various Terms, see id. at 1105 
fig.7. Zeppos’s definition of “non-text originalist” sources is nearly synonymous with 
“legislative history,” and he often casually uses the latter term to describe the category. See 
id. at 1099, 1104-06. 
51.  The proportion of cases with a dissenting opinion was about two to three times higher in 
the 1940s than it had been throughout the twentieth century until then. For the latest of 
several analyses of this phenomenon, see Marcus E. Hendershot et al., Dissensual Decision 
Making: Revisiting the Demise of Consensual Norms Within the U.S. Supreme Court, 66 POL. 
RES. Q. 467 (2013). 
52.  Cf. Law & Zaring, supra note 1, at 1736-39 (finding that Justices cited legislative history in 
their opinions 52.3% of the time when at least one other opinion cited legislative history, 
compared to only 35.9% of the time when no other opinion cited legislative history). 
53.  See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1310 fig.10 (2001). 
The x-axis of Post’s figure is Terms of the Court (beginning in October), not calendar years. 
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period noted the change. Berkeley professor Max Radin, commenting on the 
Supreme Court in 1945, referred to “the now orthodox procedure of examining 
the legislative history.”54 Harvard professor Archibald Cox wrote in 1947: 
Whereas formerly the [federal] courts, shut off from reliable indicia of 
the legislative intent, sometimes substituted their own conceptions of 
sound policy, they are now so overwhelmed by arguments from 
legislative history that the problem has become one of managing the 
mass of materials available and winnowing out the unreliable.55 
Justice Robert H. Jackson announced in 1948 that the “custom of remaking 
statutes to fit their histories has gone so far that a formal Act . . . is no longer a 
safe basis on which a lawyer may advise his client or a lower Court decide a 
case.”56 A 1952 Columbia Law Review note observed that since 1940, “the use of 
legislative history in the interpretation of statutes has become standard practice 
in the federal courts.”57 In their classic The Legal Process (1958), Harvard 
professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks noted that—over “the last fifteen 
years” and particularly since a key 1940 decision which I shall discuss below—
there had been a “sudden efflorescence of citations of legislative materials in 
[Supreme Court] briefs and opinions,” providing the Justices with a “mass of 
available material” so large that they could not fully process it all.58 
This chronology is further confirmed in the writings of Elizabeth Finley, 
the era’s best-known expert on legislative history research. From 1921 to 1942, 
she was the librarian of Root, Clark, Buckner, and Ballantine, a top Wall Street 
firm.59 In 1943, she became the librarian of Covington, Burling, Rublee, 
Acheson, and Shorb, which was then the largest firm in Washington, D.C.60 
 
54.  Max Radin, A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation: Western Union Co. v. Lenroot, 33 CALIF. 
L. REV. 219, 222 (1945). 
55.  Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 
380 (1947). 
56.  Jackson, supra note 38, at 535. 
57.  Note, A Re-Evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 
125, 128 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
58.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1237. 
59.  Jack Ellenberger, Memorial, Elizabeth Finley, 73 LAW LIBR. J. 737, 737-38 (1980). Henry 
Friendly and John Marshall Harlan started their careers at the firm while Finley was in 
house. See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 34 (2012). 
60.  Elizabeth Finley with David S. Mao, Recollections of a Mid-Twentieth-Century Law Firm 
Librarian, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 565, 566, 569 (2005). 
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She and another woman, hired that same year at another D.C. firm, may have 
been the first private-firm librarians in the nation’s capital.61 In the course of 
twenty years at Covington, Finley would become the first private-firm librarian 
ever to be president of the Association of American Law Libraries (AALL).62 In 
particular, she became “[w]ithout question, . . . the leading national authority 
on the ways and means of collecting and compiling U.S. legislative history.”63 
Finley’s writings indicate that legislative history emerged from obscurity 
around the late 1930s or early 1940s. Giving a paper at the AALL conference in 
1946, she said: 
Something new has been added to our profession, and whether we like 
it or not, it appears to be here to stay. I speak as the practicing lawyer’s 
librarian. . . . [F]rom the practical angle, I assure you the most frequent 
request these days is “Can you give me the legislative history of this 
act.”64 
When How to Find the Law added a chapter on legislative history in its fourth 
edition of 1949, Finley wrote it and opened by saying: “Probably the most 
startling development in legal research within the past fifteen years, and 
certainly one with the least literature, has been the increasing importance of 
legislative histories.”65 In a 1959 essay, she noted that “many law libraries” had 
been compiling scrapbooks of legislative history for particular statutes for “the 
past twenty years,” adding that “only in rare cases will you discover a compiled 
history of any federal law more than twenty-five years old.”66 She also referred 
to a certain statute that had been “passed in 1920, long before legislative 
 
61.  See Stephen G. Margeton, Of Legislative Histories and Librarians, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 81, 83-85 
(1993). 
62.  Ellenberger, supra note 59, at 738. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Elizabeth Finley, Legislative Histories, 39 LAW LIBR. J. 161, 161 (1946). At other points in the 
paper, Finley arguably suggested that legislative history’s rise began with the New Deal 
itself. See id. at 161 (“Beginning with the revolutionary idea of ‘caveat venditor’ instead of 
‘caveat emptor’ in the Securities Act of 1933, lawyers and judges have more and more 
inquired into the background of a statute . . . .”); id. at 163 (observing that “the craze for 
legislative histories started with the New Deal”). 
65.  Elizabeth Finley, Legislative Histories, in HOW TO FIND THE LAW 338 (Carlton B. Putnam ed., 
4th ed. 1949). 
66.  Elizabeth Finley, Crystal Gazing: The Problem of Legislative History, 45 A.B.A. J. 1281, 1283 
(1959). 
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histories were being cited extensively.”67 Having been a big-firm librarian since 
1921, Finley knew what she was talking about. 
Consistent with this, legal research guides began paying serious attention 
to legislative history only in the 1940s. In 1926, the fifth and final edition of 
Roger W. Cooley’s standard work, Brief Making and the Use of Law Books, said 
nothing about how to research legislative history and devoted only two 
sentences specifically to such material (plus three other sentences of more 
general discussion about extrinsic evidence of historical context).68 To gauge 
the treatment of legislative history in subsequent works of this kind, I located 
all major legal research guides that went through two or more editions from 
1930 through 1950.69 Of the five guides in this category, four discussed 
legislative history for the first time (or went beyond negligible discussion for 
the first time) in their first post-1940 editions.70 
 
67.  Id. at 1282. 
68.  ROGER W. COOLEY, BRIEF MAKING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 405-06, 412 (5th ed. 1926). 
69.  I searched the Harvard library catalog for all the subject headings that apparently cover legal 
research guides, those being: “Legal Research – United States”; “Law – United States – 
Bibliography”; “Law – Bibliography”; and “Legal Briefs.” From all books having any of 
these headings, I identified those that were general legal research guides (as opposed to 
guides on foreign law, specialized areas, or laymen’s guides) and determined which had two 
or more editions in 1930-50. 
70.  How to Find the Law said virtually nothing in 1940 but added a fifteen-page chapter (by 
Finley) in 1949. Compare S.E. Thorne, Construction of Statutes, in HOW TO FIND THE LAW 298, 
306-09 (Henry J. Brandt ed., 3d ed. 1940) (repeating verbatim large sections of Cooley’s 
Brief Making and the Use of Law Books, including the few sentences on legislative history), 
with Finley, supra note 65, at 338-52 (providing a detailed overview of legislative history in 
the 1949 edition of the same treatise). George Weisiger, in his editions of 1937 and 1940, 
devoted less than half a page to legislative history, but his edition of 1951 devoted seven 
pages. Compare GEORGE B. WEISIGER, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 7-8 (2d ed. 
1937), and GEORGE B. WEISIGER, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 7-8 (3d ed. 1940), 
with GEORGE B. WEISIGER & BERNITA LONG DAVIES, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 9-
16 (4th ed. 1951). Arthur Beardsley in 1937 devoted only half a page (which concerned 
tracking bills for lobbying purposes, not for the interpretation of enacted statutes), but his 
edition of 1947 included three pages (which concerned tracing an enacted statute’s history ex 
post—an approach suited to statutory interpretation). Compare ARTHUR SYDNEY BEARDSLEY, 
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 34-35 (1st ed. 1937), and id. at 53 (referring 
to “legislative history” in the sense of enacted changes to a statute over time), with 
BEARDSLEY & ORMAN, supra note 17, at 62-65. Frederick Hicks in 1933 spent only half a page 
on legislative process and said nothing about how to research it, not even distinguishing 
Congress from the state legislatures; but in 1942, he spent three pages on the subject, 
referring to specific congressional documents. Compare FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS 
AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 44 (2d ed. 1933), with FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS 
AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 78-82 (3d ed. 1942) [hereinafter HICKS]. The only 
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In the same vein, the years 1943-46 saw three big institutional initiatives 
aimed at routinizing the use of legislative history, likely in reaction to the 
Supreme Court surge that began in 1940. One of these came in December 
1943—near the end of the fourth and (as yet) biggest year of the Court’s post-
1940 surge—when Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone wrote to Archibald MacLeish, 
the Librarian of Congress. Stone had learned that the Library of Congress had 
a “spare” copy of the U.S. Congressional Serial Set, which then ran to 10,000 
volumes. Stone wanted MacLeish to transfer the “spare” 10,000 volumes to the 
Supreme Court’s own library. “We often have occasion to use the 
Congressional Serials in looking up matters of legislative history,” explained 
Stone, “and it would be of great assistance” if the spare set “could be placed in 
our Library where it would be available at any time to the members of the 
Court.”71 MacLeish agreed,72 and these 10,000 volumes became, de facto, part 
of the Court’s permanent collection.73 
Another institutional initiative came from the nation’s leading law 
publisher, West. In 1941, the company inaugurated the U.S. Code Congressional 
Service, a regular series of pamphlets (consolidated at the end of each year into 
a hardbound volume) containing the latest congressional acts and federal 
agency regulations, plus small selections of legislative history, scattered 
throughout. But then, in 1943, the Service began paying much more attention 
to legislative history: 329 pages’ worth during that year (consisting of a few 
 
exception to this pattern was the guide issued by the Lawyers Cooperative, which said 
nothing in 1930 but added a nine-page chapter in 1936. Compare LAWYERS COOP. PUBL’G 
CO., LAW BOOKS AND THEIR USE (5th ed. 1930), with Clarence A. Miller, Legislative History of 
Statutes as an Aid to Their Interpretation, in LAWYERS COOP. PUBL’G CO., LAW BOOKS AND 
THEIR USE 20-28 (6th ed. 1936). Significantly, the author of the 1936 chapter was an expert 
on the Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington, D.C. See CLARENCE A. MILLER, 
THE LEGISLATIVE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT (1930). This resonates 
with the pre-1940 seedbed of legislative history research being in the federal administrative 
state, discussed infra Part III. 
71.  Letter from Harlan F. Stone to Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress (Dec. 10, 1943), 
Box 48, Folder titled “Library of Congress,” Harlan Fiske Stone Papers, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Stone Papers]. 
72.  Letter from Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, to Harlan F. Stone (Dec. 13, 1943), 
Box 48, Folder titled “Library of Congress,” Stone Papers, supra note 71. 
73.  Edward G. Hudon, The Library Facilities of the Supreme Court of the United States: A Historical 
Study (pt. 2), 34 U. DET. L.J. 317, 320 (1957). 
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selected documents on each major statute), with its own dedicated section of 
the annual volume.74 
The third institutional initiative that occurred in apparent response to the 
Court’s surge came from the Law Librarians’ Society of the District of 
Columbia. Because so few D.C. law firms had librarians in the mid-1940s, the 
Society consisted mostly of federal agency librarians.75 These librarians had, 
over the preceding years, compiled a large number of what I call “scrapbook” 
legislative histories—books compiled by hand that each pertained to a specific 
statute, often with an index. For lawyers specializing in the implementation of 
one or a few statutes, such scrapbooks were far more useful and economical 
than having to rely on whole runs of the Serial Set or Congressional Record. 
Compiling even one scrapbook took much time and research, making it a 
precious item when complete.76 The federal agency librarians realized they 
collectively held a plethora of such scrapbooks, and knew that such histories 
were “more and more frequently referred to by courts and lawyers.”77 They 
therefore formed a committee in 1946 to assemble and publish a “Union List of 
Legislative Histories.”78 From its nucleus in D.C.-based federal agencies, this 
list would gradually expand in subsequent editions (there have now been 
seven, the most recent in 2000).79 
Consistent with the idea that use of legislative history became normal in 
the 1940s, the practice began, in those years, to attract a new kind of criticism. 
For the first time, people began to speak of using legislative history as a 
 
74.  The 1941 volume had 47 pages; the 1942 volume, 68 pages; the 1943 volume, 329 pages; the 
1944 volume, 422 pages; the 1945 volume, 303 pages. Note that all documents published in 
the Service for an annual volume were documents originating in that year. Therefore, the 
advent and growth of the Service could not have been a cause of the Court’s surge in 1940-
45, since the Justices during those years interpreted little to no legislation passed in 1943 or 
later. Rather, West’s initiative was likely a response to the Court’s surge. (In 1952, West 
gave the Service a new name: U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 
(U.S.C.C.A.N.), which it bears to this day.) 
75.  See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
76.  A former Covington attorney, having left the firm and thereby deprived himself of the 
scrapbooks he had previously taken for granted, came back and ruefully told Finley that the 
volumes were “pure gold.” Elizabeth Finley, Law Office Libraries, 40 LAW LIBR. J. 179, 181 
(1947). 
77.  Special Comm. on Legislative Histories of the Law Librarians’ Soc’y of D.C., Union List of 
Legislative Histories, 39 LAW LIBR. J. 243, 243 (1946) [hereinafter Union List]. 
78.  See id. at 244-46 (listing the 23 participating libraries, of which 21 were federal agencies’). 
79.  LAW LIBRARIANS’ SOC’Y OF WASH. D.C., UNION LIST OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES (7th ed. 
2000). 
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dominant practice that was going too far. Frankfurter in 1947 mentioned “the 
quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to [the text of] 
the statute.”80 Jackson, having enthusiastically used such material in the early 
1940s, reversed himself in 1948: “I am coming to think it is a badly overdone 
practice . . . .”81 In 1948, Charles Curtis, the popular legal writer, recalled that 
the “courts used to be fastidious as to where they looked for the legislative 
intention,” but now they were “fumbling about in the ashcans of the legislative 
process for the shoddiest unenacted expressions of intention.”82 The first of 
several editions of Effective Appellate Advocacy concluded in 1950 that the surge 
of legislative history over the last decade had caused lawyers “infinite grief.”83 
i i .  explaining normalization: new justices with new ideas 
The rise of legislative history was caused in part by a rapid turnover in the 
personnel and therefore the ideology of the Court. I devote this part to 
explaining how the appointment of new progressive-minded Justices by 
President Roosevelt helped bring about normalization (before turning to the 
other major driving force—the administrative state—in Part III). 
To appreciate the ideological turnover and its connection to legislative 
history, consider Table 1. It includes every Justice who wrote more than three 
opinions in federal statutory cases in 1930-45. It lists, for each Justice, the 
number of legislative history citations per opinion in federal statutory cases 
during that period, the percentage of the Justice’s opinions that contained any 
legislative history, and a breakdown of the citation/opinion ratio as between 
majority and separate opinions. The Justices are listed in descending order of 
their citation/opinion ratio for all opinions (which roughly correlates with the 




80.  Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543 
(1947). 
81.  Jackson, supra note 38, at 537. 
82.  Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 4 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 321, 327-
28 (1949). 
83.  WIENER, supra note 28, at 117-18. 
84.  The only big exception to this rough correlation is Justice Louis Brandeis, who ranks fourth 
in citations per opinion but eleventh in percentage of opinions citing any legislative history. 
Justice Brandeis concentrated his use of legislative history in relatively few cases. 
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As Table 1 demonstrates, there is a strong correlation between the 
likelihood that a given Justice would cite legislative history and his association 
with progressive ideology and President Roosevelt. Of the nine Justices in the 
top half of the order, seven were appointed by Roosevelt (in 1937-43) and the 
other two, Brandeis and Stone, had reputations as leading progressives on the 
pre-Roosevelt Court.85 Of the nine Justices in the bottom half, eight had joined 
the Court before Roosevelt took office in 1933. Those eight include all of the 
“Four Horsemen” (the Justices who voted most frequently to undermine the 
New Deal) and the moderates Hughes and Roberts (who sometimes voted 
against the New Deal). The Four Horsemen and Hughes all left the Court in 
1937-41. 
Further evidence of the connection between progressive ideology and 
legislative history appears in United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns,86 
decided in May 1940, near the very start of the surge. In that case, Roosevelt’s 
appointees formed a five-to-four majority for an opinion expressing great 
openness to legislative material. In fact, some commentators have briefly 
suggested that American Trucking played something like a causal role in the rise 
of legislative history.87 A close examination of the opinion is thus warranted to 
determine its exact place in the process. 
First, some background: in Anglo-American statutory interpretation, there 
had long been a maxim known as the “plain meaning rule,” which said that a 
judge ought to follow statutory text that was unambiguous on its face. The rule 
 
85.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes—a leading progressive in many ways—was (and is) claimed 
by both sides in the debate on legislative history. On the one hand, he was skeptical about 
such material and about the notion of legislative intent more broadly. See Pine Hill Coal Co. 
v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899). On the other hand, he was also skeptical of 
the plain meaning rule. See Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
My data indicate that Holmes cited no legislative history in his last couple of years on the 
Court. As Frankfurter said, Holmes “had a lively awareness that a statute was expressive of 
purpose and policy, but in his reading of it he tended to hug the shores of the statute itself, 
without much re-enforcement from without.” Frankfurter, supra note 80, at 532; see also 
POPKIN, supra note 22, at 128-31. 
86.  310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
87.  See, e.g., Baade, supra note 18, at 1087-88; Note, supra note 57, at 128. At the level of doctrine 
and theory, Eskridge notes that the case resonated with a simultaneous academic movement 
in favor of “comprehensive examination of the legislative history.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, 
at 215. 
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had originated as a counter to the ancient idea of equitable interpretation,88 but 
after Holy Trinity in 1892, some U.S. federal judges repurposed it as an 
instrument to limit the use of legislative history: in the updated formulation, 
legislative history was inadmissible if the text was facially clear.89 From the 
1890s to the 1930s, the Court had sometimes applied the plain meaning rule 
and sometimes ignored it.90 
The plain meaning rule was at the center of controversy in American 
Trucking. In 1935, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), which 
brought the trucking companies under the regulation of the industry-friendly 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).91 The MCA empowered the ICC to 
set maximum hours for “employees” of the trucking companies. But the ICC 
construed this power to cover only safety-related employees (such as drivers), 
not all employees. This became a high-stakes matter in 1938, when Congress 
passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), empowering the Department of 
Labor (DOL), which was not industry-friendly, to set maximum hours for all 
industrial employees with an exception for those already covered by the MCA. 
The trucking companies, hoping to escape the FLSA, argued that the MCA 
meant to cover all their employees. DOL disagreed (as did the ICC, which 
wanted to stick to its core competence of regulating safety). 
The lower court held that the word “employees” unambiguously covered 
all the trucking companies’ employees and refused to consider legislative 
history indicating that the provision was aimed at preserving safety.92 But the 
Supreme Court sided with the government, five-to-four, with the five 
Roosevelt appointees in the majority and the four pre-Roosevelt Justices in the 
minority.93 Justice Reed, writing for the majority, selectively read the Court’s 
prior cases so as to effectively repudiate the plain meaning rule: 
When [the text’s] meaning has led to absurd or futile results, . . . this 
Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. 
 
88.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53-56 
(2001). 
89.  Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal 
Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 5 (1939). 
90.  Id. at 25 & n.71. 
91.  Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935). 
92.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.D.C. 1939) (three-judge court), 
rev’d, 310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
93.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The 
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at li, lxviii n.75. 
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Frequently, . . . even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd 
results but merely an unreasonable one “plainly at variance with the 
policy of the legislation as a whole” this Court has followed that 
purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the 
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can 
be no “rule of law” which forbids its use, however clear the words may 
appear on “superficial examination.”94 
The four dissenters wrote no opinion but simply endorsed “the reasons stated” 
by the lower court.95 
Reed’s pronouncement in American Trucking was significant, but I do not 
think it predetermined the surge in legislative history that occurred over the 
next few years. Neither before 1940, nor since, has the Supreme Court treated 
statements on statutory interpretation methodology as having much 
precedential value. In the years up to 1940, the Justices, progressive and 
conservative alike, had been quite inconsistent in their adherence to the plain 
meaning rule.96 They had also been inconsistent on other methodological 
points regarding legislative history, such as the admissibility of floor debates.97 
Likewise, in the first several years after 1940, the Court did not follow 
“consistently accepted principles of interpretation,”98 and this casualness about 
method encompassed legislative history.99 As Hart and Sacks wrote in the 
 
94.  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (citations omitted). For 
background, see Baade, supra note 18, at 1087. In the lower-profile case of United States v. 
Dickerson, decided the same day, Justice Murphy, writing for the same five-to-four majority, 
made a similar statement. 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940). 
95.  Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. at 553 (Hughes, C.J., McReynolds, Stone & Roberts, JJ., dissenting).  
96.  Jones, supra note 89; Warren H. Wagner, The Use and Abuse of Legislative History in the 
Construction of a Statute, 5 I.C.C. PRAC.’S J. 485 (1938). 
97.  Harry Willmer Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REV. 737, 752 (1940); 
Jacobus tenBroek, Comment, Admissibility of Congressional Debates in Statutory Construction 
by the United States Supreme Court, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 326 (1937). 
98.  Jackson, supra note 38, at 537; see also Helen Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. 
PA. L. REV. 499 (1950) (arguing that binding rules of interpretation could offer effective 
guidance). 
99.  In January 1943, Justice Murphy wrote an opinion of the Court that endorsed American 
Trucking’s statement that there was no bar to considering legislative history, and no Justice 
wrote separately. See Harrison v. N. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943). But one month 
later, Justice Roberts wrote a majority opinion for seven Justices—all of whom had joined 
Harrison and three of whom had joined American Trucking—suggesting that committee 
hearings were not admissible. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163, 
168 n.10 (1943). The inconsistency was delicately pointed out in Brief for the United States 
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1950s, American Trucking “was decided by a closely divided Court, and no one 
could then [in 1940] have been sure” that its statement about the universal 
admissibility of legislative history “really meant what it said.”100 
Still, even if American Trucking did not control the Court’s post-1940 
interpretive practice as a matter of precedent, it did reflect the tendency of 
progressive judges to be receptive to legislative history. That tendency makes 
sense in light of the progressive legal thought of the period. 
The bête noire of progressive legal thinkers—such as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Robert Hale, and Karl Llewellyn—was the classical 
notion that common-law doctrines in fields like property and contract were 
neutral and apolitical. Such doctrines, according to the progressive critique, 
were not determinate enough to decide particular cases. When judges claimed 
to make decisions on the basis of these doctrines, they in fact exercised 
discretion and made policy choices under a cloak of neutrality. Judges, 
counseled the progressives, ought to be explicit about the policy choices that 
inevitably underlay their decisions. Conscious, transparent articulation of the 
policies behind the common law was the best way to ensure the wise resolution 
of disputes. Although absolute determinacy was impossible, explicit policy 
reasoning would bring legal decisions nearer to that ideal than would the 
empty verbal formulas of doctrine.101 
Because they did not revere common-law rights of property and contract as 
neutral and apolitical, progressives were receptive to regulatory and social-
welfare legislation. But progressive scholars who studied legislation—such as 
James Landis and Frederick de Sloovère—found that judicial interpretation of 
statutes often exhibited pathologies similar to those of conventional common-
law reasoning. In particular, judges often made a pretense of reasoning in a 
neutral and objective manner from the statute’s literal words, without reference 
to its policies. This often had the effect of undermining the legislature’s policy 
choices and substituting the judge’s own, under the cloak of literalism. By the 
early to mid-1930s, Landis, de Sloovère, and other scholars were pushing 
 
[Petitioner] at 42 n.53, United States v. Laudani, 320 U.S. 543 (1944) (No. 71). Also, in 
American Trucking itself, it would appear that Stone, despite dissenting on the basis of the 
lower court’s reasoning, did not actually believe in the plain meaning rule. Strauss, supra 
note 39, at 341 n.48. 
100.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1237. 
101.  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 93, at lv-lviii; William W. Fisher III, The Development of 
Modern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE 
OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, at 266, 
270-73 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991). 
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legislative history as an interpretive tool to ensure that judges would 
consciously confront legislators’ intent, rather than hide behind the false 
determinacy and objectivity of the text (as they did when invoking the plain 
meaning rule).102 But here the progressives ran into a problem: the charge of 
indeterminacy that they leveled against common-law doctrinal reasoning and 
statutory text-reading could also apply to the process of discerning the 
legislature’s “intent.”103 
As William Eskridge shows, several progressive scholars of statutory 
interpretation in the late 1930s and 1940s converged on an answer to this 
question. They began by conceding that statutory interpretation, even if 
couched as the search for legislative intent, frequently required the judge to 
make discretionary choices.104 But they insisted that the judge could 
productively cooperate with the legislature by (1) seeking, in good faith, to 
identify the legislation’s overall objective and (2) making discretionary choices 
in a way that creatively furthered that objective. 
The practical implication of this new thinking, as Eskridge points out, was 
that judges should reason from legislative history at a relatively high level of 
generality. Legislative history was a source from which the judge could infer 
the overall objective—the general intent—of the legislation. Having gleaned the 
general intent from the legislative material, the judge would then reason 
“downward” to figure out how best to achieve that objective on the specific 
facts of the case. This approach contrasted with an older academic conception 
of legislative history as useful for discerning the legislature’s specific intent—
that is, the exact result the legislature would have wanted on the particular 
issue presented to the court, without reference to the statute’s larger objective 
or to the implementational creativity of the judge.105 
The focus on general intent reached its culmination in Hart and Sacks’s 
1958 classic The Legal Process.106 In their view, judges should use legislative 
history only insofar as it spoke to general intent, and general intent should be 
defined to include only rational, public-regarding goals. Since legislators’ duty 
was “to think in general terms,” the “probative force of materials from the 
internal legislative history of a statute varies in proportion to the generality of 
 
102.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 211-13; POPKIN, supra note 22, at 144-45. 
103.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 212-13. 
104.  Id. at 213. 
105.  Id. at 213-15; see also POPKIN, supra note 22, at 144-47. 
106.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35. 
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its bearing upon the purpose of the statute or provision in question.”107 If a 
congressman predicted in the legislative record that the bill would produce a 
certain result when applied to a certain situation, then a judge facing that 
situation should not automatically impose that result. Instead the prediction 
“should be given weight only to the extent that [it] fits rationally with other 
indicia of general purpose.”108 The judge was to attribute a public-regarding 
rationality to the legislature and take account of legislative history only insofar 
as it fit into that vision of rationality. Although “a court should try to put itself 
in imagination in the position of the legislature which enacted the measure,” it 
“should not do this in the mood of a cynical political observer, taking account 
of all the short-run currents of political expedience that swirl around any 
legislative session.”109 Rather the court “should assume, unless the contrary 
unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons 
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”110 As Richard Posner later 
observed, Hart and Sacks apparently believed “that the judge should ignore 
interest groups, popular ignorance and prejudices, and other things that deflect 
legislators from the single-minded pursuit of the public interest as the judge 
would conceive it.”111 Hart and Sacks exhibited “a reluctance to recognize that 
many statutes are the product of compromise between opposing groups.”112 
How much can the Court’s surge in legislative history during the early 
1940s be understood as a manifestation of the interpretive theory that was just 
then emerging in progressive academic circles (and later reached its 
culmination in The Legal Process)? Arguably, the general-intent theory required 
an especially comprehensive analysis of legislative history, which would 
perhaps increase the rate of citation.113 
 
107.  Id. at 1254 (quoting Hart’s proposed restatement language to the Association of American 
Law Schools). 
108.  Id.; see also id. at 1379 (“The [internal legislative] history should be examined for the light it 
throws on general purpose.”). 
109.  Id. at 1378. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Posner, supra note 24, at 819. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Harry Willmer Jones, who wrote more extensively on legislative history than any legal 
scholar before 1945, argued that a focus on general intent (which he advocated) required 
“the full utilization of extrinsic aids.” He believed that legislative discourse was largely 
concerned with discussing and debating the general objective of a statute, not its specific 
applications, so that a focus on general intent would end up implicating the bulk of the 
debate. Jones, supra note 97, at 761. 
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There is surely an important connection between the theoretical 
developments and the surge, though not so strong as to provide a complete 
explanation for the latter. With the exception of a very short article by Landis 
in 1930,114 the earliest (and, until after World War II, the clearest) articulation 
of general-intent theory came from Harry Willmer Jones, in a series of three 
articles published in 1939-40.115 At the time, Jones was a young lecturer at 
Columbia and would start a professorship at Berkeley in 1940.116 Only the first 
of his three articles was published before May 1940; it was cited in Reed’s 
American Trucking opinion, while his other two articles were not.117 The first of 
Jones’s articles (the one cited by Reed) documented the Court’s frequent 
failure to adhere to the plain meaning rule and argued that textual meaning 
could never be plain without context, but it said almost nothing about using 
legislative history to discern general intent—a theme that Jones would 
elaborate only in the second and third articles. Consistent with this, American 
Trucking itself was hardly a learned treatise on general intent. It discussed 
interpretive methodology only briefly, quoting a 1922 opinion about the need 
to honor “the policy of the legislation as a whole” but saying nothing more 
about general intent.118 
Hart and Sacks in The Legal Process briefly noted the surge in legislative 
history that followed American Trucking, but—significantly—they believed the 
surge had occurred without much of a theory behind it. Amid the “sudden 
efflorescence of citations of legislative materials in briefs and opinions” in the 
years after American Trucking, neither the Justices nor the lawyers “had a 
sufficiently articulated and disciplined theory of interpretation to know how to 
appraise the mass of available material properly and prevent abuses.”119 
To be sure, there were many opinions in 1940-45 that used legislative 
history to discern intent at a high level of generality, then reasoned downward 
to the meaning of specific provisions.120 These opinions indicate that the 
 
114.  James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930). 
115.  Jones, supra note 97, at 761; Jones, supra note 89, at 3-4; Jones, supra note 35, at 972-74. 
116.  On the Columbia lectureship, see the opening footnotes in his three articles, cited supra note 
115. On the Berkeley affiliation, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 93, at lxix n.79, lxxvi 
n.116, lxxviii. 
117.  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 n.17 (1940). 
118.  Id. at 543 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922)). 
119.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1237. 
120.  I say this having read all seventy of the Court’s cases in 1940-45 that included an opinion 
with ten or more cites to legislative history. For many of these opinions, it is difficult to say 
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emergent theory of general intent played some practical role in the surge. For 
example, in a 1943 case on whether a federal statute exempted Indian lands 
from state taxation, the state invoked the remarks of the bill’s sponsor, but 
Justice Murphy, writing for the Court, declared that, even if those remarks did 
support the state’s interpretation, “we do not accept them as definitive,” for 
they were “opposed to” other indicia of the act’s meaning, including “the 
reasons for its enactment,” as evidenced by the committee reports describing 
“the problem at which the . . . Act was aimed.”121 Similarly, in a 1945 case on 
whether the FLSA allowed backpay claimants to settle their suits, Reed wrote 
for the Court that 
[n]either the statutory language, the legislative reports nor the debates 
indicates that the question at issue was specifically considered and 
resolved by Congress. In the absence of evidence of specific 
Congressional intent, it becomes necessary to resort to a broader 
consideration of the legislative policy behind this provision as 
evidenced by its legislative history and the provisions in and structure 
of the Act.122 
Several other opinions followed this pattern.123 
 
clearly whether the author reasons from legislative history at a high or low level of 
generality. But some opinions are quite clear about it. 
121.  Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 710-11 & n.8 (1943) (Murphy, J.). 
122.  Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1945) (Reed, J.). 
123.  See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 107 (1943) (Douglas, J.) (finding that the Bank 
Robbery Act aimed to supplement local enforcement, so its reference to felonies did not 
include state-law crimes); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942) 
(Reed, J.) (finding that the FLSA had a general purpose not only to raise wages but also 
spread work, so its provisions mandating increased pay for overtime should apply even to 
employees who did not work by the hour and were therefore exempt from hourly-wage 
regulations); United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1941) (Reed, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the National Housing Act aimed to stimulate construction rather than produce 
revenue, so the federal government—in attempting to collect on loans under the Act—
should not have the preference in bankruptcy proceedings that it otherwise enjoyed). Other 
cases also fall in this category, though not as explicitly. See U.S. Alkali Exp. Ass’n v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 196, 210-11 (1945) (Stone, C.J.) (reasoning that the Webb-Pomerene Act of 
1918 aimed “to insure continued and vigorous application of the antitrust laws to domestic 
restraints of trade,” so it did not require that antitrust prosecutions against export 
associations be brought only by the Federal Trade Commission; therefore holding that such 
prosecutions could also be brought by the Justice Department); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 
300-04 (1944) (Douglas, J.) (holding that the statute on military zones aimed to prevent 
espionage and sabotage, so it did not empower the government to hold Japanese Americans 
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But at the same time—in keeping with Hart and Sacks’s view that the surge 
in legislative history did not conform to a particular theory—there were also 
many opinions that used such material to discern legislative intent at a high 
level of specificity, without self-consciously elaborating a public-regarding 
policy. The persistence of this approach is consistent with the intellectual 
history told by Eskridge, who traces the interest in general intent at the 
academic-intellectual level and notes its resonance with American Trucking but 
adds that the older interest in specific intent survived and coexisted with the 
new thinking.124 For instance, in 1941, when deciding whether the Chandler 
Act of 1938 repealed an emergency 1933 statute establishing a broad definition 
of “farmer” for the purpose of certain bankruptcy protections, Murphy wrote 
an opinion for the Court citing copious legislative history indicating 
congressmen’s intention to leave the 1933 provision alone, with virtually no 
policy discussion.125 As another example, Reed in 1943 wrote an opinion for the 
Court holding that the statutory provisions on extra compensation for customs 
inspectors covered work at night but not Sundays and holidays. He cited a 
mountain of legislative history about the understandings of various 
congressmen and stakeholders but without weaving them into any broader 
 
for the purpose of ensuring their orderly integration into new communities); McLean 
Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 83-90 (1944) (Rutledge, J.) (holding that the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 generally imposed a corporatist rather than pro-competitive 
policy, so the ICC need not strictly adhere to antitrust principles in evaluating mergers); 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 319 U.S. 61, 84-87 (1943) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Federal Power Act intended to remedy the gap between 
state and federal regulatory schemes and cover matters the states could not constitutionally 
regulate, so the Act did not cover the type of utility at issue); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 
310 U.S. 469, 487-88 & n.7, 493 n.15 (1940) (Stone, J.) (holding that the Sherman Act’s 
purpose was not to prevent all obstructions of commerce, but only anti-competitive ones, so 
it did not apply to sit-down strikes). For another example, see the dueling opinions of 
Justices Reed and Black—agreeing that the purpose of the statutory ban on cost-plus-
percentage-of-cost contracts is to prevent run-up of costs but disagreeing on whether the 
type of contract at issue creates that tendency—in Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 
(1945). 
124.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 213-15 (on general intent and American Trucking); id. at 216-17 
(on the survival of specific intent among jurists like Hand and Frankfurter); id. at 219-20 
(noting the simultaneous focus on general and specific intent in 1960s and later). 
125.  Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 313 U.S. 270 (1941). The nearest thing to policy 
discussion was Murphy’s mention that, since the 1933 statute was “[d]esigned for a 
particular purpose, the relief of hard-pressed farmers,” it was natural that such an 
enactment should have an ad hoc definition of “farmer.” Id. at 273. But this did not bear on 
the ultimate question of what the enactors of the Chandler Act intended to do with the 1933 
provision. 
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purposive thinking.126 Several more opinions took this approach in using 
legislative history.127 
At times, a single opinion relied upon legislative history both to discern 
general intent and to confirm the correctness of the specific application. Thus, 
Frankfurter in 1941 wrote that the Wagner Act’s purpose (evident from its 
legislative history) was to encourage worker self-organization for industrial 
peace, and he concluded that this purpose required the Court to read the Act’s 
anti-discrimination provision to cover not only firing but also hiring. But he 
also added that a committee report contemplated this exact application.128 In 
1943, Black wrote an opinion giving a very broad reading to Congress’s 1939 
abolition of assumption of risk under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 
basing his conclusion both on the enactment’s general policy and on the fact 
that congressmen during the hearings had criticized a particular case (whose 
holding, the opinion therefore reasoned, the statute must be read to 
override).129 In 1944, the Carolene Products Company argued that its milk 
compounds did not come within a statutory ban on products “in imitation or 
semblance of milk,” since the act (said the Company) required the imitation to 
be deliberate. The Court, per Reed, rejected this argument because the 
 
126.  United States v. Myers, 320 U.S. 561, 571-73 (1943). 
127.  Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107-10 
(1944) (Murphy, J.) (using legislative history to confirm that a statute easing recovery of 
debts owed by government contractors to materialmen and laborers had an exception to its 
general remedial policy for debts owed to subcontractors; noting a few policy considerations 
but not grounding them in legislative history); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 
U.S. 598, 605-06 (1943) (Black, J.) (on whether a federal act regarding oil on Indian lands 
exempted such lands from state taxation); Cudahy Packing Co. of La. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 
357, 360, 362 n.3 (1942) (Stone, J.) (parsing successive versions of a bill in minute detail to 
determine that, when the FLSA said the “principal office of the Administrator shall be in the 
District of Columbia, but he or his duly authorized representative may exercise any or all of 
his powers in any place,” it meant only that the representative could exercise his otherwise-
existing powers in any place, not that the Administrator was authorized to delegate any of 
his powers to a representative); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1941) (Roberts, J.) 
(holding that the Interior Department’s establishment of fee charges during the phase-in 
period of the Taylor Grazing Act was lawful because Congress had been aware of the 
charges when it appropriated funds for the Act’s implementation); United States v. 
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 557-62 (1940) (Murphy, J.) (on whether a clause in a 1938 
appropriation statute meant to suspend an Army enlistment bonus or merely withhold 
funding for it while preserving the right). 
128.  Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182-83, 186 n.5 (1941). Rhetorically, Frankfurter 
privileged the general-intent aspect of his analysis, but still cited specific intent. 
129.  Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 64-68 (1943). 
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committee reports named specific products that were meant to be covered, 
which included “compounds of this innocent character.” Having said this, 
Reed could not resist adding that Carolene Products’ own “compounds were 
themselves so named.”130 
The absence of a simple causal relationship between general-intent 
thinking and the surge in legislative history is especially evident in two further 
cases: Viereck v. United States (1943) and Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling (1945). In 
Viereck, the Court had to decide whether a statute requiring a foreign agent to 
disclose propaganda activities encompassed situations in which the agent 
spread propaganda on his own behalf, rather than on behalf of his foreign 
principals. On the basis of legislative history, Black argued that because the 
“general intent of the Act was to prevent secrecy as to any kind of political 
propaganda activity by foreign agents,” the act should be read broadly.131 But 
Black commanded only one additional vote for his position.132 Opposing him 
and writing for the majority was Stone, who acknowledged Black’s argument 
(and the government’s) that the act, if not read broadly, would be a “halfway 
measure.” But Stone marshaled post-enactment legislative history to show that 
“Congress itself . . . recognized that the legislation was in this sense a halfway 
measure.”133 Further, Stone (who showed himself capable of reasoning about 
general intent elsewhere134) expressed anxiety about this method: 
While Congress undoubtedly had a general purpose to regulate agents 
of foreign principals . . . we cannot add to [the Act’s] provisions other 
requirements merely because we think they might more successfully 
have effectuated that purpose. And we find nothing in the legislative 
 
130.  Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 25-28 (1944). The previous year, the 
Court, per Justice Reed, extensively cited legislative history to show that the ICC deserved 
deference from the judiciary in planning railroad reorganizations, but it also cited specific 
remarks in a committee hearing to show that the ICC’s decision in that particular 
reorganization to exclude certain shareholders from participation was specifically 
contemplated by Congress. Ecker v. W. Pac. R.R. Corp., 318 U.S. 448, 468-75, 475-76 & n.25 
(1943). 
131.  Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 250 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). 
132.  Id. at 249. 
133.  Id. at 245-46 (majority opinion). 
134.  E.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 487-88 & n.7, 493 n.15 (1940). 
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history of the Act to indicate that anyone concerned in its adoption had 
any thought of [the application urged by the government].135 
Here, Stone gathered his own history to counter Black’s history-based 
invocation of general intent. 
In Gemsco, the Court faced the question of whether the FLSA authorized 
the DOL to ban home-work across the entire embroideries industry if the 
agency concluded that doing so was necessary to enforce the minimum wage in 
that industry. Employers cited copious legislative history implying a political 
deal not to ban home-work outright, but Rutledge, writing for the Court, cast 
the history as ambiguous and insisted that, in any event, the industry’s reading 
would “deprive the [DOL] of the only means available to make [the statute’s] 
mandate effective” and “would make the statute a dead letter for this 
industry.”136 The “necessity to avoid self-nullification” was enough to refute 
the industry’s reading.137 In this case, legislative history was the enemy of 
general intent. 
The Justices, when using legislative history, did not confine themselves to 
an idealized, rational vision of the legislature. On the contrary, they could, at 
times, be brutally frank about the realities of Congress. This was most true of 
Black, the former U.S. Senator. In one opinion, he emphasized that a certain 
interpretation of a bill had been “accepted both by the unions and the 
railroads” at the hearings.138 In another opinion, he pointed out that a federal 
statute alleged to override Oklahoma state taxes had been “sponsored by 
Oklahoma Congressmen who said nothing which supports the imputation that 
they intended to deprive their State of this income.”139 In a third, concerning 
the ICC’s treatment of railroad and barge lines, he fulminated that the 
“railway-minded” ICC was taking the very anti-barge actions that senators 
“from the midwestern states where the barge lines . . . were operating” had 
feared it would take—and which the statute’s cheerleaders had assured them it 
 
135.  Viereck, 318 U.S. at 243-44. 
136.  Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 255 (1945); see also id. at 260 (discussing why 
Congress’s general intent should override specific evidence from the statute’s legislative 
history). 
137.  Id. at 255. 
138.  Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 64 (1943). 
139.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 605 (1943). 
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could not take.140 Similarly Reed, in a case about an excise tax on the processing 
of imported oils, based his reading on the special-interest nature of the statute: 
“the legislative history cannot be read without reaching a conviction that the 
advantages which would result to American vegetable oil producers from the 
heavy tax on oils not produced in the continental United States played a 
leading part in promoting the legislation.”141 For his part, Roberts argued that 
one of the provisions of the Federal Power Act, having been amended to meet 
the demands of state regulators, should not be construed to encroach on their 
turf.142 Frankfurter, in one instance, pointed out the unusually long “continuity 
of membership” on the House and Senate Commerce Committees, and he 
suggested the Court should assume that bills from those committees contained 
“skilled language” whose variation from other relevant statutes must be 
meaningful (apparently implying that other committees were less “skilled”).143 
All in all, the coincidence between Roosevelt’s appointments and the surge 
in legislative history—combined with the intellectual resonance between 
progressive legal thought and legislative history—indicates that the 
ideologically-charged turnover of the Justices was surely a cause of the 
normalization of this interpretive source. Yet the turnover is not a complete 
explanation. We know it is incomplete because of the tensions (just discussed) 
between the emergent progressive legal theory of legislative history and the 
Justices’ actual use of that material. 
And we know it is incomplete for another reason: even the pre-Roosevelt 
Justices (the dissenters in American Trucking) greatly increased their use of 
legislative history in the 1940s. On this point, consider the examples of two 
Justices who joined the Court well before 1940 and served till well after 1940: 
the progressive Harlan F. Stone and the moderate Owen Roberts. In the years 
 
140.  Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 698-99 & n.7 
(1943) (Black, J., dissenting). 
141.  Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 425 (1943). 
142.  Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 319 U.S. 61, 85-86 (1943) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting). 
143.  Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634, 648 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). In another case that year, Rutledge, writing on the FLSA, documented “the 
great variety and complexity of opinion” in the floor debates on a certain issue, which 
bolstered his conclusion that Congress had punted the question to the agency: the matter 
was “resolved there, not by decision either way, but reference to the Administrator.” 
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 635 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
Byrnes, construing the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 to except certain violent and 
threatening acts by workers, emphasized union lobbying. United States v. Local 807, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521, 528-31 (1942). 
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1930-39, Stone had a citation/opinion ratio of 1.5, but in 1940-45, it was double 
that (3.0). Similarly, Roberts in 1932-39 had a ratio of 0.5, but in 1940-45, it 
was more than double (1.4). A similar pattern obtains for the moderate 
Hughes: his ratio grew from 0.9 in 1930-39 to 1.7 in 1940-41 (though we 
should not assign too much weight to this, since Hughes’s track record in 
1940-41 was short). The two early Roosevelt appointees who acquired more-
than-negligible track records during the 1930s also exhibited a big increase in 
their citation rates in 1940 and later. Black in 1937-39 had a citation/opinion 
ratio of 0.8, which more than doubled to 1.9 in 1940-45. Reed in 1938-39 had a 
ratio of 0.9, which quintupled to 4.7 in 1940-45. The experiences of all these 
Justices suggest that we cannot explain the transformation simply by saying 
that (1) progressive Justices were more inclined to cite legislative history and 
(2) Roosevelt appointed more progressive Justices. Something more was 
happening. 
i i i .  explaining normalization: the new administrative 
state 
The progressive ideology of the Roosevelt appointees was a major but not 
sufficient cause of the interpretive revolution. Its insufficiency, as noted above, 
is evident from the tensions between progressive theory and judicial practice 
and from the pre-Roosevelt Justices’ change in behavior. 
But even if the shift toward legislative history had occurred exclusively in 
the opinions of the Roosevelt Justices, and even if those Justices’ use of 
legislative history had corresponded perfectly with cutting-edge progressive 
thought, that still would not be enough to explain the interpretive revolution, 
for this was not the kind of revolution that judges, however intellectually 
committed, could effectuate on their own. Congress was a remarkably complex 
body that produced a rich, sophisticated, confusing, and voluminous discourse. 
Serious, sustained, and sympathetic engagement with that discourse—
especially in the holistic manner urged by the progressive jurists in their focus 
on general intent—required an intimacy with Congress, a sophistication about 
its processes, and an institutional capacity to monitor its sheer output that had 
rarely, if ever, been seen in American litigation. 
The initiative for systematically briefing congressional discourse did not 
come—could never have come—from ordinary lawyers. It originated instead 
from the New Deal administrative state, vested with unprecedented capability 
to process and analyze congressional discourse and translate it into legal 
argument. The federal leviathan provided the indispensable institutional basis 
for what might seem, on the surface, to be simply a change in judges’ ideas. 
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A. The Court’s Reliance on the Federal Government for Legislative History 
To appreciate the importance of the federal government in the Court’s use 
of legislative history, we must first recognize that the federal government was 
an overwhelmingly familiar presence before the Court in federal statutory cases 
during the late 1930s and especially the early 1940s. As my research team and I 
found, in 1936-39, 68% of federal statutory cases were briefed by the federal 
government, usually as a party, but sometimes as an amicus curiae. In 1940-45, 
during the surge, the proportion was even higher, at 78%.144 
Further, the Court, especially during the surge, was far more inclined to 
cite legislative history in federal statutory cases that were briefed by the federal 
government than in those without a federal brief. In 1940-45, the number of 
legislative history citations per statutory case was 3.9 for those with federal 
briefs and only 2.2 for those without, and the proportion of statutory cases 
citing any legislative history was 50% for those with federal briefs and only 31% 
for those without. Notably, the divergence between cases with federal briefs 
and those without was less clear prior to 1940. In 1936-39, the number of 
legislative history citations per case was 0.9 for statutory cases with federal 
briefs and 1.0 for those without (though there was a larger divergence in the 
proportion of statutory cases citing any legislative history: 28% for those with 
federal briefs and 14% for those without). 
Thus, during the surge of legislative history in 1940-45, the Court was 
hearing from the federal government in a large and increasing majority of 
statutory cases, and the Justices’ citations were becoming more concentrated in 
those federally briefed cases. Of all the legislative history citations appearing in 
federal statutory cases in 1940-45, 86% were in cases with federal briefs. 
This evidence suggests that the Court was leaning on the federal 
government to provide it with legislative history research. To test that 
possibility, I took a sample of all federal statutory cases citing legislative history 
in 1940-45,145 and I had research assistants determine whether the Justices’ 
 
144.  Nearly all of these federal briefs were signed by the U.S. Solicitor General and thus bore the 
imprimatur of the Department of Justice, though a handful were signed solely by some 
other federal entity, such as the ICC or the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
145.  Here is how I took the sample: 
          I knew that the relatively small number of cases with large numbers of citations would 
substantially influence the results, and I was concerned that if these “heavy” cases differed 
from one another in the matches they produced, my results would depend too much on 
which of those “heavy” cases I happened to draw. Therefore, I decided that my sample 
should be stratified into “heavy” cases (those with more than 25 citations to legislative 
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citations in those cases “matched” the citations appearing in the briefs that 
were submitted.146  
The results are as follows. First consider the federally briefed cases (which, 
to reiterate, were 78% of all federal statutory cases and accounted for 86% of all 
legislative history citations). In these cases, I found, through my sample, 22% 
of the citations matched both the federal brief and at least one non-federal brief 
(such as the brief of a private party or state government); 33% of the citations 
matched the federal brief and no other brief; 10% of the citations matched at 
least one non-federal brief but not the federal brief; and 34% of the citations 
matched no brief (suggesting they arose from the Court’s own research). 
Thus, the Justices relied far more on federal government lawyers for 
legislative history than on any other lawyers arguing before them. It was 50% 
more common for the Justices to take a citation exclusively from the federal 
lawyers than to take one jointly from federal lawyers and non-federal lawyers. 
And it was more than three times more common for the Justices to take a 
 
history) and “regular” cases (those with 1 to 25 citations), with the former to be over-
sampled to reduce randomness. Also, because I was interested in the difference between 
federally briefed cases and non-federally-briefed cases, I decided the sample should also be 
stratified along that dimension. With these considerations in mind, I divided the population 
of statutory cases using legislative history in 1940-45 into four strata: 
          “Heavy” cases that were federally briefed, which numbered 15 and contained 520 cites; 
          “Heavy” cases not federally briefed, of which there was only one, containing 56 cites; 
          “Regular” cases that were federally briefed, which numbered 214 and contained 1,363 
cites; and 
          “Regular” cases not federally briefed, which numbered 46 and contained 244 cites. 
          For the first two strata—the “heavy” cases with and without federal briefs—I “over-
sampled” to the maximum; that is, I had my research assistants do the matching for 100% 
of the cases. The 15 federally briefed “heavy” cases had 95 corresponding briefs, and the one 
non-federally-briefed “heavy” case had 6 corresponding briefs. For the third and fourth 
strata—the “regular” cases with and without federal briefs—I took a 20% random sample 
from each, which yielded 43 cases from the stratum of “regular” federally briefed cases 
(which contained a total of 257 cites and had a total of 141 corresponding briefs) and 9 cases 
from the stratum of “regular” non-federally-briefed cases (which contained a total of 60 
cites and had a total of 24 corresponding briefs). I then had my research assistants do the 
matching for all the cases in the sample. 
          I then combined the results for the two sets of federally briefed cases (that is, for all of 
the “heavy” federally briefed cases and for the 20% of the “regular” federally briefed cases), 
weighting the results for the two according to the proportion of the total population of 
legislative history citations in all federally briefed cases to which each stratum corresponded. 
Then, in the same way, I combined the results for the two sets of non-federally-briefed 
cases. 
146.  For my definition of a “match,” see infra Appendix I at 400-01. 
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citation exclusively from federal lawyers than to take one exclusively from non-
federal lawyers.147 (The high proportion of citations apparently arising from 
the Court’s own research is also interesting; I shall have more to say about that 
later.148) 
For further confirmation of federal lawyers’ dominance over other lawyers 
in providing legislative history, let us now consider the cases without federal 
briefs. These, again, represented only 22% of federal statutory cases and 
accounted for only 14% of all legislative history citations. In these cases, I 
found, based on my sample, that 45% of the citations appeared in at least one of 
the briefs, while 55% did not (suggesting they came from the Court’s own 
research). That is, the Justices themselves provided a much higher proportion 
of the citations (55%) than they did in federally briefed cases (34%), 
presumably because they did not have the federal government to help them. 
This helps explain the fact (noted earlier) that the Justices cited legislative 
history only about half as much in non-federally-briefed cases. 
Though the surviving case files of the Justices from this period are mostly 
thin, there is one archival document confirming that at least one member of the 
Court viewed the federal government as the “go-to” source of legislative 
history. In December 1941—two full years into the surge—Justice Reed and his 
clerk were working on a case between Alabama food-safety officials and a 
butter-making company. The question was whether certain federal food-safety 
statutes should be construed to preempt Alabama laws on the subject. Lawyers 
 
147.  An alternative measure of this phenomenon is the proportion of cases in which the Justices, 
to the extent they relied on lawyers at all, relied exclusively on one category of lawyers or 
another, i.e., the case has at least one citation matching a federal (non-federal) brief but no 
citation matching a non-federal (federal) brief. I think this measure is less informative than 
the one presented in the text, since exclusive reliance was an extreme and relatively unusual 
occurrence, and focusing on it obscures the Justices’ tendency to rely predominantly, if not 
exclusively, on certain kinds of lawyers. Still, the exclusive-reliance measure does indicate 
the Justices’ greater tendency to lean on the federal government. Predictably, a large 
proportion of cases contained at least one match to a federal brief and at least one match to a 
non-federal brief: 87% for the 15 “heavy” cases and 47% for the 43 “regular” cases (or 57% of 
all cases together). Still, the measure does indicate that it was more common for the Justices 
to rely exclusively on federal lawyers than exclusively on non-federal lawyers: there was at 
least one citation matching a federal brief and no citation matching a non-federal brief in 0% 
of the 15 heavy cases and 28% of the 43 regular cases (or 21% of all the cases together), while 
there was at least one citation matching a non-federal brief and no citation matching a 
federal brief in 7% of the 15 heavy cases and 14% of the 43 regular cases (or 12% of all cases 
together). There were no matches with any brief in 7% of the heavy cases and 12% of the 
regular cases (or 10% of all cases together). 
148.  See infra Section III.F. 
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for Alabama and the company briefed the case, but the federal government was 
not a party and submitted no brief. Reed wrote to his clerk: 
Please check the reports [i.e., committee reports] and Congressional 
debates to see what was the purpose of the adoption by the [federal] 
Renovated Butter Act of the details of the [federal] Meat Inspection 
Act. It may be that this was in the briefs but as there have been no 
Government briefs, it is not so likely that it will be.149 
By “Government briefs,” Reed clearly meant federal government briefs, for the 
Alabama attorney general had briefed the case. 
B. The Difficulty of Briefing Legislative History 
To understand why the federal government was so dominant in providing 
legislative history to the Court, we must first appreciate the extraordinary 
difficulty of employing that material in legal argument, especially as of the 
1940s. Compared to case law and statutory text, documents of legislative 
history were much harder to identify, obtain, and use. The people who wrote 
judicial opinions and statutory text wrote those documents with the primary 
purpose of making them usable in future legal decision-making, and the West 
Company in the 1880s had built an infrastructure to increase that usability. By 
contrast, the people who produced legislative history had far more diverse 
purposes; there was no infrastructure remotely comparable to the West Digest, 
and building any such thing would have been a Herculean task.150 
Begin by considering the textbook version of the process of enacting a 
statute. In one chamber, a member introduced a bill. The chamber’s 
parliamentarian gave the bill a number (such as S. 123 or H.R. 456) and 
referred it to a committee. The committee might hold hearings on the bill and 
print documents relevant to it, such as executive branch recommendations. The 
committee then sent the bill back to the chamber, with a report. The whole 
chamber then took up the bill, debated it, and (possibly) amended it, before 
finally passing it. The bill then went to the other chamber, where the textbook 
 
149.  Memorandum from S.R. [Stanley Reed], Justice, to Mr. [John H.] McClay, Clerk, Re: No. 
28, Cloverleaf Butter Co. (Dec. 13, 1941), Box 68, Folder titled “Oct. Term 1941, Case No. 
28, Cloverleaf Butter Co. vs Patterson,” Stanley F. Reed Papers, Margaret I. King Library, 
Univ. of Ky., Lexington, Ky. [hereinafter Reed Papers]. 
150.  For more recent discussion of the cost and difficulty of using legislative history in the 
present day, see sources cited supra note 24. 
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process required all the same steps. If the second chamber passed a version of 
the bill that was not identical to the first chamber’s, the two chambers could 
appoint a conference committee, which then issued a report of its own. Thus, 
even the textbook process, applied to a single bill, could produce many 
documents: committee reports in both chambers, committee hearings and 
documents in both chambers, floor debates and amendments in both 
chambers, and a conference report, not to mention all the successive versions of 
the bill in both chambers. 
Identifying all the relevant documents in the textbook process for a single 
bill was mostly easy, though not entirely. Starting with the statute, one could 
quickly find the number of the bill that had become that statute. One could 
then look up the bill number in the index to the Congressional Record for the 
Congress that enacted the statute and find references to all committee reports, 
floor proceedings, and conference reports on that bill. But the Record index did 
not cover hearings. Locating hearings required a more cumbersome process 
using a different (and less widely available) index, though it was still doable.151 
The main problem in identifying documents was that the textbook process 
for a single bill was dwarfed, in both scale and complexity, by the usual “real-
life” process for an important statute. It was common for the text of a single 
statute to be pasted together, through the amendment process, from several 
different bills (or pieces of bills), each of which had its own distinct number 
and might, in itself, have gone through some (or nearly all) of the steps in the 
textbook process. That is, the bill that officially became law might encompass 
amendments that occasioned little comment when offered but whose texts 
began life as separate bills on which extensive committee hearings, reports, or 
floor debates had occurred,152 often in Congresses prior to the one that actually 
passed the law.153 Crucially, the indexing was not remotely adequate to identify 
all the bills that had been sewn together into the final product. Only in the late 
1930s did the bill-number index of the Congressional Record begin including 
complete substitutions of one numbered bill for a different numbered bill,154 
but complete substitutions were merely the tip of the iceberg: many statutes 
 
151.  See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE 172-73 (2d 
rev. ed. 1939) (describing the volumes containing lists of hearings); Finley, supra note 66, at 
1283-84; Finley, supra note 65, at 342. 
152.  BEARDSLEY & ORMAN, supra note 17, at 63-64; J.S. Seidman, Legislative History in Federal 
Income Tax Cases, 18 TAXES 339, 341 (1940). 
153.  BEARDSLEY & ORMAN, supra note 17, at 63-64. 
154.  SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 151, at 165-67. 
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involved more complicated cut-and-paste jobs involving several bills, some 
from the present Congress and others from prior Congresses.155 Even if a 
legislative proposal never underwent combination with other proposals, its 
legislative history could still be fragmented if (as often happened) deliberations 
extended over multiple Congresses, since unenacted bills expired at the end of 
every Congress and had to be introduced at the start of the next Congress as 
“new” bills with new numbers.156 There was no index linking the old bill to the 
new one, even if their texts were the same. One had to read the reports, 
hearings, and debates on the enacted bill in hope that somebody would 
mention the existence of earlier bills, which was not guaranteed.157 Thus, 
merely identifying all the documents composing the legislative history of all 
the bills relevant to an eventual statute “may be long and laborious,” as a 
standard research guide warned in 1947.158 There was “no entirely adequate 
reference aid published by the government to cover the period between the 
introduction of a bill in Congress and its printing . . . in the ‘Statutes at 
Large.’”159 
Assuming the researcher identified all the documents on all the relevant 
bills, the trouble had only begun. Obtaining them could be very hard. 
“Committee reports and hearings,” noted Finley in 1946, “go out of print in a 
very few years.” The only sure way to obtain such documents was to purchase 
them during the enactment process, hot off the press. Otherwise, warned 
Finley, it was a nightmare: “even if you have the citations to all the material 
you need, you will be unable to find most of it.”160 The nation’s two leading tax 
 
155.  For example, when librarians in the 1970s retrospectively compiled the legislative histories 
of the securities acts of 1933-34, the first act’s history included documents pertaining to five 
different bills; the second, to ten bills. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at v-xii (J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar 
eds., 1973). The legislative history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 had 
documents on seven bills. CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC 
ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD, at vii-xii (1938). The Federal Tort Claims 
Act of 1946 had “over thirty ‘ancestors’ in almost every Congress as far back as” the 1920s. 
Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Libraries Held 
at Boston, Massachusetts, June 25 to June 28, 1951, 44 LAW LIBR. J. 119, 209 (1951) (statement of 
Huberta A. Prince, Law Library, Judge Advocate General, Army, Washington, D.C.) 
[hereinafter Proceedings]. 
156.  BEARDSLEY & ORMAN, supra note 17, at 63-64. 
157.  Finley, supra note 65, at 342-43. 
158.  BEARDSLEY & ORMAN, supra note 17, at 63. 
159.  Id. at 64. 
160.  Finley, supra note 64, at 164. 
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professors—Erwin Griswold at Harvard and Roswell Magill at Columbia—
attested to this problem. Committee reports on internal revenue, complained 
Griswold in 1939, “have been very difficult to find, and sometimes almost 
unobtainable.”161 That same year, Magill agreed that the reports were “highly 
fugitive, for the editions of the reports are not large, and even a law librarian 
must exercise more vigilance than many do in order to acquire copies in 
time.”162 “Committee hearings,” noted a standard research guide in 1951, 
“especially older ones, are often difficult to obtain.”163 As to the Congressional 
Record, it was so vast that “few law offices would have shelf-room for” it, as 
Magill said.164 In general, concluded Finley, “[i]t is next to impossible to collect 
extra copies of the necessary material [for a legislative history] after several 
years have passed [since enactment].”165 
One also needed to obtain the changing versions of the bill as it had moved 
through the process, but this, too, might be tough. The bill’s successive 
versions were essential, not only in themselves, but also because, in their 
absence, a researcher could fall into disastrous misunderstandings of the 
reports, hearings, and debates. A committee, a congressman, or a witness 
might make a remark about a particular section of the bill, but it was 
dangerous for a lawyer to cite that remark without confirming what the 
wording of the section had been at the time of the remark.166 Successive 
versions of the bill were printed for the use of congressmen during the process, 
but beyond Capitol Hill, they were not generally available.167 To be sure, it was 
 
161.  Erwin N. Griswold, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 718, 718 (1939) (reviewing J.S. 
SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861 (1938)). There 
were “few libraries where they may be conveniently and completely found.” ERWIN N. 
GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 17 (1st ed. 1940). 
162.  Roswell Magill, Book Review, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 741, 741 (1939) (reviewing SEIDMAN, supra 
note 161). 
163.  WEISIGER & DAVIES, supra note 70, at 12. 
164.  Magill, supra note 162, at 741. 
165.  Finley, supra note 65, at 347. 
166.  For examples of one lawyer or judge catching another in this error, see Brief for the 
Petitioner [United States] at 34-35, United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (No. 
484); and Letter from Justice Black to the Members of the Conference (May 5, 1945), Box 
135, Folder 5, Robert Houghwout Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 
[hereinafter Jackson Papers]. 
167.  Bill prints were added to the optional distribution list for depository libraries only in 1938. 
HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1251 n.1. Even after that, it appears they were not widely 
accessible. Finley, supra note 66, at 1282 (noting that the Library of Congress made an 
exception to its ordinarily generous interlibrary loan policy in the case of bill prints); id. at 
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common for committee reports, hearing transcripts, or floor debates to include 
the current text of the bill, but there was no fixed rule about this,168 and 
finding the successive versions might require scanning through several 
documents. 
One might obtain documents from federal depository libraries, but even 
those institutions fell short. In the late 1930s, about 500 libraries were 
designated as federal depositories,169 but they were not required to receive all 
the congressional documents offered them, so “many” did not have “complete 
collections” of offered materials.170 This was especially true for hearings and 
bill prints: up to 1938, these two categories of material were not even offered,171 
and even after 1938, depositories normally did not accept them (unless they 
were state libraries or big university libraries).172 Committee reports and floor 
debates were somewhat easier: as of the 1950s, Finley thought it “most unlikely 
that any sizeable city is without a set [i.e., at least one set] of the Congressional 
Record and the Congressional Serial Set, which collects the committee 
reports,”173 although Griswold and Magill’s complaints about committee 
reports in 1939 may indicate that Finley was too sanguine about the 
completeness of such collections, or that collections had been thinner prior to 
the 1950s. In any event, lawyers not near a large city were clearly out of luck. 
“In most cases,” wrote two attorneys in 1948, “particularly when the lawyer 
 
1283 (noting that, even in depository libraries, “[i]t is true that the bills may not be readily 
available”). 
168.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1251 n.1; Finley, supra note 66, at 1283. 
169.  JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, 75TH CONG., GOVERNMENT DEPOSITORIES: MEMORANDUM 
RELATIVE TO THE PRESENT LAW GOVERNING DESIGNATED DEPOSITORY LIBRARIES 1 (Comm. 
Print 1937). 
170.  HART & SACKS, supra note 35, at 1251. Note that, up to 1922, depositories were required to 
receive all publications on the distribution list (which included the Serial Set and 
Congressional Record). Further, they were always forbidden to discard any of the material 
they received, though “appropriations have never been adequate to permit effective 
enforcement of depository-library obligations.” Id. at 1250. 
171.  Id. at 1251. Hart and Sacks add that, “[e]ven before 1938 . . . committee hearings were easy to 
collect, and commonly collected,” but the material they quote in the corresponding footnote 
does not support their statement. Id. 
172.  Finley, supra note 66, at 1283; Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American 
Association of Law Libraries Held at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, June 27 to June 30, 1941, 34 
LAW LIBR. J. 159, 252 (1941) [hereinafter Proceedings] (statement of Sidney B. Hill). 
173.  Finley, supra note 66, at 1283. 
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does not practice in or near a large city, there is no convenient access to 
Government publications.”174 
Even if the researcher identified all documents and obtained them, it would 
often prove extremely time-consuming to use them. For a major statute, all the 
relevant documents on all the relevant bills could add up to thousands of 
pages. For example, when some law-firm librarians in the 1970s retrospectively 
compiled the complete legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, it ran to about 4,000 pages.175 When in 1949 the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) published the legislative history of the Wagner Act, it 
ran over 3,200 pages.176 When a drug-industry lobbyist compiled a legislative 
history of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, it ran to over 1,300 pages, 
even though it omitted 2,000 pages of hearings.177 
Facing such a vastness of material, the researcher’s instinct would be to 
read selectively. That was easier said than done.178 Hearings and floor debates 
often involved desultory discussion, in which any topic might arise at any time. 
For a hearing, there was typically an index of the names of witnesses but not 
subjects. For the Congressional Record, there was a subject index for each entire 
two-year Congress, but this was far too general to find discussion of a 
particular section or issue within the debate on a particular bill. J.S. Seidman, 
an expert in tax law, wrote in 1940: 
[The researcher]’s interest at any time is likely to be in only a particular 
provision or segment of the law. Nevertheless, each time he wanted to 
check its legislative history, he had to plow through virtually every page 
of all of the material to see what, if anything, it contained on the 
subject. Why this search for the needle in the haystack? For the reason 
that, with the exception of bill prints, the material is generally not 
 
174.  Robert K. Emerson & Frank L. Fuller, III, How to Find and Use Federal Legislative Materials, 
51 W. VA. L.Q. 169, 174 (1948). 
175.  See 4-11 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934, supra note 155. 
176.  NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
ACT, 1935 (1949). 
177.  DUNN, supra note 155. On the omission of hearings, see id. at 1048, 1112, 1213, 1235. 
178.  Theoretically, the Supreme Court might have confined its inquiry to comparatively brief 
documents, such as committee reports, conference reports, and bills. But such limits might 
lead to an incoherent understanding of the statute and produce arbitrary results. In fact, the 
Court did not follow such limits. About half of all citations in 1940-45 were to comparatively 
voluminous sources like floor debates and hearings. See supra note 47. 
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marked or arranged in any particular order. To the contrary, it is in a 
state of disorder. Suppose we are looking up section 23(c). In the 
hearings, discussion of section 23(c) may be preceded by consideration 
of section 102 and followed by section 12(b). Later on, they may be back 
on 23(c) again. Or there may be nothing on 23(c) at all, but we would 
never know it until we went completely through the hearings. So, also, 
with the Congressional [floor] debates.179 
Similarly, in 1955, the chief librarian of the U.S. Supreme Court sent a memo to 
the Justices’ law clerks, warning: “The Library Staff cannot ordinarily 
undertake the responsibility of selecting material pertinent to a particular 
[statutory] section from often lengthy debates and hearings.”180 
The lack of indexing in the Record occasioned particular comment. In a 
1930 opinion, U.S. District Judge William Clark quoted a floor speech on the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1898 that contradicted an opinion the Supreme Court had 
handed down in 1913 without benefit of the legislative history.181 Clark noted 
that he found out about the 1898 floor speech only because, in writing a 
scholarly book on bankruptcy, he had assumed the “arduous task” of reading 
the floor proceedings.182 Even then, the indexing of the Congressional Record 
was so inadequate that Clark feared there might be some other snippet of 
legislative history saying something different about the provision at issue. On 
this point, he lamented that the West Key Number System for case law had no 
analogue in legislative history: “Without the help of some such trained experts 
as are employed by the West Publishing Company, it can be only reasonably 
certain,” not fully certain, that the quotation he had found was “the only 
reference” to the Code section at issue.183 Clark stressed the crying need “for 
some sort of digest of the Congressional Record for the use of the United 
States judges and others required to interpret Federal legislation.”184 In 1939, 
Magill lamented that the “discussions in the Congressional Record . . . are 
 
179.  Seidman, supra note 152, at 341. 
180.  Memorandum from Helen Newman to the Supreme Court Law Clerks (1955), Part III, Reel 
14, Frame 0070, in Felix Frankfurter Papers [Microform] (Frederick, Md.: University 
Publications of America, 1986) [hereinafter Frankfurter Papers]. 
181.  In re Pinals, 38 F.2d 117 (D.N.J. 1930). 
182.  Id. at 119. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. 
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quite inaccessible, due to inadequate indexing.”185 Committee reports were less 
problematic in this respect, since they were relatively short and might be 
organized according to the bill’s section numbers, though even then, the 
section numbers might have changed after the issuance of the report, so the 
researcher would have to scan the whole report.186 
Even if a researcher waded into the history and found some nugget that 
appeared dispositive, it was dangerous to stop there and declare victory. The 
history encompassed the utterances of so many different congressmen and 
witnesses that one snippet might be contradicted by some other snippet. “On 
particular occasions,” warned the first edition of Effective Appellate Advocacy in 
1950, “the committee reports will be valueless—because later disavowed on the 
floor of Congress.”187 Altogether, said Jackson in 1948, “[i]t is a poor cause that 
cannot find some plausible support in legislative history.”188 The whole matter 
was summed up by Frederick C. Hicks, the librarian of Yale Law School, in 
1942: “Even though [legislative] material is available in libraries, it is of large 
volume, and, in use, very time-consuming, in spite of the existing lists and 
indexes.”189 
At the Supreme Court itself, law clerks in the 1950s singled out legislative 
history as the one kind of source that the Court’s library staff was incapable of 
handling. As Frankfurter’s outgoing law clerks, in a message to their 
successors, put it: 
The library staff is generally excellent in digging things out. But 
experience in the 1954 Term indicated that it is unwise to rely on their 
research on such matters as legislative history. If, for example, you wish 
all the hearings on a bill, you should check to make sure that they have 
found all materials.190 
As lawyers and librarians increasingly recognized, the ideal method for 
rendering legislative history usable was for somebody to collect all the relevant 
documents for a single statute, bind them in a “scrapbook,” and draw up an 
 
185.  Magill, supra note 162, at 741. 
186.  Seidman, supra note 152, at 341. 
187.  WIENER, supra note 28, at 120. 
188.  Jackson, supra note 38, at 538. 
189.  HICKS, supra note 70, at 81-82. 
190.  Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter’s Law Clerks to Their Successors 10 (circa 1955), Part 
III, Reel 9, Frame 0071, Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180 [hereinafter Frankfurter Clerk 
Memo]. 
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index for the scrapbook.191 But this method was extremely costly. Assembling 
such a scrapbook was nearly impossible for a past statute; rather, the work 
needed to be done in “real time” as the enactment process was unfolding, so 
the compiler could purchase the documents before they went out of print. 
Gathering the documents in “real time” required a skilled researcher who could 
follow any and all congressional activity that might lead to a statute of interest. 
Since nobody knew in advance whether any particular bill would pass, the time 
expended for a single statute might be huge.192 “Tracing or compiling a 
legislative history,” wrote Finley in 1949, “may seem like a devious [i.e., 
tortuous] and laborious task. It certainly, to say the least, is troublesome.”193 
“If complete compiled histories of all [federal] laws were to be undertaken,” she 
observed in the 1950s, “there would probably have to be a whole new agency to 
do the job.”194 
Another possibility was that a researcher might compile all documents for a 
statute, not in the form of a scrapbook, but as a publication to be sold 
commercially. Theoretically, commercial sale could cover the large investment 
necessary to compile and index the documents. But so long as legislative 
history was not a routinely used source, the market would never be large 
enough for this purpose. A few published volumes appeared on the legislative 
histories of particular statutes before 1945, but (with four arguable exceptions) 
they were really just glorified bibliographies or highly selective collections of 
excerpts, not remotely comprehensive collections of the primary documents.195 
 
191.  On the value of scrapbook histories, see Finley, supra note 76, at 181; Finley, supra note 66, 
at 1283; and Proceedings, supra note 155, at 210 (statement of Huberta A. Prince). 
192.  Emerson & Fuller, supra note 174, at 182; Finley, supra note 64, at 163. 
193.  Finley, supra note 65, at 347. 
194.  Finley, supra note 66, at 1284. 
195.  The most comprehensive list of published, statute-specific legislative histories is SOURCES 
OF COMPILED LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, 
PERIODICAL ARTICLES AND BOOKS, 1ST CONGRESS – 108TH CONGRESS (Nancy P. Johnson ed., 
2007). For statutes enacted up to 1945, Johnson notes several pre-1945 publications, but 
nearly all of them—in contrast to many of the post-1945 publications—are designated as 
including only indexes, citations, scholarly discussion, or excerpts, and not as actually 
reprinting the reports, debates, or hearings. Id. at B1-B22. The only exceptions are a 1934 
volume on the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (which covers only one clause of that 
statute), id. at B4; two contemporaneously published collections on the FDCA and the 
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, both in 1938, which covered the reports and floor debates but 
only excerpted the hearings, id. at B18-2; and a contemporaneously published collection on a 
military appropriations act of 1944, which covered only the floor debates, id. at B21. From 
what I can tell, the most copious volume of excerpts published before 1945 on any statute is 
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The commercial publication of full-blown legislative histories (which finally 
took off in the 1950s and especially the 1970s) was a result of the normalization 
of legislative history, not its cause. 
Even Harry Willmer Jones—who wrote far more scholarship arguing in 
favor of legislative history than anyone before 1945—admitted, as of 1940, that 
lawyers were not practically able to brief such material: “The unsatisfactory 
nature of the typical judicial reference to extrinsic aids is due, it would seem, to 
the incomplete presentation of relevant materials by counsel who would gain 
by their introduction.” Tellingly, Jones analogized the briefing of legislative 
history for statutory interpretation to the briefing of legislative facts in 
constitutional litigation (which were often drawn from legislative sources).196 
Briefing legislative facts in constitutional litigation was labor-intensive and was 
peculiarly the competence of federal government lawyers—a profoundly 
significant fact, as we shall see in the next section. 
C. The Federal Government’s Unique Capacity to Brief Legislative History 
The federal government was uniquely suited to meet the challenge of 
briefing legislative history. To understand this, we must first recognize that 
when the federal government submitted a brief to the Court, that brief was a 
product of the federal bureaucracy writ large. In the 1930s and early 1940s, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in Washington, D.C., had five main divisions 
that focused on litigation. These were the Antitrust Division (which covered 
not only antitrust but business regulation generally),197 the Tax Division, the 
 
ROGERS MACVEAGH, THE TRANSPORTATION ACT 1920: ITS SOURCES, HISTORY, AND TEXT 
TOGETHER WITH ITS AMENDMENTS (1923), which is still not nearly complete. One volume of 
interest, not listed by Johnson, is JAMES ARTHUR FINCH, BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS 
RELATING TO TRUSTS, S. DOC. NO. 57-147 (1903) (including many bill prints and about 330 
pages of floor debate on the Sherman Act of 1890, plus several hundred pages of post-
enactment debates and bill prints). Also of interest is SEIDMAN, supra note 161, which 
contains about 1,000 pages of excerpts across numerous tax statutes, keying the excerpts to 
the individual provisions. Griswold said this volume was a “step forward” but omitted so 
much material “that it will apparently be impossible to rely on the . . . compilation as much 
more than a digest or partial index.” Griswold, supra note 161, at 718. 
196.  Jones, supra note 97, at 764. 
197.  Reminiscences of Robert Houghwout Jackson (1952), at 490, in the Columbia University 
Center for Oral History Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y. [hereinafter Jackson Oral 
History, CUCOHC]. 
 
leviathan and interpretive revolution 
329 
 
Claims Division, the Criminal Division, and the Public Lands Division.198 The 
DOJ also included the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which 
throughout the period consisted of around a dozen lawyers, far fewer than any 
one division had.199 The OSG was charged with representing the federal 
government before the Supreme Court,200 and although some independent 
agencies had authority to litigate on their own, the OSG could and normally 
did serve as their official representative,201 and so the SG’s signature appeared 
on nearly all federal briefs filed at the Court.202 But in reality, the OSG 
possessed only a tiny fraction of the manpower necessary to brief the numerous 
Supreme Court cases of which it was nominally in charge. The standard 
practice was for the brief to be drafted outside the OSG, most commonly by 
one of the DOJ divisions, but also, in a large minority of cases, by a separate 
 
198.  For a list of all DOJ personnel in Washington, D.C., broken down into divisions, see 
REGISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1-21 
(39th ed. 1938) [hereinafter 1938 DOJ REGISTER]. For more on this, see infra note 270 and 
accompanying text. 
199.  The OSG’s size dipped to five as of 1934, though I suspect that was the result of temporarily 
unfilled slots. For the number of attorneys in the OSG, besides the SG himself and law 
clerks, see REGISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (35th ed. 1930) (nine); REGISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES (36th ed. 1931) (twelve); REGISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
AND THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (37th ed. 1934) (five) [hereinafter 1934 DOJ 
REGISTER]; REGISTER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (38th ed. 1936) (ten); 1938 DOJ REGISTER, supra note 198 (nine); REGISTER OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (40th ed. 1942) (thirteen) 
[hereinafter 1942 DOJ REGISTER]. 
200.  5 U.S.C. § 309 (1940). 
201.  Carl Brent Swisher, Federal Organization of Legal Functions, 33 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 973, 996-
97 (1939). For example, in SEC cases, the SG asserted formal control of the litigation but 
practically let the agency take the lead while reviewing its arguments. Reminiscences of 
Chester Tevis Lane (1951), at 453-61, in the Columbia University Center for Oral History 
Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y. [hereinafter Lane Oral History, CUCOHC]. In 
ICC cases, the SG would give the case either to the Antitrust Division or to the ICC itself; in 
the latter cases, the ICC asserted that it had complete control, though practically the level of 
cooperation with DOJ depended on the individual attorneys involved. Memorandum from 
Paul Freund to the Solicitor General (Nov. 30, 1938), Box 189, Folder 2, Paul A. Freund 
Papers, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. [hereinafter Freund Papers]. Occasionally, 
the SG would permit an agency to file a brief without endorsing it himself. Jackson Oral 
History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, at 644. 
202.  For example, of 62 federally briefed cases decided in 1940, the SG’s signature was on the 
briefs in 59. 
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federal agency such as the NLRB, ICC, SEC, FCC or DOL.203 (When a DOJ 
division drafted the brief, it would also consult with whatever agency was 
involved in the case.204) After the brief was drafted, one of the OSG lawyers 
would then revise it, to a greater or lesser extent, usually over a period of one or 
two weeks just before filing it with the Court.205 In this process, the “spade 
 
203.  See Memorandum from Richard S. Salant to the Solicitor General Re: Procedure, 
Organization, and Relationships of the Office of the Solicitor General 4-5, 8-10, 18 (July 1, 
1943) [hereinafter Salant Memo], Box 43, Folder titled “Procedure, Organization, and 
Relationships of the Office of Solicitor General,” Papers of Charles Fahy, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. [hereinafter Fahy Papers] (referring, six 
times, to “the divisions [i.e., DOJ divisions] and agencies which draft the briefs,” or some 
similar phrase). In the papers of Charles Fahy (who served as Solicitor General from 1941-
45), there are two lengthy memoranda, pertaining to the 1941 and 1942 Terms, naming the 
agencies and DOJ divisions to which the briefs are assigned. Document titled “In the 
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1941, Government Cases to be Argued,” 
Box 44, Folder titled “Supreme Court (Oct. 1941 Term) – Government Cases to be Argued,” 
Fahy Papers, supra (listing 80 cases, not necessarily all statutory, in which the brief is 
assigned to DOJ Tax Division in 21, DOJ Criminal Division in 10, DOJ Antitrust Division in 
9, DOJ Claims Division in 8, DOJ Lands Division in 2, NLRB in 7, ICC in 5, Department of 
Labor in 4, War Risk Bureau in 2, Department of Interior in 1, and FCC in 1; there are also 3 
cases in which the brief is assigned to the OSG itself or a named attorney, plus 5 that leave 
the assignment blank, presumably to be determined); Document titled “In the Supreme 
Court of the United States, October Term, 1942, Government Cases to be Argued During 
the October Term, 1942,” Box 44, Folder titled “Supreme Court (Oct. 1942 Term) – Cases 
to be Argued & Assignments for Argument,” Fahy Papers, supra (listing 106 cases, not 
necessarily all statutory, in which the brief is assigned to DOJ Tax Division in 22, DOJ 
Criminal Division in 15, DOJ Antitrust Division in 11, DOJ Claims Division in 11, DOJ Lands 
Division in 5, NLRB in 5, SEC in 4, FCC in 3, Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 2, 
Department of Labor in 2, and War Risk Bureau in 1; there are also 7 cases in which the 
brief is assigned to the OSG itself or a named attorney, plus 18 that leave the assignment 
blank, presumably to be determined). For confirmation that Supreme Court briefs were 
generally drafted in the DOJ divisions and not OSG as of the late 1920s, see ERWIN N. 
GRISWOLD, OULD FIELDS, NEW CORNE: THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY 
LAWYER 80 (1992). 
204.  See Reminiscences of Charles E. Wyzanski (1954), at 284, in the Columbia University Center 
for Oral History Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y. [hereinafter Wyzanski Oral 
History, CUCOHC]. 
205.  On the time constraint of one to two weeks, see Salant Memo, supra note 203, at 4, 8, 11. 
Normally the OSG had no role in shaping the brief before receiving the draft. Id. at 11-12. 
The extent of OSG revision was variable, depending on the quality of the draft, the 
complexity of the case, and the nature of the issues (e.g., OSG would revise more 
aggressively on constitutional issues). GRISWOLD, supra note 203, at 80; Jackson Oral 
History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, at 658-59; Lane Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 
201, at 659-62. 
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work” of research normally came mainly from the DOJ division or agency.206 
This did not mean that the DOJ division or agency simply recycled whatever 
research it had already done in the lower courts; rather it appears that the 
divisions and agencies did special preparation for cases that went to the high 
Court.207 
The agencies and DOJ divisions—the institutions that collectively did most 
of the work of briefing Supreme Court cases for the federal government—were 
better suited to research legislative history than any other institutions in 
America. First, they simply had more personnel to do legal research. To get a 
sense of this, consider that in 1938 the five DOJ divisions together had 421 
lawyers in Washington, D.C.208 Federal agencies besides DOJ in 1939 totaled 
more than 4,000 lawyers nationwide.209 Assuming very conservatively that 
non-DOJ federal lawyers lived in the Washington area at the same rate as 
federal employees more generally, approximately 550 additional federal lawyers 
would have resided in and around the nation’s capital.210 Numbers like this 
 
206.  Jackson Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, at 641. 
207.  Salant Memo, supra note 203, at 4 (indicating that drafting of Supreme Court briefs by the 
DOJ divisions was done in their “Supreme Court sections,” to which were assigned “the best 
possible men”); id. at 14 (“The agency or division sometimes insists that it has put its best 
men on the brief,” such that OSG should not change it.); id. at 15 (stating that a draft brief 
sent to OSG “must be presumed to be the product of the best efforts of the best men in the 
agency or division concerned”). For example, Gordon Dean, a lawyer at the Criminal 
Division who drafted FDR’s 1934 crime package and had extraordinary firsthand knowledge 
of its legislative history, argued several Supreme Court cases arising from those statutes, but 
he became involved in such cases only after they reached the Supreme Court level. 
Reminiscences of Gordon Evans Dean (1954), at 54-55, in the Columbia University Center 
for Oral History Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y. [hereinafter Dean Oral History, 
CUCOHC]. Another example: after Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (1943), reached 
the Supreme Court, attorneys from the Criminal Division and OSG spent much of a 
summer researching the legislative history of the statute at issue. Letter from Oscar Cox, 
Acting Solicitor General, to Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress (July 14, 1943), Box 
42, Folder titled “Correspondence Re Cases – R,” Fahy Papers, supra note 203. 
208.  Calculations based on 1938 DOJ REGISTER, supra note 198, at 2-14. 
209.  REPORT OF PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE IMPROVEMENT, H.R. DOC. NO. 77-
118, at 29-30 (1941). The report clarifies that “[t]his number includes all positions which 
require the incumbents to possess legal training whether under the classification title of 
attorney or under such designations as examiner, hearing examiner, civil service examiner 
(law), adjudicator, claims examiner, legal editor or other title.” But it goes on to state that 
these jobs were “in every instance professional legal positions,” and elsewhere refers to those 
who hold them as “attorneys.” Id. at 29 n.1, 30. 
210.  For the proportion of nationwide federal employees located in D.C., see Federal Government 
Employees, by Government Branch and Location Relative to the Capital: 1816-1992, HISTORICAL 
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dwarfed all other organizations. In 1935, the largest law firm in Chicago—the 
nation’s second-biggest city—had 43 lawyers.211 Even in 1950, according to the 
best estimates, no law firm in America had more than 92 lawyers, and only 
eleven had more than 60 (of which nine were in New York City).212 The New 
York City Law Department, largest of all government law offices below the 
federal level, had only about 100 lawyers in 1940.213 
The federal government’s sheer number of lawyers allowed for a unique 
degree of specialization. In an era when private-sector appellate practice groups 
did not yet exist,214 the five DOJ divisions all had their own appellate sections 
by the late 1930s and early 1940s,215 and some had their own Supreme Court 
sections.216 Not only had the federal government pioneered appellate practice, 
but it sub-specialized appellate practice by substantive area. 
 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT: MILLENNIAL EDITION 
(Susan B. Carter et al. eds., 2006), http://hsus.cambridge.org/HSUSWeb/search 
/searchTable.do?id=Ea894-903 (showing, in Series Ea894 and Ea896, the total number of 
federal government employees and their location relative to Washington, D.C.). 
211.  Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms, 6 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 95, 109 (1981). 
212.  Id. at 105-07. It appears that corporate law departments were smaller than law firms. See 
Charles S. Maddock, The Corporation Law Department, 30 HARV. BUS. REV. 119, 120 (1952) 
(noting that the nationwide Survey of the Legal Profession in 1949 had identified 231 
industrial corporations with legal departments of 3 or more lawyers, of which six had 
departments of 50 lawyers or more). 
213.  I infer this from ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER: A 
SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 59-60 (1954) (noting it had 125 lawyers 
in 1950); and WILLIAM E. NELSON, FIGHTING FOR THE CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK 
CITY CORPORATION COUNSEL 111 (2008) (noting it had 70 lawyers in the early 1900s). 
214.  Thomas G. Hungar & Nikesh Jindal, Observations on the Rise of the Appellate Litigator, 29 
REV. LITIG. 511, 518-23 (2010). For more general background, see Frederick Bernays Wiener, 
Specialized Appellate Counsel: His Importance, Necessity, and Usefulness, 45 A.B.A. J. 677 
(1959). 
215.  Dean Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 207, at 63 (Criminal, as of 1936); Jackson Oral 
History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, at 403 (Tax, as of 1936); Memorandum from Warner 
W. Gardner to the Acting Solicitor General, p. 2 (July 30, 1941), Box 44, Folder titled 
“Supreme Court (Oct. 1941 Term) – Assignments of Argument,” Fahy Papers, supra note 
203 (Antitrust); Memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker to the Solicitor General (Sept. 14, 
1942), Box 44, Folder titled “Supreme Court (Oct. 1942 Term) – Cases to be Argued & 
Assignments for Argument,” Fahy Papers, supra note 203 (Claims); Memorandum from J. 
Edward Williams, Acting Head, Lands Division, to the Solicitor General (Dec. 11, 1944), 
Box 45, Folder titled “Supreme Court (Oct. 1944 Term) – Assignments for Argument,” 
Fahy Papers, supra note 203 (Lands). 
216.  Salant Memo, supra note 203, at 4, 18. 
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The manpower advantage extended not only to lawyers but also (it seems) 
to law librarians. Regional societies of law librarians first began to form in 
1938-39, and two of the first three were in New York and D.C.217 The New 
York society was apparently a diverse coalition from courts, bar associations, 
universities, and law firms.218 In D.C., however, it appears no law firms had 
librarians before 1943,219 and the society was dominated by federal agency 
librarians, with a minority from courts and universities.220 
Beyond raw manpower, there were even deeper reasons why the agencies 
and DOJ divisions were uniquely suited to research legislative history. For one, 
they each devoted themselves full-time to implementing one or a few statutes, 
so they could amortize the cost of researching the background of those statutes 
over many cases. Moreover, they had uses for legislative history far beyond 
litigation. Program officers needed guidance on implementation, which 
legislative history could help provide. Further, the agencies and DOJ divisions 
constantly communicated and negotiated with Congress on how to administer 
(and whether to amend) the statutes in their charge, and legislative history was 
essential to that work—something that drove the agencies and DOJ not merely 
to collect legislative history, but to collect it in “real time,” which was the most 
efficient way.221 
Take for example the Treasury Department. Its Legal Division, established 
in 1934, had three missions, for all of which legislative history was valuable. 
First was litigation: the Division “cooperated with the Department of Justice in 
 
217.  Several pieces in the Law Library Journal discuss the earliest local societies of law librarians. 
See Current Comments, 34 LAW LIBR. J. 332, 335 (1941) (discussing the Law Librarians’ Society 
of Washington, D.C.); Current Comments, 32 LAW LIBR. J. 95, 97 (1939) (discussing the Law 
Library Association of Greater New York); Current Comments, 32 LAW LIBR. J. 125, 126 
(1939) (discussing the Law Librarians of the Nation’s Capital, among others); Proceedings, 
32 LAW LIBR. J. 207, 320 (1939) (discussing the Law Library Association of Greater New 
York); Current Comments, 31 LAW LIBR. J. 357, 357 (1938) (discussing the Carolina Law 
Library Association). 
218.  See the affiliations listed in Law Librarians of Greater New York Meet, 32 LAW LIBR. J. 15 
(1939). 
219.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
220.  Note the prevalence of federal agency librarians in Current Comments, 33 LAW LIBR. J. 52, 54 
(1940); Current Comments, 32 LAW LIBR. J. 125, 126 (1939); and Matthew A. McKavitt, The 
Library of the Department of Justice, 32 LAW LIBR. J. 271, 273 (1939). Note also that federal 
agencies accounted for 21 of the 23 participating libraries in the Union List, supra note 77, at 
244-46. 
221.  Several of these points are raised, at a theoretical level with respect to present-day agencies, 
in VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 115, 209, 213. 
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preparing a large number of cases in which the Treasury was interested.” 
Second was advising Congress: the Division “prepared analyses and 
recommendations [in a single year] with respect to approximately 650 
congressional bills affecting the Department” and “furnished technical 
assistance to congressional committees.” Third was program implementation: 
the Division produced “formal legal opinions and numerous informal 
opinions” for “the information and guidance of the administrative officers of 
the Department.”222 To help with all these tasks, the Division compiled 
legislative history on a systematic and ongoing basis: 
[The] library compiles and binds in folders the legislative histories of 
current bills in which the Treasury is interested. The folders contain the 
debates taken from the daily Congressional Record, the reports and 
bills. The folders are filed by Congress and bill number. The hearings 
are also listed by Congress and bill number, as well as being shelf-listed 
and cataloged.223 
In a testament to the role of legislative history in program implementation, 
Treasury’s Internal Revenue Bureau in 1939 distributed an 800-page volume of 
committee reports on all revenue acts going back to 1913, “in order that they 
may be available to officers and employees of the Bureau both in Washington 
and in the field divisions in construing the provisions of the various” 
statutes.224 
As another example, consider the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 
Founded as a tiny agency in 1887, the Commission expanded into a behemoth 
in the 1910s, establishing a Bureau of Law.225 As of the 1930s, that Bureau had 
the usual three missions: to represent the ICC in litigation, to advise on bills 
the ICC might propose, and to advise internally on applying the existing 
statutes.226 The Bureau accordingly kept “itself continually informed 
 
222.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE 
STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1935, at 133-34 (1936). 
223.  Wanda Miller, The Library of the Office of the General Counsel of the United States Treasury, 35 
LAW LIBR. J. 157, 158 (1942). 
224.  TREASURY DEP’T, INTERNAL REVENUE BULLETIN: CUMULATIVE BULLETIN 1939-1 (PART 2), at i 
(1939). 
225.  4 I.L. SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCEDURE 68, 86 (1937). 
226.  Id. at 85-86. 
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concerning legislative . . . developments.”227 Indeed, it was in charge of the 
ICC’s library, which maintained “a large file of congressional bills and 
resolutions from the creation of the Commission in 1887 to date” and was 
responsible for “indexing the same,” and also for “[r]eading the Congressional 
Record daily and indexing same.”228 
As a third example, take the DOJ Tax Division. Founded in 1919 and 
greatly expanded in the 1930s, the division in 1931 hired an attorney named 
Carlton Fox,229 who became “a pioneer in the field of legislative histories.”230 
By the late 1930s, Fox had assembled scrapbooks of primary material on the 
internal revenue laws—apparently consisting largely of legislative history—that 
totaled forty-five volumes.231 When a private tax attorney published a one-
volume “legislative history” of the internal revenue laws in 1938, Griswold 
criticized it in the Harvard Law Review, arguing that it was not “much more 
than a digest or partial index,” declaring that the “only place where the 
complete sources may now be found is in the compilations which have been 
made by Carlton Fox, Esq., of the Department of Justice,” and concluding that 
“[t]he final story on the legislative history of the Revenue Acts will not be told 
until Mr. Fox’s compilations can be made more readily available.”232 The Tax 
Division apparently took advantage of its legislative history to guide the DOJ 
field service, sending circulars to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices with legislative 
history on commonly litigated questions.233 
 
227.  Id. at 86. 
228.  S. DOC. NO. 73-45, at 15, 17 (1933). 
229.  1934 DOJ REGISTER, supra note 199, at 3. 
230.  Hudon, supra note 73, at 325. 
231.  A copy of the set was donated to the Supreme Court and discussed in Oscar D. Clarke, The 
Library of the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 LAW LIBR. J. 89, 91 (1938). Clarke 
describes the collection as forty-five volumes and covering “tax laws, regulations, and 
legislative history,” id., but it appears the bulk of it was legislative history. See the 
description by Griswold, infra note 232 and accompanying text. A description of the 
collection’s various parts as of 1950 (by which point it had been further expanded to 160 
volumes) indicates that 107 of the volumes consisted entirely of legislative history and 
another 27 partly of legislative history. Federal Taxation, 32 CHI. B. REC. 180 (1950); see also 
id. at 190 (confirming that the donation to the Court occurred in 1937 and that the collection 
is “adequately indexed”). 
232.  Griswold, supra note 161, at 718. Griswold added that copies of Fox’s volumes were available 
in the libraries at Harvard and two of the U.S. circuit courts. Id. 
233.  E.g., Circular Letter to All United States Attorneys, Circular No. 2730, Re: Memorandum of 
authorities with respect to the applicability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to suits 
for the recovery of taxes 10-13 (Aug. 1, 1935), Box 182, Folder 1, Freund Papers, supra note 
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Legislative history operations were common across the federal 
administrative state. Thus, although many of the congressional materials on 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 became rare 
and almost unobtainable shortly after enactment, the SEC was the great 
exception: it possessed the “almost one and only official history” of the two 
statutes, from which librarians “charted [their] course” in compiling a 
commercially published history in the 1970s.234 At the Federal Works Agency 
(a conglomeration of the Works Progress Administration and other agencies), 
the librarian in 1941 explained that 
one of our chief services is to compile these so-called legislative 
histories . . . . We get the material together by following the 
Congressional Record proceedings very closely, and we found that by 
binding all of that material together, . . . it has been of invaluable help 
to our attorneys in getting the interpretation of the law and also in 
drafting subsequent legislation.235 
The dominance of the federal leviathan in using legislative history was a 
foregone conclusion among experts in legal research. Speaking before the 
AALL in 1947, Finley said, “I know the librarians here from government 
agencies will bear me out when I say that legislative histories are the most 
important non-routine part of a practising lawyer’s library.”236 An article in 
1948 noted that the best approach to compiling legislative history—“[k]eeping 
a current file on all bills before Congress which may become important laws”—
was “a job requiring the full attention of an experienced librarian and is 
consequently a method employed mainly by Government agencies.”237 It added 
that there was “only one private law firm at the present time [presumably 
Covington] that has such a primary interest in Congressional legislation as to 
justify such a method.”238 In 1953, the first edition of Effective Legal Research, by 
 
201. The DOJ Criminal Division and Claims Division would likewise acquire their own 
legislative history libraries, while DOJ’s central library would provide such material to the 
other divisions. McKavitt, supra note 220, at 276; William Mitchell, Government Law 
Libraries: Guideposts to Research, 20 FED. B.J. 281, 283 (1960). 
234.  1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934, supra note 155, at xv; see also id. at xiii (elaborating on the materials’ rarity). 
235.  Proceedings, supra note 172, at 251 (statement of Minnie Wiener). 
236.  Finley, supra note 76, at 181. 
237.  Emerson & Fuller, supra note 174, at 182. 
238.  Id. 
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the Columbia law librarians, held up federal agencies as the gold standard for 
legislative history research. The book set forth an elaborate procedure for 
tracking bills and gathering congressional material in real time, which it 
characterized as “typical” for a federal agency but “perhaps somewhat more 
elaborate than most law offices would follow.” The method could “be 
simplified to the extent desired.”239 
The advantage that the government consequently enjoyed in litigation was 
obvious. When two private attorneys in 1948 published a compiled legislative 
history of the Revenue Act of that year, they advertised it as part of a private 
effort to catch up with the government. The “Government attorney in the 
Nation’s Capital,” they warned, 
has a decided advantage over the non-government practitioner who in 
most instances does not work in Washington and who, even though he 
may have the time at his disposal to make a search of voluminous 
legislative history material, invariably cannot find all the documents 
that need to be examined. The result of this disparity in the availability 
of source material is that the attorney for the Government generally is 
prepared to meet the problem while the private practitioner usually is 
not.240 
One last point: agencies and DOJ divisions watched Congress carefully and 
recorded what it did, but in truth, their relationship to legislative history was 
even more intimate. They were watching and recording a drama in which they 
themselves were leading players—perhaps the leading players. Agency and DOJ 
employees drafted bills, provided congressmen with analyses, testified at 
hearings, and even served as ghostwriters for committee reports and floor 
speeches.241 Such practices have been a constant in U.S. history, to some 
degree.242 
 
239.  MILES O. PRICE & HARRY BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH: A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF 
LAW BOOKS AND THEIR USE 51 (1st ed. 1953). 
240.  PAUL WOLKIN AND MARCUS MANOFF, REVENUE ACT OF 1948, at iii (1948). 
241.  It was not just the substantive agencies, but very much the DOJ divisions as well, that were 
involved in drafting bills. Edwin E. Witte, The Preparation of Proposed Legislative Measures by 
Administrative Departments, in THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 359, 364 (1937). 
242.  “The effective authors of federal legislation,” wrote Frankfurter, “have, ever since the days of 
Alexander Hamilton, largely been the various agencies of the Government.” Felix 
Frankfurter, A Symposium on Statutory Construction: Foreword, 3 VAND. L. REV. 365, 367 
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That said, it seems probable that the New Deal and World War II saw the 
greatest executive-branch dominance of congressional drafting and 
deliberations that America has ever witnessed. The volume and gravity of 
legislation in those years was unprecedented, but Congress did not seriously 
begin to build up its own internal administrative capacity until the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 and after. Thus, up to 1946, the House and Senate 
standing committees had no regular professional staff. “When such staff 
assistance was needed,” noted one political scientist, “it was borrowed on detail 
from an executive agency,” still on the executive payroll.243 Though personal 
staff for individual members had crept upward since the 1890s, the number 
stood in 1944 at only three for each Representative and six for each Senator 
(less than one-fifth what it is today).244 The 1946 Act provided four 
professional staffers per committee,245 but this was so few that they generally 
would merely review agencies’ proposals, not take initiative themselves.246 
Only in the 1960s and 1970s would congressional committee staff grow into a 
major force.247 Likewise for the House and Senate Offices of Legislative 
Counsel. In the early 1940s, these offices, which helped congressmen with 
drafting upon request, had only five lawyers each.248 With such tiny numbers, 
 
(1950). Today, likewise, scholars note that agencies are playing an important role in 
authoring bills and legislative history. Katzmann, supra note 3, at 659-60. 
243.  GLADYS M. KAMMERER, THE STAFFING OF THE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 3 (1949). 
Committees did have clerical staffers, but the number of these “had not increased 
perceptibly since World War I,” and nearly all of them were non-expert. HARRISON W. FOX, 
JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN 
LAWMAKING 20 (1977); see also id. at 21-22 (recounting discussions in 1946 regarding staffing 
levels in Congress). 
244.  On the House figure up to 1944, see FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 243, at 19. Each Senator 
was entitled to a maximum of four personal staff members as of 1924, id. at 18, while by 
1946, the average Senator employed six personal staff members, id. at 20. For numbers 
today, see R. ERIC PETERSEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41366, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE STAFF LEVELS IN MEMBER, COMMITTEE, LEADERSHIP, AND 
OTHER OFFICES, 1977-2010, at 7, 11 (2010). 
245.  KAMMERER, supra note 243, at 4. 
246.  Id. at 41-42; accord Harry W. Jones, Drafting of Proposed Legislation by Federal Executive 
Agencies, 35 A.B.A. J. 136, 137 (1949). 
247.  FOX & HAMMOND, supra note 243, at 22-25. 
248.  OFFICIAL CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 267, 274 (1941); OFFICIAL 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 267, 274 (1943). On the titles in the 
directories, see Harry W. Jones, Bill-Drafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures, 65 
HARV. L. REV. 441, 444 (1952). 
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they could not rival the administrative state.249 The Legislative Counsel Offices 
would expand after 1946 and become important only later.250 Today they have 
more than seven times as many lawyers as they had before 1946.251 
With such a crushing demand for legislation and so little internal capacity 
to meet it, Congress leaned heavily on the administrative state in drafting and 
deliberations in 1933-45. On this point, a key observer was Edwin Witte. An 
economist at the University of Wisconsin, Witte had worked for a 
congressman and a federal investigatory commission in 1912-15; then as 
executive director of FDR’s Committee on Economic Security in 1934-35, in 
which capacity he was the chief lobbyist for the Social Security Act; and then as 
 
249.  The testimony of the House and Senate Legislative Counsels in 1945, when read closely, is 
entirely consistent with executive-branch dominance of drafting. According to a colloquy 
between the House Legislative Counsel and a congressional committee, the House Counsel’s 
office “either drafted or did substantial work on” about 23% of the public bills and joint 
resolutions introduced in 1943-44, and “of the public bills that became law, what you might 
call major bills, either our office [i.e., the House Counsel’s office] or the Senate office 
worked on pretty near all of them,” meaning “that at some time during the process the bill 
went through [the Legislative Counsel’s] office,” though it “may not have been what we call 
a complete job,” that is, the “language” of the bill “may have originated in our office or 
somewhere else, but we had some connection at some stage of it in connection with almost 
all important legislation.” Organization of Congress: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the 
Org. of Cong., 79th Cong. 420-21 (1945) (statement of Middleton Beaman, House Legislative 
Counsel). The House Legislative Counsel added that “there are important exceptions” to the 
office having had even this level of involvement with a major bill. Id. at 421. The Senate 
Legislative Counsel stated that “many bills are drawn in the executive branch of the 
Government”; “it is very common . . . for Senators to submit to our office drafts that have 
been furnished to them by an executive agency”; “a lot of proposed legislation that comes 
down here is the outgrowth of long study by administrative agencies over a long period, 
possibly years.” Id. at 461 (statement of Charles F. Boots, Senate Legislative Counsel). He 
added that, for 19 of 21 bills designated as “major” on the House calendar in 1943-44, the 
House office, Senate office, or both “either drafted the final legislation in its entirety” or 
“devoted a substantial amount of work to the preparation of the final drafts.” Id. at 463. He 
also gave statistics on the number of bills “drafted,” see id. at 466, but he apparently equated 
“drafting” a bill with responding to any request for any kind of help with the bill, see id. at 
463. 
250.  See the rising appropriation in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 
812, 837 (1946). 
251.  See House Office of the Legislative Counsel—Staff Directory, LEGISTORM, http://www.legistorm 
.com/pro/staffer_list/office_id/1532/name/House_Office_of_the_Legislative_Counsel.html 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (naming 47 employees with Counsel or Attorney in their titles); 
Senate Legislative Counsel—Staff Directory, LEGISTORM, http://www.legistorm.com/pro 
/staffer_list/office_id/675/name/Senate_Legislative_Counsel.html (last visited Sept. 19, 
2013) (naming 37 employees with Counsel or Attorney in their titles). 
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a consultant to the Social Security Board and to leading liberal congressmen in 
the succeeding years, visiting D.C. frequently.252 In a 1942 article, Witte 
attested that 
[b]eyond question many important statutes enacted by Congress have 
their origin in administrative departments and congressional action is 
profoundly influenced by the wishes of these departments. To my 
personal knowledge this has been the situation as to substantially all 
social security legislation and also, I believe, as to most of the 
agricultural, banking, credit, defense, housing, insurance, public utility, 
securities, tax, and much other legislation of the last five or eight 
years.253 
From the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, administrators’ “influence in legislation 
grew and reached an importance unique in the history of this country.”254 
Administrators were especially important in shaping the content of legislative 
history: 
The role of administrators and administrative agencies in statute 
lawmaking is not confined to the preparation of bills introduced in 
Congress. Their influence is important also in the congressional 
consideration of these measures. Administrators are constantly 
appearing before congressional committees to give testimony in public 
hearings both on measures which originated in their departments and 
on other bills. 
. . . Departmental representatives work with legislative draftsmen and 
committee clerks [i.e., non-professional staff] in preparing committee 
amendments, substitute bills, and [committee] reports. Commonly also 
the interested departments supply the committee chairmen and other 
members who champion their bills with material for their speeches, and 
their representatives are within beck and call to supply needed 
information during the course of the debate in the houses themselves. 
[Here Witte dropped a footnote: “In the Senate, departmental 
representatives are often on the floor during debates. In the House they 
 
252.  See David B. Johnson, The “Government Man”: Edwin E. Witte of the University of Wisconsin, 
82 WIS. MAG. HIST. 32, 32, 37-38, 42-44 (1998). 
253.  Edwin E. Witte, Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking, 2 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 116, 116 
(1942). 
254.  Id. at 117. 
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are barred strictly from the floor but are in the galleries or in near-by 
rooms to be called for as needed.”] Almost always representatives of the 
interested departments work and sit with conference committees in the 
final stages of important congressional enactments.255 
To be sure, added Witte, “[m]embers of Congress who have served long on 
committees . . . often become real specialists in these fields, quite well able to 
hold their own with any one,” but “[o]n any particular measure . . . few 
members of Congress can become as expert as able civil servants who devote 
most of their lives to a narrow specialty.”256 In an article published shortly 
before Witte’s, political scientist O. Douglas Weeks similarly concluded that 
agency influence on congressional drafting and deliberations had reached a 
new peak.257 And in 1949, Harry Willmer Jones expressed a similar view of 
agencies as the principal originators and expositors of bills “in matters of 
government regulation and administration.”258 
Often, an individual attorney would (1) work for an agency or DOJ, (2) 
draft or lobby for a statute on the administration’s behalf, thus helping to 
author its legislative history, and then (3) help write the government briefs in 
Supreme Court cases about the statute, citing that very legislative history. Take 
for example FDR’s crime package of 1934. Gordon Dean, of the DOJ Criminal 
Division, shouldered the “principal load” of drafting, testified on Capitol Hill, 
forcefully lobbied the House Judiciary Chair “behind the scenes,” and later 
briefed multiple Supreme Court cases on the package, citing its history 
extensively.259 Years later, Dean looked back on the opportunities that federal 
lawyering had offered him: 
I think it is a rare thing for a lawyer to be able to get into the position 
where he has something to do with writing the statute, then guiding it 
through the district [court] and the [Court of Appeals], and then 
finally making the final argument for his work in the United States 
 
255.  Id. at 119-20. 
256.  Id. at 121. 
257.  O. Douglas Weeks, Initiation of Legislation by Administrative Agencies, 9 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 
118, 122-24 (1940). 
258.  Jones, supra note 246, at 136. 
259.  Dean Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 207, at 52-55. For legislative history in one of the 
briefs, see Brief for the United States [Respondent] at 9-15, Gooch v. United States, 297 
U.S. 124 (1936) (No. 559). 
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Supreme Court. That was the situation in which I found myself in 
those days. It was a lot of fun.260 
Several other lawyers also played each of these multiple roles.261 
D. The Federal Government’s Turn Toward Briefing Legislative History 
My discussion so far has been static. As of about 1940, the federal 
government had extraordinary capacity to meet the challenge of providing 
legislative history to the Supreme Court, and it did so. But what was 
happening up to 1940? Had the federal government always been providing 
legislative history, only to have the Court ignore it? Had the federal 
government only recently begun to provide it? If so, what triggered this shift in 
briefing practice? 
To investigate these questions, I now present data on the use of legislative 
history in federal Supreme Court briefs over time (irrespective of whether the 
Court’s opinions picked up on that history). Figure 7 gives, for each calendar 
year in 1930-45, the ratio between (1) the number of legislative history citations 
 
260.  Dean Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 207, at 61. 
261.  For example, Charles Wyzanski, as Solicitor of DOL, worked on some of the predecessor 
bills to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935: he helped prepare the Secretary’s 
congressional testimony, helped draft one bill, drafted the committee report for that bill, 
and stood next to the sponsoring Senator during floor debate “for the purpose of helping 
him answer questions.” Wyzanski Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 204, at 205-08. 
Wyzanski then moved to the OSG, where he briefed the cases on the constitutionality of the 
eventual statute, relying in part on its legislative history. See, for example, the citations to 
the hearings in Brief for the National Labor Relations Board [Petitioner] at 83-84 & n.32, 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (No. 419). 
          For his part, Thomas Eliot served as Assistant Solicitor of DOL; then as counsel to 
FDR’s Committee on Economic Security, where he personally drafted the Social Security 
Act; then as General Counsel to the Social Security Board, where he helped write the 
Supreme Court brief defending the Act’s constitutionality, which cited huge amounts of its 
legislative history. Wyzanski Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 204, at 180, 246; Brief for 
the Respondent, Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (No. 837). 
          Another example involves the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which the Court struck 
down in 1936. Warner Gardner was detailed from OSG to help with the challenging task of 
drafting the statute to provide refunds of the unconstitutional taxes. When a case 
concerning the refund statute arrived at the Court in 1941, Gardner told the new acting SG 
that he had it covered: “I helped draft the AAA refund statute and have handled most of the 
cases under that statute.” Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner to the Acting Solicitor 
General 3 (July 30, 1941), Box 44, Folder titled “Supreme Court (Oct. 1941 Term) – 
Assignments of Argument,” Fahy Papers, supra note 203. 
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appearing in federal briefs filed in Supreme Court statutory cases decided 
during that calendar year and (2) the number of federally briefed Supreme 
Court statutory cases decided during that calendar year. 
A clear break occurs in 1936. In 1930-35, the average of the annual ratios is 
2.8. In 1936-45, it is 10.1, nearly four times higher. The lowest ratio in 1936-45 
(of 5.1 in 1938) is still higher than the highest ratio in 1930-35 (of 4.5 in 1935). 
Thus, the government enormously increased its briefing of legislative history 
around 1936 and never returned to the initial baseline. (An alternative metric 
oriented toward the regularity of citation rather than its intensity—the annual 
proportion of federally briefed cases in which federal briefs cited any legislative 
history—likewise reveals a strong upward trend, but a smoother one, averaging 
43% in 1930-35, 60% in 1936-40, and 70% in 1941-45.262) 
 
Figure 7. 
legislative history citations in federal supreme court briefs per 





262.  The proportions for each year are: 34% in 1930; 24% in 1931; 43% in 1932; 49% in 1933; 56% 
in 1934; 50% in 1935; 48% in 1936; 59% in 1937; 62% in 1938; 67% in 1939; 62% in 1940; 
68% in 1941; 57% in 1942; 79% in 1943; 73% in 1944; and 72% in 1945. The cases used in 
calculating this metric total 1,094 across 16 years. They exclude those cases—7 in number—
that were identified by the opinion as federally briefed but for which we could find no 
federal briefs. They include those cases—8 in number—for which we found at least one 
federal brief but could tell that at least one other federal brief was missing. 
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These figures are consistent with the idea that heavy government briefing 
of legislative history was a necessary condition for heavy Court citation of such 
history. The Court’s process of normalization began (in 1940) only after the 
government’s process of normalization was in full swing. In a general way, the 
Court followed the government. 
Still, there is an interesting lag between the government’s shift (around 
1936) and the Court’s shift (around 1940). Why did the Justices wait four years 
before intensively using the material that the government was copiously 
providing? In part, it may be that the Justices on the Court at the time were 
less intellectually receptive to legislative history in general (as discussed in Part 
II). 
But my research suggests there is also another reason. Within the period 
1936-45, there was a change in the predominant purpose for which the 
government used legislative history. The initial spike centering on 1936 
reflected the government’s use of legislative history to defend the 
constitutionality of federal statutes, whereas the more sustained upward trend 
from about 1939 onward reflected the government’s routinization of legislative 
history as a tool for arguing “pure” questions of statutory interpretation 
unconnected to constitutional challenges.263 
This change in the government’s purpose fits with the sweep of events. The 
years 1935-37 saw a constitutional crisis, in which the Court initially threatened 
to block much of the New Deal but, in spring 1937, retreated to a more 
cooperative position. In the years after 1937, as scholars observed at the time, 
the Court shifted its focus away from judicial review of federal legislation and 
 
263.  This is based on a targeted investigation of federal briefs in the four years with the highest 
ratios: 1936, 1940, 1941, and 1944. For each of those years, I made a list of every case in 
which the federal government’s brief(s) totaled 10 citations or more. For all cases on the list, 
I examined the federal briefs and divided them into (1) those that used legislative history 
entirely or almost entirely to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute, (2) those that 
used legislative history entirely or almost entirely on a pure question of statutory 
interpretation, unconnected to constitutionality, and (3) those that used legislative history in 
ways that were mixed or unclear. Through this targeted examination of the briefs that were 
heaviest on legislative history, I determined that, in 1936, at least 84% of the legislative 
history citations in all federal briefs in that year’s statutory cases were used to defend the 
constitutionality of a statute. But in 1940, it was just the opposite: at least 84% of legislative 
history citations in all federal briefs in that year’s statutory cases were used on pure 
questions of statutory interpretation. The year 1941 followed the pattern of the preceding 
year, albeit not as dramatically: at least 54% of legislative history citations were on pure 
statutory interpretation. The year 1944 followed the same pattern, this time more strongly: 
at least 74% of legislative history citations were on pure statutory interpretation. 
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began focusing more on the interpretation and implementation of that 
legislation.264 
The lag between the government’s shift and the Court’s shift can be 
explained not only by new progressive Justices’ general receptivity to legislative 
history, but also by the fact that (1) the government began intensively using 
legislative history for pure statutory interpretation only in 1939-40, 
immediately before the Court’s shift, and (2) the Justices were apparently more 
reluctant to shovel the government’s research into their opinions in cases on 
constitutionality than in cases on pure statutory interpretation. Why this 
reluctance? When defending the constitutionality of a federal act, the 
government’s usual aim in citing legislative history was to assure the Court 
that Congress had found the legislative facts requisite to the exercise of its 
enumerated powers.265 But conservative and progressive Justices each had 
reason to avoid confronting such material: conservatives wanted to preserve 
formalist doctrines immune from the functional considerations to which 
legislative facts pertained, while progressives thought the judiciary should 
defer to congressional fact-findings and therefore wished to avoid a searching 
judicial examination of those findings. For example, in defending the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, the government cited an avalanche 
of congressional reports and hearings to support Congress’s finding that 
regulation of coal mining was necessary to redress the unregulated industry’s 
enormous deleterious effects on interstate commerce.266 In his majority 
opinion striking down the Act, however, the conservative Justice Sutherland 
ignored this congressional evidence. He insisted that the magnitude of the evil 
effect was irrelevant, for the effect still was not “direct” in the doctrinal sense 
required to legalize congressional action: “[T]he extent of the effect bears no 
logical relation to its character.”267 
As a converse example, consider the government’s brief in defense of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which cited copious reports and hearings in 
support of Congress’s view that substandard working conditions created 
 
264.  Walton H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 
YALE L.J. 1319, 1357 (1941). 
265.  Reflecting on his litigation of constitutional cases in 1937-40, Jackson said: “Generally the 
best plan [for the government] was first to convince the court that a problem existed which 
the federal government ought to remedy.” Jackson Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, 
at 661; see also id. at 478-79, 485. 
266.  Brief for Government Officers, Respondents in No. 636 and Petitioners in No. 651, at 15-25, 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Nos. 636 & 651). 
267.  Carter, 298 U.S. at 307-08. 
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problems for interstate commerce that individual states could not solve.268 
Writing for a unanimous Court, however, the progressive Justice Stone cited 
legislative history only sparingly, for he believed the examination of such 
findings was not appropriate in constitutional review: “The motive and 
purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative 
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction, 
and over which the courts are given no control.”269 Stone and his progressive 
colleagues adopted a different attitude when the government briefed legislative 
history for the purpose of pure statutory interpretation, for then the judicial 
task was to carry out Congress’s intent, not to judge the legality of that intent. 
Now that we have a picture of the government’s briefing practices across 
the period 1930-45, we can ask why the government began intensively briefing 
legislative history when it did, rather than earlier. At one level, the answer is 
obvious: the government’s initial leap into legislative history occurred in 
constitutional cases around 1936 simply because federal lawyers at that time 
faced the most acute constitutional crisis in living memory. Extraordinary  
challenges called for creative solutions. But this explanation is not entirely 
satisfying. Most importantly, the government’s intensive use of legislative 
history over the long run pertained more to pure statutory interpretation than 
to constitutionality, and the government began heavily briefing legislative 
history on purely statutory questions only in about 1939-40, even though 
statutory questions had been part of its workload for generations. Why did the 
government routinize the use of legislative history for statutory questions in 
1939-40 and not before? 
The answer appears to be that the federal government’s unique capacity to 
brief legislative history—which I documented in Section III.C—was of recent 
origin. It came into being only in the 1930s. The unrivaled manpower of the 
DOJ divisions resulted from remarkably rapid growth amid the New Deal. In 
Table 2, I give the available data on the number of attorneys located in 
Washington, D.C., at the five principal DOJ divisions270: 
 
268.  Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 20-43, United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 
U.S. 100 (1941) (No. 82). 
269.  Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. at 115. 
270.  The table is based on my calculations from the Register of the DOJ, see sources cited supra 
note 199, for the listed years. I exclude any attorneys listed as being “in the field” or the like. 
I focus on these five principal divisions because they were the ones regularly involved in 
briefing Supreme Court cases. (See memoranda cited supra note 203.) This means I exclude 
sections that did not litigate: Administrative Division; Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of 
Prisons; Bureau of Prohibition; Office of the Attorney General; Office of the Assistant SG; 
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Table 2.  
doj attorneys in washington, d.c., by division, 1930-42 (selected years) 
 
 1930 1934 1936 1938 1942 
Antitrust (All 
Business Regulation) 
19 37 69 122 268 
Public Lands 16 37 71 114 112 
Tax 36 82 92 91 96 
Claims 44 31 37 52 66 
Criminal 8 25 37 42 82 
Total 123 212 306 421 624 
 
 
This is an explosion. In 1938, the divisions had nearly four times as many 
lawyers as in 1930. In 1942, they had more than five times. Back in 1930, it is 
possible that the D.C. headquarters of DOJ constituted the largest law office in 
America, but not by much. By the late 1930s, there was no comparison: “Main 
Justice” dwarfed any other American organization of lawyers. It was this 
unprecedented size that allowed DOJ to develop an appellate section and 
sometimes a Supreme Court section within each division—an amazing degree 
of specialization for the period.271 
Agencies outside DOJ also played a major role in researching legislative 
history before the Court, and those agencies, too, exploded in the 1930s.272 
 
and the Taxes and Penalties Unit (on liquor excise taxes). I also exclude litigation sections 
not frequently assigned Supreme Court briefs: the Alien Property Bureau (sometimes listed 
under the Claims Division, or as a separate section labeled “Admiralty, Finance, Alien 
Property, Custodian Matters, Etc.”); and the Bureau of War Risk Litigation (covering 
veterans’ benefits); and the Customs Division (located in New York City). In addition, from 
the count for 1930, I exclude nineteen lawyers who worked in the offices of the Solicitors of 
the Treasury Department, Commerce Department, and Labor Department. These three 
offices were technically part of DOJ, but they had never actually been practically integrated 
into DOJ and were instead really attached to their respective departments. Shortly after 
1934, these offices were officially moved back into the departments to which they were 
already practically attached (or they were abolished and replaced with offices officially in 
those departments). Wyzanski Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 204, at 179-80. 
271.  See supra notes 214-216 and accompanying text. 
272.  The agencies named in this paragraph, along with the DOJ divisions, cover all the entities 
assigned briefs for 1941-42 in the memoranda cited supra note 203. The only exception is the 
 
 
the yale law journal 123:266   2013  
348 
 
Many of the agencies assigned to draft Supreme Court briefs in the early 1940s 
had come into existence in the preceding decade: the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (1932), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the 
Federal Communications Commission (1934), the National Labor Relations 
Board (1935), and the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department 
(1938). New Deal statutes also gave vast new missions and personnel to 
preexisting agencies that would brief Supreme Court cases. The ICC acquired 
the power to direct railroad bankruptcies (1933) and regulate trucking (1935); 
its personnel grew by about 70% in 1935-41.273 The missions of the Treasury 
Department and Internal Revenue Bureau expanded with new taxes on rich 
individuals and corporations (1935-37) and Social Security taxes (1935); the 
Department’s new Legal Division, with its huge legislative history operation, 
was founded in 1934. The Federal Power Commission acquired the authority to 
regulate electricity (1935) and natural gas (1938); its “original organization” 
was therefore “greatly enlarged.”274 
This explosion of DOJ and agency capacity during the 1930s occurred 
simultaneously with an increased volume of legislation and a failure by 
Congress to beef up its own internal staff. This led to the upsurge in the 
administrative state’s influence over congressional drafting and deliberations 
described by Witte and Weeks. 
As the agencies and DOJ divisions grew bigger, and as Congress became 
more dependent on them, they became better integrated with the OSG, their 
pipeline to the Court. After the ineffectual tenure of James Crawford Biggs 
(1933-35), Stanley Reed became SG in 1935. He deliberately hired lawyers with 
experience in agencies: Wyzanski from DOL, Alger Hiss from the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration,275 Paul Freund from the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, Robert Stern from the Interior Department, Arnold Raum from 
the DOJ Tax Division, etc. And he made a conscious effort to engage more 
with the agencies “to get the best background” in producing briefs and making 
 
War Risk Bureau inside DOJ, which had only three briefs over two years. The Treasury 
Department and Internal Revenue Bureau are included although they were not officially 
assigned any briefs, for they surely helped with them. 
273.  INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES 1937-1962, H.R. DOC. NO. 87-359, at 18-19 
(1962). 
274.  BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROPOSED PLAN OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 2, 
5 (1940). 
275.  Wyzanski Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 204, at 258-59. 
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arguments.276 This cleared the pipeline from the administrative state to the 
Court. 
Thus, the administrative state by the late 1930s was in a far better 
institutional position to provide legislative history to the Court than any 
organization in American history to that time. This timing explains why the 
federal government did not leap into briefing legislative history before the late 
1930s. But there remains the converse question: why did the government leap 
so quickly into briefing such history once it was positioned to do so? 
I think that, once the critical mass of institutional capacity was reached, 
briefing legislative history was simply the natural thing for federal lawyers to 
do, because the agencies and DOJ were so familiar with the material (given 
their engagement with Congress) and because the adversary system provided 
an incentive to wield any weapon that was less available to one’s opponent. 
These causal factors operated across most, perhaps all, agencies and DOJ 
divisions. Consistent with this, federal briefs heavily citing legislative history 
during the upsurge of 1939-40 were not concentrated in any particular field.277 
Another possible reason the government began wielding legislative history 
so enthusiastically in 1939-40 was that federal lawyers—confident in their 
ability to use such material insofar as the Court was open to it—perceived an 
emergent Supreme Court majority that was more open than any of its 
predecessors. Roosevelt made his third and fourth appointments in 1939 and 
his fifth in early 1940. Government briefing of legislative history in pure 
statutory interpretation was on the rise in 1939 and early 1940. The American 
Trucking opinion in May 1940 announced the new Roosevelt appointees’ 
openness, and it was an announcement that the federal government—as the 
petitioner and victorious party in that case—had actively sought and helped 
bring about. The government’s American Trucking brief, in contending that the 
Motor Carrier Act’s use of “employees” excepted only safety-related employees 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act, argued for a partial rollback of the plain 
meaning rule. Citing Holy Trinity, it declared that “general terms” like 
“employee” could never have a plain meaning but always had to be “interpreted 
in the light of the purposes sought by Congress,” allowing resort to legislative 
 
276.  Reminiscences of Stanley Forman Reed, Harold Leventhal and John Sapienza (1959), at 
190, in the Columbia Center for Oral History Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y; see 
also id. at 142, 233 (reporting the same). 
277.  Also, using archival records of briefing assignments in 1941-43, I found that no agency or 
DOJ division was seriously over- or underrepresented among the federal briefs that heavily 
used legislative history in those years. These records are cited supra note 203. 
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history.278 The government pushed a similar approach in another high-profile 
case simultaneously with American Trucking (which it also won),279 and after 
American Trucking came down, the government embraced Reed’s language in 
future briefs.280 
The federal government’s adoption of legislative history arose mainly from 
its institutional position, not from any particular theory of interpretation. 
Indeed, the government’s institutional position was so well-suited to the 
briefing of legislative history that federal lawyers proved capable of using that 
material in widely disparate ways, which reflected divergent theories of its 
interpretive usefulness. On the one hand, many federal briefs in 1940-45 used 
 
278.  Brief for the Appellants [United States et al.] at 14-15, United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns 
310 U.S. 534 (1940) (No. 713). 
279.  The case was SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940), on whether the 
Chandler Act of 1938 permitted publicly-held companies to file for bankruptcy in such a way 
as to avoid SEC protections for investors. In its brief, the government invoked Holy Trinity 
vociferously: “there can be no reasonable doubt that adherence to the strict letter of the law 
would nullify rather than effectuate the intent of Congress,” so the “clear purpose of 
Congress,” revealed in the legislative history despite the poor drafting, “must be given 
effect.” Brief for the Petitioner [SEC] at 13-14, U.S. Realty, 310 U.S. 434 (No. 796). On the 
case’s outcome, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
IN AMERICA 163-64 (2001) (noting that, although United States Realty was viewed as a 
government victory at the time, the opinion had ambiguities that would cause trouble for 
the SEC in later years). 
280.  Seven months after American Trucking was handed down, a case arose under the Espionage 
Act in which the text clearly supported the government’s view, while the legislative history 
cut against it. The government studiously refrained from questioning American Trucking. 
Instead, it recognized that the legislative history was clearly admissible, discussed it in great 
depth, and urged that it was too ambiguous to override the clear import of the text. Brief for 
the United States [Respondent in Nos. 87, 88] at 42, 53-54, Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 
19 (1941) (Nos. 87, 88). For later invocations of the American Trucking principle by the 
government, see Brief for the Federal Power Commission at 49-50, Conn. Light & Power 
Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515 (1945) (No. 189); Brief for the Administrator of the 
Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor as Amicus Curiae at 14-16, 
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (No. 217); Brief for the 
Petitioner [Harrison, Collector] at 15, Harrison v. N. Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943) (No. 
103); and Brief for the Petitioner [Helvering] at 15-16, Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 
(1943) (No. 467). To be sure, some attorneys slipped in a minor tax case in 1942, asserting 
the plain meaning rule in one sentence before extensively discussing the legislative history. 
Brief for the Petitioner [Helvering] at 20, Helvering v. Ohio Leather Co., 317 U.S. 102 (1942) 
(Nos. 40, 41, 42). Also, in a brief of January 1941, some antitrust lawyers invoked plain 
meaning in an introductory clause of one sentence, again as a preface to an extensive 
discussion of legislative history; the tone of the brief overall was highly purpose-oriented, 
not at all literalist. Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 34, United States v. Cooper 
Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (No. 484). 
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legislative history in a clear effort to discern the statute’s general intent, then 
worked “downward” from there to the particular application.281 One can 
understand the attractiveness of general intent for agency thinking: in the view 
of many scholars, agency personnel are distinctly oriented toward program 
implementation, so they want to find and defend the interpretation that best 
furthers their organization’s overall objective.282 But on the other hand, federal 
lawyers in 1940-45 were quite capable of using legislative history to argue for 
the specific intent of a provision. Agencies had as much of an advantage in 
digging up specific references in legislative history as in using it to understand 
general intent, for agency personnel were so deeply immersed in congressional 
deliberations that they could remember the nitty-gritty specifics better than 
anybody. Thus, in a 1940 brief on whether a federal statute criminalized false 
affidavits submitted under the Hot Oil Act, the government cited a committee 
report indicating that Hot Oil affidavits were “one of the two specific instances 
which prompted the enactment of” the statute, so that a construction failing to 
cover them would contravene “not only the general purpose of the [provision] 
 
281.  Brief for the Federal Trade Commission [Respondent] at 68-70, Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. 
FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (No. 680) (arguing that a certain definition of “processing” would 
better effectuate the Robinson-Patman Act’s purpose to prevent discrimination by 
manufacturer-distributors); Brief for the United States [Respondent] at 25, Jerome v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) (No. 325) (arguing that the Bank Robbery Act’s purpose 
to protect banks against larceny and burglary meant it should not be construed to draw a 
distinction between federal and state offenses); Brief for the National Labor Relations Board 
[Respondent] at 38, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320) (arguing that the 
act’s purpose to “improve the condition of the American sailor” meant its repealer should 
not be construed to reinstate a severe penalty); Brief for the Petitioner [Brooks] at 46-50 & 
n.62, Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941) (No. 718) (arguing that a 1934 statute 
empowered the Grazing Service not only to make permanent rules for the conservation of 
grazing land, but also to impose interim rules while figuring out the permanent rules, since 
incapacity to make interim rules “would frustrate the explicitly declared purposes of the 
Act,” i.e., conservation, as shown by legislative history); Brief for the National Labor 
Relations Board [Respondent] at 50-51, H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941) (No. 
73) (arguing that the NLRA’s purpose to promote industrial peace required reading the 
statute to require that agreements be in writing); Brief for the Appellants [United States et 
al.] at 28-29, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (No. 713) (arguing that the Motor 
Carrier Act should not be construed as a complete substitute for the National Industrial 
Recovery Act as applied to trucking, for “the purposes and ends sought to be achieved by 
the National Industrial Recovery Act were totally different from those sought in the Motor 
Carrier Act,” since NIRA was “a recovery measure” affecting employees generally, while 
MCA was “solely a transportation statute”). 
282.  On the present day, see Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89. 
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but one of its specific purposes as well.”283 In a 1943 brief on whether the Anti-
Kickback Act applied to foremen, the federal lawyers dug up complaints from 
the hearings about foremen receiving kickbacks.284 In a 1944 brief arguing that 
the Federal Power Commission had the authority to force Connecticut Power 
and Light to fulfill certain accounting requirements, the government pointed 
out that the “proponents of the [Federal Power] Act, by way of illustrating the 
accounting abuses sought to be remedied thereby, specifically cited during the 
debates in the House alleged write-ups aggregating $21,000,000 in the 
accounts of petitioner [Connecticut Power and Light].”285 
E. Non-Federal Lawyers Briefing Legislative History: The Importance of 
Lobbyists 
While the federal government was formidable in its capacity to use 
legislative history, this did not mean that lawyers outside were entirely 
incapable of doing so. Here I discuss the non-federal lawyers who briefed 
legislative history. Their backgrounds deepen our understanding of what made 
lawyers capable of using this material. 
Having counted legislative history citations in all federal briefs in Supreme 
Court statutory cases in 1930-45, my research team also counted such citations 
in all non-federal briefs in such cases, but only for the years 1938-41. The reason 
we focused on this narrow range of years was time and money: non-federal 
briefs were more numerous than federal ones, so processing a year’s worth of 
them took us longer. I selected the years 1938-41 because they encompassed the 
federal government’s normalization of legislative history for pure statutory 
interpretation, for which a comparison to non-federal briefing would be of 
interest. 
We can begin our analysis by comparing (1) the number of legislative 
history citations in all federal briefs in federally briefed cases for a given year 
and (2) the number of legislative history citations in all non-federal briefs in 
 
283.  Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 19, 22, United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 
(1941) (No. 245). 
284.  Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 39-40, United States v. Laudani, 320 U.S. 543 
(1944) (No. 71). 
285.  Brief for the Federal Power Commission [Respondent] at 41-42, Conn. Light & Power Co., 
324 U.S. 515 (No. 189); see also Brief for the National Labor Relations Board [Respondent] 
at 42-47, Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944) (Nos. 66, 67) (using legislative 
history to put a narrowing gloss on the NLRA’s legalization of closed-shop agreements, so 
as to better effectuate the Act’s broader purpose of promoting employee free association). 
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federally briefed cases for that same year. In 1938, the federal-brief citations 
were 3% less than the non-federal-brief citations; in 1939, 39% less; in 1940, 
21% less; and in 1941, 111% more. The near-parity in 1938 is not surprising, 
since Figure 7 indicates that 1938 saw a brief dip in federal briefing, after the 
constitutional crisis but before the routine use of legislative history for pure 
statutory interpretation. However, the ratios in 1939 and 1940—when federal 
briefs contained (respectively) 39% and 21% fewer citations than did non-
federal briefs—are surprising. How could the non-federal briefs have been 
ahead? Importantly, the non-federal citations were concentrated in relatively 
few cases. For example, across the 61 federally briefed cases in 1939, 78% of the 
citations appearing in non-federal briefs were packed into two cases; by 
comparison, the two cases that year in which federal briefs contained the most 
legislative history accounted for only 34% of that year’s federal-brief citations. 
Similarly, across the 64 federally briefed cases in 1940, 59% of the citations 
appearing in non-federal briefs were packed into two cases; by comparison, the 
two cases that year in which federal briefs contained the most legislative history 
accounted for only 32% of that year’s federal-brief citations. 
Because the citation total for a year’s worth of briefs (especially non-federal 
briefs) was often driven by just a few cases—much more so than was the case 
with judicial opinions286—I decided that my comparison of federal and non-
federal briefs needed to go beyond aggregate annual numbers. Therefore, I 
made an ordered list, for each year, of all the federally briefed cases, starting 
with the case in which the federal brief(s) contained the most legislative history 
citations and moving downward to the case in which such brief(s) contained 
the fewest. I then made an analogous ordered list, for the same year and the 
same cases, starting with the case in which the non-federal brief(s) contained 
the most legislative history citations and moving downward to the case in 
which such brief(s) contained the fewest. Then, for each year, I placed the two 
lists side-by-side, so it was possible to compare the median number of federal 
citations with the median number of non-federal citations, or the 75th 
percentile of federal citations with the 75th percentile of non-federal citations, 
etc. 
In Table 3, I report comparisons between numbers of federal and non-
federal citations at percentiles ranging from the 95th to the 50th (below which 
 
286.  Consider the legislative history citations appearing in the Court’s opinions in statutory cases 
in 1940-45. In each of these six years, the percentage that appeared in the top two cases 
ranged from 15% to 27%. This is a lower level of concentration than we observe in federal 
briefs and far lower than in non-federal briefs. 
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the numbers become small or zero). I also report, for each year, the percentage 
of cases in which the federal brief(s) contained any legislative history and the 
percentage of cases in which the non-federal brief(s) contained any legislative 
history.287 
Looking across the run of cases (rather than at aggregate annual numbers), 
we see that, starting in 1939, federal lawyers were generally ahead of non-
federal lawyers when it came to legislative history, usually by a wide margin. 
The federal advantage is more impressive considering that it was not 
uncommon, in a single case, for there to be two or more non-federal briefs each 
of which came from a distinct non-federal party (or amicus) with its own set of 
lawyers. That is, the federal government might be double-teamed (or triple-
teamed, etc.). This occurred in 26% of cases in 1938, 38% in 1939, 14% in 1940, 
and 26% in 1941.288 
The biggest exception to the federal advantage is that, at least in 1939-40, 
the federal lawyers fell behind at the very top of the scale (the 95th percentile 
and sometimes the 90th). This is consistent with the high aggregate numbers 
for non-federal briefs in those years. Thus, although non-federal lawyers 
usually failed to match their federal counterparts across the board, there was 








287.  There are some gaps in the data, but in all years except 1938, the gaps are tiny and about 
evenly split between the federal and non-federal categories. In 1939, of 61 federally briefed 
cases, two cases were clearly missing federal briefs, and one case was clearly missing a non-
federal brief (or briefs). In 1940, of 64 federally briefed cases, one case was clearly missing a 
federal brief (or briefs) and two cases were clearly missing non-federal briefs. In 1941, of 75 
federally briefed cases, there were no evident gaps in the data. 
          It is in 1938 that larger gaps occur. In that year, of 66 federally briefed cases, one case 
was clearly missing a federal brief (or briefs) and six cases were clearly missing non-federal 
briefs. Thus, the ratio of federal to non-federal citations was probably somewhat lower than 
is reflected in the table. This just further confirms that, as of 1938, the federal government 
had not yet begun briefing legislative history at full power for purposes of statutory 
interpretation; it would make that leap only in 1939-40. 
288.  Conversely, it was possible for two or more federal briefs to be submitted by distinct federal 
entities, but this was rare: it occurred not at all in 1938 and 1939; in 2% of cases in 1940; and 
in 1% in 1941. 
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To investigate how non-federal lawyers acquired this capability, I identified 
all non-federal briefs in cases decided in 1938-41 that contained 25 or more 
citations to legislative history. There were 25 such briefs. I then researched the 
backgrounds of the lawyers and litigants on those briefs. 
Before I discuss common factors among the non-federal lawyers and 
litigants, the first thing to note is that there were no “repeat players.” No 
lawyer or litigant appeared more than once across the 25 briefs. This is 
consistent with what we know about the “Supreme Court Bar” during the 
1930s and 1940s: no such bar existed. Back in the early republic, when travel to 
D.C. had been difficult, there had been a small cadre of private lawyers who 
argued frequently before the Court, but as travel eased, that cadre 
disappeared.289 The proportion of non-federal advocates arguing more than a 
single case before the Court fell from 25% in 1840 to 17% in 1900 to 7% in 1940. 
Thus, nearly all non-federal lawyers in our period were one-timers.290 
While no factor was universal among all of the lawyers or litigants on the 25 
briefs in our selection, it appears that the most important common factor was 
congressional lobbying. For eight of the briefs, there is direct evidence or 
strong circumstantial evidence that an attorney or litigant on the brief 
personally lobbied Congress on the passage of the statute at issue.291 For 
another two of the briefs, the legislative history in the brief consisted mostly of 
post-enactment congressional deliberations related to the statute at issue, and 
the attorney on the brief began lobbying Congress on the specific subject of the 
statute before that post-enactment history was produced.292 For one additional 
brief, about one-quarter of the legislative history in the brief consisted of post-
enactment deliberations related to the statute at issue, and the attorney on the 
brief began lobbying Congress on the specific subject of the statute before that 
post-enactment history was produced.293 For two more of the briefs, there is 
direct evidence that an attorney or litigant on the brief knew and worked with a 
principal lobbyist on the statute at issue.294 For three more of the briefs, there 
is direct evidence that an attorney on the brief, long before submitting it, 
acquired general experience in lobbying Congress (e.g., testifying or 
 
289.  Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the 
Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491-92 (2008). 
290.  Id. at 1493 n.30. 
291.  Infra Appendix II ¶¶ 1, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 24. 
292.  Id. ¶¶ 2, 21. 
293.  Id. ¶ 9. 
294.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 13. 
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submitting an analysis at a hearing, drafting bills and committee reports), 
albeit on statutes separate from those in the case.295 For one last brief, the 
attorneys were not exactly lobbyists, but they were closely connected to the 
Senator who produced the congressional documents cited in their brief, which 
he personally gave to them.296 
The briefs covered in the preceding paragraph tally up to seventeen, all 
with evidence that attorneys or litigants had lobbied Congress (or were 
connected to those who lobbied Congress), almost always on the statute at 
issue or on other deliberations that produced the legislative history cited in the 
brief. 
In light of this evidence, it seems that non-federal briefs heavily citing 
legislative history are the exceptions that prove the rule: the best way for an 
attorney outside the federal government to become expert at legislative history 
was to have direct experience in lobbying Congress, usually on the very statute 
being litigated, thus gaining the same kind of workaday familiarity with 
congressional deliberations that the agencies and DOJ divisions acquired on a 
systematic basis. 
That lawyer-lobbyists played a role in normalizing legislative history makes 
sense. Lobbyists have been extremely important in the past century of 
congressional deliberations, and a high proportion of congressional lobbyists 
have been lawyers. In most Western democracies, national political power has 
been concentrated in strong political parties, but in the United States, 
especially in the early to mid-twentieth century, the political parties were weak, 
creating a vacuum that was filled by organized interest groups unbeholden to 
the parties. “American politics,” wrote E.E. Schattschneider in 1942, “is 
remarkable for the exaggerated role played by pressure groups. These 
organizations are found in all free countries, but they play a unique role in 
American politics.”297 Congress was “prodigal in its concessions to organized 
minorities because the parties [were] too decentralized to impose an effective 
discipline on their congressional representation.”298 Just as the federal 
bureaucratic establishment came into its own during the New Deal, so the 
corps of D.C. interest-group lobbyists came into its own around the 1920s and 
1930s. In his 1929 book Group Representation Before Congress, Pendleton 
Herring explained that, although Congress had always been lobbied for 
 
295.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 18, 23. 
296.  Id. ¶ 25. 
297.  E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 107 (1942). 
298.  Id. at 108-09. 
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individual monetary claims or company-specific subsidies, the period since 
World War I had seen an unprecedented “descent of Washington 
representatives of national associations upon the capital,” each encompassing a 
whole industry or other mass group.299 Indeed, many of the attorneys on the 
briefs in our selection represented just such mass groups.300 In keeping with 
the general importance of lawyers in American governance, a large portion of 
these lobbyists were attorneys. Quoting a congressman, Herring said, “The 
‘general practice of law’ in Washington is coming to be synonymous with 
‘general lobbying.’”301 
What about the remaining eight briefs in our selection of 25? Interestingly, 
five can be understood as arising from the labor movement’s sudden leap in 
organizational capacity and its confrontation with the DOJ Antitrust 
Division.302 These briefs lend some limited support to my thesis about 
congressional lobbying, and they reinforce larger themes about the importance 
of the federal bureaucracy and interest groups in the normalization of 
legislative history. 
The story behind those five briefs is as follows. Historically, litigators for 
the American Anti-Boycott Association (an anti-union group) had been among 
the rare early users of legislative history, citing the material to great effect in 
Loewe v. Lawlor (1908), which held that unions were subject to the Sherman 
Act,303 and in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921), which held that the 
ambiguous Clayton Act of 1914 did not provide the antitrust exemption that 
unions thought it did.304 In both these cases, the labor attorneys were caught 
flat-footed, providing almost no answer to their opponents’ extensive 
discussion of legislative history.305 Only in the 1930s did the labor movement 
 
299.  PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 21 (1929); see id. at 21-22, 
36, 40-41, 51. 
300.  Infra Appendix II ¶¶ 1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 21. More in the old style of private claims was the 
Northern Pacific Railroad land-grant case (¶ 20) and perhaps the Indian-claim cases (¶¶ 2, 
25). 
301.  HERRING, supra note 299, at 56. The earliest quantitative study of Washington lobbyists 
found that, in its sample of 114, 45 were trained as lawyers. LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE 
WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 73 (1963). 
302.  These briefs are listed, with their citation counts, in infra Appendix II ¶¶ 6, 7, 14, 15, 16. 
303.  208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
304.  254 U.S. 443 (1921). On the AABA, see DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1995). 
305.  On Loewe, see EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 86 (1930). On Duplex 
Printing, compare Brief for Appellant at 71-138, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 
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acquire a dedicated national lawyering apparatus. The Congress of Industrial 
Organizations was founded in 1935, and in 1937 it acquired a full-time, three-
man Legal Department, headed by former WPA general counsel Lee 
Pressman.306 Meanwhile, the traditionally decentralized American Federation 
of Labor in 1938 hired Joseph Padway as its first full-time general counsel.307 
Both the CIO and AFL lawyers were intimately familiar with Congress. 
Pressman, a veteran agency lawyer, was lobbying Congress extensively by 1938, 
aided by junior CIO attorneys who wrote his testimony.308 Padway, too, was 
lobbying by 1939.309 Thus, both attorneys had a workaday familiarity with 
Congress. 
Shortly after the labor movement acquired these lawyer-lobbyists, it faced 
one of its greatest legal challenges. In 1938, the DOJ Antitrust Division, headed 
by the ferocious Thurman Arnold, initiated the biggest campaign of antitrust 
enforcement in U.S. history, frequently targeting unions.310 With Arnold 
gunning for them, the AFL and CIO lawyers invested in enormous research to 
try to overturn Duplex Printing and immunize unions from antitrust 
prosecution. Briefing the history of the Sherman Act was relatively doable, 
given that Congress in 1903 had published the Bills and Debates in Congress 
Relating to Trusts, which included a 300-page selection of debates from 1890,311 
and political scientist Edward Berman in 1930 had written a monograph on the 
1890 debates.312 But the Clayton Act’s 1914 history remained largely uncharted. 
When one of Arnold’s enforcement suits reached the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Borden Co. (1939), Padway represented one of the defendants and filed 
a brief setting forth much new research on the Clayton Act.313 Some additional 
defendants were represented by Daniel Carmell, who (aided by the Bills and 
 
U.S. 443 (1921) (No. 45), with Brief for Appellees at 16-18, Duplex Printing Press Co., 254 
U.S. 443 (No. 45). 
306.  GILBERT J. GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE CIO 45, 76-77 
(1999). 
307.  ANDREW E. KERSTEN, LABOR’S HOME FRONT: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 
DURING WORLD WAR II 44 (2006). 
308.  GALL, supra note 306, at 95-101. 
309.  See KERSTEN, supra note 307, at 47. 
310.  ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 106, 
117-20 (1995). 
311.  JAMES ARTHUR FINCH, BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS, S. DOC. NO. 
57-147, at 69-411 (1903). 
312.  BERMAN, supra note 305. 
313.  Infra Appendix II ¶ 6. 
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Debates and Berman’s book) briefed the Sherman Act’s history, in a kind of 
sideshow to Padway’s brief.314 Ultimately, the Court’s decision in Borden Co. 
did not reach the question of whether to overturn Duplex Printing. 
Then, in 1940, the Justices agreed to hear Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.315 In 
that case, a private employer (rather than DOJ) sued a union for antitrust 
violations, but the case raised the union-exemption issue just the same. This 
time, Pressman and his CIO colleagues had their shot at the Clayton Act’s 
history: they filed an amicus brief recounting the history even more extensively 
than Padway had,316 and they assisted the attorney for the union (Isidore 
Katz), who likewise briefed it, albeit less deeply.317 The attorneys for the 
employer (Apex) had ignored legislative history in their opening brief but now 
faced an onslaught of it from their labor opponents. Incapable of briefing such 
material on demand, they went scurrying to the institution that briefed it best: 
the federal government. The Antitrust Division was then prosecuting a big case 
against unions in the U.S. District Court in Missouri, where it was fighting off 
union claims about the Clayton Act’s legislative history, answering with 
legislative history of its own. Apex’s attorneys obtained the Antitrust Division’s 
brief in the Missouri case and submitted a reply that block-quoted forty-five 
pages of it.318 Ultimately, the Justices in Apex ruled for labor, but on narrow 
grounds.319 
This leaves only three briefs out of our selection of 25. In these, I find no 
evidence of lobbying by the lawyers or litigants. Perhaps some of them briefed 
legislative history in response to other parties in the case doing so. For one of 
the briefs, the opposing party was the federal government, which briefed 
 
314.  Id. ¶ 7. 
315.  310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
316.  Infra Appendix II ¶ 14. 
317.  For the union’s brief, see id. ¶ 15. On CIO assistance to Katz, see GALL, supra note 306, at 
104-05. 
318.  Infra Appendix II ¶ 16. The employer’s brief also included several citations from JAMES 
ARTHUR FINCH, BILLS AND DEBATES IN CONGRESS RELATING TO TRUSTS, S. DOC. NO. 57-147 
(1903). 
319.  The Court would later shut down Arnold’s campaign against the unions in United States v. 
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), though not based on the legislative history of the Clayton 
Act. 
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legislative history extensively.320 For one other, the opposing party was 
represented by a lawyer-lobbyist who also briefed much legislative history.321 
F. The Court’s Own Internal Research 
As noted in Section III.A, 34% of the citations in the sample of federally 
briefed statutory cases in 1940-45 matched no brief, and that figure rose to 55% 
for non-federally-briefed cases. These citations apparently came from the 
Court’s own internal research. In some of the most striking instances of this 
internal research, the Justices analyzed a statute’s legislative history extensively 
even though the briefs said nothing about it at all.322 Given the difficulty of 
researching legislative history, how did the Justices succeed in doing so much 
on their own? 
For one thing, the Court had acquired, by about 1940, an internal research 
apparatus that was quite extraordinary for an American judicial tribunal: the 
emergent corps of Supreme Court clerks. Historically, the Justices had 
frequently employed clerks with merely stenographic duties. But increasingly, 
in the early 1900s, they began adopting the modern model of the law clerk: a 
top recent graduate of an elite law school, suited to perform advanced research. 
Roosevelt’s appointees all adopted this model, and their doing so increased the 
Court’s internal research powers in a way that coincided with—and 
presumably helped cause—the surge in legislative history. To be sure, we 
should not exaggerate the rapidity of the change. At least three Justices who 
preceded Roosevelt—Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone—had already adopted the 
modern model and followed it throughout the 1930s. Hughes apparently 
adopted it by 1938 and perhaps earlier. And even among the Justices who did 
not hire elite graduates on a rotating basis, the clerks were still often lawyers, as 
in the cases of Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds.323 Nevertheless, the 
 
320.  Infra Appendix II, ¶ 8. 
321.  Id. ¶ 22. For the last remaining brief, see id. ¶3. 
322.  E.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge, No. 27 v. Toledo, Peoria & W. 
R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944) (Rutledge, J.); Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) 
(Black, J.); Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 708 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941) (Reed, J., dissenting). In Tiller, one 
of the briefs cited one House Report, but that was all. 
323.  TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 61-70, 88, 91-101 (2006). Butler’s clerk did “research on points 
not briefed by the parties.” Id. at 93. On Van Devanter’s clerks (mostly lawyers), see Barry 
Cushman, The Clerks of the Four Horsemen, 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. (forthcoming 2014) 
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completion of the changeover to the modern hiring model around 1940 must 
have contributed to legislative history’s triumph. 
The Court’s internal research capacity was extraordinary not only because 
of the number and skill of its clerks but also because of the paucity of its cases, 
allowing a large amount of manpower per case. Whereas the Court had often 
issued full opinions in 200 to 250 cases per year during the early 1900s, the 
annual number was much lower in 1940-45 (160 or less).324 This reduction in 
caseload resulted from the Judiciary Act of 1925, which had empowered the 
Court (with few exceptions) to choose which cases it would hear—a great leap 
in the centralization and rationalization of the federal judiciary.325 But while the 
reduced caseload may have been a precondition for the Court’s intensive use of 
legislative history in 1940-45, it surely was not the immediate trigger. The real 
reduction had occurred very soon after the Act, in about 1925-28. In 1940-45, 
the Court’s average number of full-opinion cases per year was virtually 
identical to that of the late 1930s.326 Still, the manpower that the Supreme 
Court could devote to each individual case—as of 1928 and continuing into the 
1940s—was very large by the standards of American courts. 
To some extent, however, the high proportion of legislative history 
citations that matched no brief does not simply reflect the Court’s internal 
capacity. It appears that a substantial number of these unmatched citations 
actually arose indirectly from federal agencies and DOJ divisions. Most 
importantly, those organizations played an important role in building up the 
Court’s library. Up to 1935, the Court met in the basement of the Capitol 
building, and most of the Justices and their clerks did their work in the 
Justices’ private homes, though the clerks could use the Capitol’s law library or 
venture to the Library of Congress building.327 Only in 1935 did the Court 
acquire its own building and independent library.328 By 1946, this library had 
acquired the second-largest collection of statute-specific legislative history 
 
(manuscript at 15-23), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2312520. Apparently little is known about 
Roberts’s clerks. Note that the Chief Justice had two clerks by the 1930s and up to 1946. 
PEPPERS, supra, at 94, 124, 134. All other Justices had one, until the number was increased to 
two in 1947. Id. at 101. 
324.  Post, supra note 53, at 1280 fig.2. 
325.  Id. at 1276-81. 
326.  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 75 tbl.2-8. 
327.  1 Reminiscences of Herbert Wechsler 66 (1982), in the Columbia University Center for Oral 
History Collection (CUCOHC), New York, N.Y. 
328.  Hudon, supra note 73, at 317-20. 
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scrapbooks in D.C. (bested only by the Treasury Department).329 But 82% of 
those scrapbooks were in tax or bankruptcy, and they arose from two gifts to 
the Court from the federal bureaucracy. The first gift was a 45-volume set on 
the internal revenue statutes, which the DOJ Tax Division gave the Court in 
1937.330 The second was a multi-volume legislative history of the bankruptcy 
statutes, compiled by a DOJ attorney who worked on a federal investigation of 
the bankruptcy system in 1939-40.331 
Further, it appears that the Justices sometimes obtained legislative history 
research from federal agencies ex parte. (Recall that the Court’s own library 
staff was considered incompetent to do original research in legislative history 
as late as 1955.332) Frankfurter’s papers contain several memos in this vein. For 
example, in February 1946, he asked the Court librarian to locate all materials 
bearing on the meaning of a certain phrase in the Social Security Act, apropos 
of a pending case, adding that the librarians of the Labor Department and 
Social Security Board “are the most hopeful sources for getting such materials, 
including of course legislative hearings and reports.”333 Other memos indicate 
that Frankfurter made similar requests to the Patent Office in 1945,334 to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1945,335 to the Patent Office again in 
 
329.  Calculations based on Union List, supra note 77, at 247-59. 
330.  The tax histories were described as a donation from Carlton Fox at DOJ. Clarke, supra note 
231, at 91; Hudon, supra note 73, at 324-25. On Fox, see supra notes 229-232 and 
accompanying text. 
331.  The bankruptcy histories were described as having been donated by their compiler, “Leon 
Frechtel, Assistant Director, Attorney General’s Committee on Bankruptcy Administration.” 
Hudon, supra note 73, at 324-25. Organization of the Committee had begun in April 1939, 
and it submitted its report in December 1940. ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON BANKR. ADMIN., 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT ix (1941). The staff, including Frechtel, had their 
offices in the DOJ building. Federal Committee Reports, 15 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. BANKR. 89, 89 
(1941). Frechtel had officially been a DOJ attorney starting in November 1939. 1942 DOJ 
REGISTER, supra note 199, at 10. 
332.  Frankfurter Clerk Memo, supra note 190, at 10. 
333.  Letter from Frankfurter to Helen Newman (Feb. 28, 1946), Part III, Reel 14, Frame 0030, 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180. The request apparently pertains to Unemployment 
Compensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143 (1946). 
334.  Letter from Frankfurter to Helen Newman (Oct. 26, 1945), Part III, Reel 14, Frame 0140, 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180. The request apparently pertains to Scott Paper Co. v. 
Marcalus Manufacturing Co., 326 U.S. 249, 261 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
335.  Letter from Frankfurter to Helen Newman (Dec. 10, 1945), Part III, Reel 14, Frame 0029, 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180. The request apparently pertains to Girouard v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1946) (Stone, C.J., dissenting, joined by Frankfurter, J.). 
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1946,336 and to the Treasury Department in 1949.337 It is possible that 
Frankfurter made other such requests that left no trace in his papers. Archival 
documents also indicate that Hughes, Reed, and Douglas communicated with 
agencies ex parte about cases before the Court, though none of the surviving 
memos have to do with legislative history.338 
The Court’s familiarity with the agencies and with legislative history may 
also have arisen from the career patterns of the clerks, which were oriented 
more toward the administrative state, and less toward the judiciary, than today. 
In 1943-44, according to one recollection, several clerks had done stints at DOJ 
or in a federal agency, more than had served as clerks on lower courts.339 
 
336.  Letter from Frankfurter to Helen Newman (Nov. 15, 1946), Part III, Reel 14, Frame 0032, 
Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180. The request apparently pertains to MacGregor v. 
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 402, 410 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
337.  Letter from General Counsel, Treasury Department, to Helen Newman (Jan. 14, 1949), Part 
I, Reel 31, Frames 0858-0859, Frankfurter Papers, supra note 180 (replying to Newman’s 
request for information, which Newman apparently made on behalf of Frankfurter). The 
letter is in Frankfurter’s file for Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949). 
338.  See Handwritten letter from “Martin” [apparently Martin Riger, head of the SEC 
Reorganization Division, as the letter is on the Division’s stationery] to “Edith” [Edith 
Waters, Douglas’s secretary] (Mar. 10, 1942), Box 84, Folder 2, Douglas Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C. (apparently replying to Douglas’s request for SEC information 
about Marine Harbor Properties v. Manufacturer’s Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942), in which 
Douglas later wrote the opinion); Memorandum from “e.w.” [Edith Waters, Douglas’s 
Secretary] to Douglas, regarding Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 
(1941), (memo undated), Box 68, Folder 11, Douglas Papers, supra (stating “SEC has 
nothing on [the] above [case]”); Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Stanley Reed (Jan. 
19, 1939), Box 171, Folder titled “October Term 1939,” Reed Papers, supra note 149 (stating, 
with regard to Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939), that he has “obtained the files from the 
War Department” indicating the Department’s construction of Georgia law regarding 
federal jurisdiction over certain land and, on the basis of this administrative construction, 
changing his vote in the case); and Memorandum from Reed to Mr. [Phillip] Graham, Law 
Clerk (Jan. 31, 1940), Box 171, Folder titled “October Term 1939,” Reed Papers, supra note 
149 (asking the clerk, in regard to Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 
(1940), to “check with the fiscal officers of the administration” on the question of how FHA 
employees are paid, which bears on the crucial question of whether the FHA is to be 
considered a federal agency). 
339.  Victor Brudney & James Brudney, Recollections of a Supreme Court Community, in IN 
CHAMBERS: MORE STORIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR LAW CLERKS (Todd 
Peppers & Clare Cushman eds., Univ. of Va. Press, forthcoming 2014). I thank James 
Brudney for providing this source. 
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G. The Minimal Role of the Lower Courts 
The lower courts were not an important source of the Supreme Court’s 
citations to legislative history during the period of normalization. Legislative 
history did not “bubble up” from below. In my sample of federally briefed 
statutory cases in 1940-45, only 7% of the legislative history citations could be 
matched to citations in the corresponding lower-court cases. For my sample of 
non-federally-briefed statutory cases in 1940-45, the figure was again 7%.340 
This suggests that the normalization of legislative history was a top-down 
phenomenon, originating in the Supreme Court. This is understandable. The 
Supreme Court itself had extraordinary manpower per case, and the federal 
bureaucracy was most likely to invest in legislative history research when the 
stakes were high, as in Supreme Court litigation.341 Relatedly, a crude search of 
the Westlaw database indicates that, during the early 1940s, the U.S. circuit 
courts were about one-fourth as likely to cite at least some legislative history in 
a case on a federal statute as was the Supreme Court.342 More refined data, for a 
 
340.  By “lower court,” I mean whichever court decided the case immediately prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which was usually a U.S. circuit court, though sometimes a U.S. district 
court or state court. The few cases that lacked a corresponding published lower-court 
opinion were excluded from this calculation completely. 
          An alternative measure of this phenomenon is the proportion of cases in which at least 
one legislative history citation matched the lower-court opinion. For all federally briefed 
cases in our sample, this was 16%; for all non-federally-briefed cases in our sample, it was 
10%. 
341.  It appears that federal lawyers typically rewrote and expanded the government’s briefs when 
a case went from the lower courts to the Supreme Court. See supra note 207 and 
accompanying text. 
342.  To get rough estimates of the number of cases decided at the two levels that cited legislative 
history, I entered the following search string into the SCT-OLD database (Supreme Court) 
and the CTA-OLD database (Court of Appeals): da(aft 12/31/1939) & da(bef 01/01/1945) & 
((committee /s (house senate)) (hearing! /s (house senate)) (“cong. rec.” “cong. record” 
“congressional record”)). The search produced 147 cases for the Supreme Court and 363 cases 
for the Court of Appeals (all Circuits). For the Supreme Court, I divided the number of 
cases (147) by 497, which was the number of Supreme Court cases from 1940-44 that 
interpreted federal statutes, as counted by my research team. This produced a ratio of 0.296. 
For the Court of Appeals, I divided the number of cases (363) by 5,588, which was my 
estimate of the number of Court of Appeals cases decided from 1940-44 that interpreted 
federal statutes. This produced a ratio of 0.065, less than one-fourth the Supreme Court 
ratio. (I derived the estimate of 5,588 from the work of Donald Songer and his colleagues. I 
began by adding up the total number of cases, on any subject, decided by any circuit court of 
appeals from 1940-44. See Donald R. Songer, The United States Courts of Appeals Data Base: 
Documentation for Phase 1, JUD. RES. INITIATIVE, UNIV. S.C. 254-69, http:// 
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somewhat later period, has been collected by Glenn Bridgman, pursuant to his 
important recent study of the use of legislative history in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals in 1950-2006, which employs innovative electronic counting 
methods.343 Bridgman’s data indicate that, over the period 1950-60, the 
number of legislative history citations in all published decisions of the Supreme 
Court was 37% greater than in all published decisions of the U.S. circuit courts 
combined,344 despite the fact that the circuit courts issued more than twenty 
times as many published decisions as did the Supreme Court during those 
years,345 with little difference in the proportion of decisions that interpreted 
federal statutes.346 Consistent with this, Ray Stringham wrote in 1961 that the 
“United States Supreme Court has been the open leader in the movement” for 
using legislative history.347 Stringham criticized the Court’s enthusiasm for 
legislative history, in part because the Justices too often decided cases on the 
basis of such material when it had not been briefed in the lower courts.348 
 
artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/cta96_codebook.pdf (last updated Oct. 21, 2008). I then 
multiplied this total by 0.5, which is the approximate proportion of Court of Appeals cases 
that Songer and his colleagues found to involve federal statutes during this period. See 
DONALD SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS 67 fig.3.2 (2000).) 
343.  Glenn Bridgman, One of These Things Is Not Like the Others: Legislative History in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeal (2012) (Yale Law Sch. Student Prize Papers No. 88), http:// 
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/88. Bridgman uses a recently established 
online database (bulk.resource.org) that contains all cases in the United States Reports and 
Federal Reporter from 1950 to 2006; it is usable for the counting of multiple strings of letters 
to a degree that Westlaw and Lexis are not. His count excludes hearings. 
344.  This calculation is mine, using Bridgman’s data, which he generously shared with me. 
345.  From 1950-60, the circuit courts issued 27,108 published decisions. Calculations based on 
Songer, supra note 342, at 254-69. The Supreme Court issued 1,250 during that same period. 
Calculations based on Professor Harold Spaeth’s database of Supreme Court cases. SUP. CT. 
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last updated July 17, 2013). 
346.  Approximately half the published decisions of the circuit courts from 1950-60 concerned 
federal statutes. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 342, at 67 fig.3.2. For the Supreme Court, the 
proportion was roughly 54%. This is the proportion of cases in the Spaeth Database, SUP. 
CT. DATABASE, supra note 345, for that period that contain a “4” (the code for construction of 
a federal statute) in the field “authorityDecision1” or “authorityDecision2.” 
347.  Ray Stringham, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in Action, 47 A.B.A. J. 466, 466 (1961). 
348.  Id. at 471-72. 
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iv.  legislative history as a statist tool of interpretation 
The federal administrative state was the dominant force in the 
normalization of legislative history as a tool of statutory interpretation. Federal 
lawyers almost always briefed more legislative history than other lawyers 
before the Court; provided a very disproportionate share of the citations in the 
Justices’ opinions; and even served as the hidden source for some of the 
Court’s “internal” research capacity, via library donations and responses to ex 
parte inquiries. Legislative history was therefore a statist tool of interpretation, 
in the sense that the administrative state enjoyed privileged access to such 
material and was a privileged provider of it to the Court, more than was true of 
other interpretive sources, such as statutory text. 
But legislative history was also statist in a deeper sense. The federal 
bureaucracy was a privileged participant in congressional discourse, and 
legislative history had the potential to extend that privilege into the courtroom. 
As I discuss in Section IV.A below, the federal government in 1940-45 
frequently invoked legislative history in order to show that (1) congressmen 
intended for a bill to mean what the agency had told them it meant, or (2) 
congressmen, having been apprised of how an agency was interpreting a 
particular statute, acquiesced in the agency’s view. And these were only the 
explicit briefs; surely numerous other invocations of legislative history by the 
federal government rested on congressional utterances that had been ghost-
written (or at least influenced) by agencies and thus reflected the bureaucratic 
agenda. By invoking legislative history, the bureaucracy advertised and 
leveraged its constant, intense engagement with the body that officially 
originated the norms to be implemented. At times, this may have been a 
ventriloquist’s performance, with Congress as the puppet, though in other 
instances it presumably relayed a serious dialogue between lawmakers and 
bureaucrats (even if the government expertly presented the dialogue as 
favorably to itself as the record would allow). 
In any event, legislative history served to deliver the bureaucracy’s views to 
the judiciary clothed in the mantle of congressional authority, and this at the 
very moment when the Court had recognized such authority as virtually 
unlimited in the economic sphere. The Court’s acceptance of legislative history 
as a normal interpretive source in 1940-45 was of a piece with its larger 
acceptance (at that same moment) of an agency-centered vision of governance, 
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with a diminished role for the judiciary and for the sources farthest inside the 
“comfort zone” of judges.349 
Though “statist” is a fitting label for legislative history, the term requires 
two qualifications, each of which has to do with a peculiar aspect of the 
American bureaucratic state. The first qualification, which I discuss in Section 
IV.B, concerns judges. Though legislative history was outside the traditional 
judicial “comfort zone,” the Supreme Court in 1940-45 did acquire some 
capacity to use it independently, as if learning a second language—one that the 
Roosevelt Court, given its extraordinary institutional resources and the 
administrative experience of several of its members, was more suited to acquire 
than were courts generally. By learning this second language, the Court—even 
as it acquiesced in an agency-centered view of governance—preserved a degree 
of autonomy for itself, ensuring that judicial review of administrative action 
would still have some bite. American governance has long been marked by a 
judiciary that is both separate from the bureaucratic state and willing to 
scrutinize that state. Despite their general friendliness to administrative 
governance, the Roosevelt Justices, by becoming skilled in legislative history, 
ensured that such separateness and scrutiny would not be extinguished. 
The second qualification, which I discuss in Section IV.C, concerns non-
federal lawyers. In congressional discourse, the most privileged participants 
(apart from congressmen themselves) were the agencies, but there was also a 
role for lobbyists, many of them lawyers. This reflected the peculiar openness 
of the legislative process in America (given its weak parties) to industry-
specific and cause-specific advocacy. Judicial reliance on legislative history 
privileged lawyer-lobbyists above the general population of lawyers (if not to 
the same degree as it privileged the agencies). And another American 
peculiarity—the tendency of government to exchange personnel with law firms 
and lobbying firms through the proverbial “revolving door”—meant that 
advocates who produced and briefed legislative history in the agencies would 
frequently migrate to the private sector, where they would do the same thing 
(if on a smaller scale). As lawyers exited the government after the New Deal 
and World War II, they created a new kind of law firm—the “Washington law 
firm”—staffed by veterans of the administrative state and dedicated to constant 
lobbying of that state and of Congress. Accordingly, these firms would 
 
349.  On the Court’s shift to an agency-centered view of governance at the moment when the 
Roosevelt appointees took over, see Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, 
and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007), especially 
at 406. 
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assemble libraries of legislative history that imitated the libraries of the 
agencies. Such firms were like adjuncts of the bureaucracy, and their clients—a 
select group of big corporations—benefited from a competence in legislative 
history approaching that of the leviathan. 
A. Legislative History to Bless the Bureaucratic Agenda 
In many instances, the federal government argued for its preferred 
interpretation of a statute by citing legislative history to show that the agency, 
in proposing the measure, had put congressmen on notice that it would have 
that meaning. In a case on the Walsh-Healey Act, which empowered DOL to 
define prevailing wages required of federal contractors in each “locality,” the 
government contended that DOL had wide discretion to define “locality,” 
partly because similar acts had been construed that way in state cases, one of 
which had been “specifically called to the attention” of the House 
Subcommittee by the Acting Solicitor of DOL.350 In American Trucking, the 
government sought an expansive reading of the FLSA by arguing that the 
carve-out for trucking employees to be covered by the ICC was narrow: the 
ICC had asked the Senate Committee for power to regulate only a particular 
subset of trucking employees, and the lower court had erred in holding that the 
ICC “had been granted a power for which it had not asked.”351 In a fight over 
whether a 1934 statute criminalizing false statements to the government 
covered oil-men’s lies to the Interior Department about illegal interstate 
shipments, the government invoked the Department’s pleas to Congress to 
enact the statute, which congressmen had acknowledged by stating the 
measure was “proposed by the Department of the Interior for the purpose of 
reaching” those very oil-shipment deceptions.352 Later, when defending the 
Grazing Service’s use of its rulemaking power to impose licensing and fee 
requirements on stockmen during the Taylor Grazing Act’s phase-in period, 
the federal lawyers cited statements of agency officials at committee hearings 
that (it was said) made clear to congressmen that such interim measures would 
 
350.  Brief for the Petitioners [Perkins et al.] at 99, Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 
(1940) (No. 593). The citation is to the hearing testimony of Acting Solicitor of Labor 
Gerard D. Reilly. 
351.  Brief for the Appellants [United States et al.] at 16, 19, 23, United States v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940) (No. 713). 
352.  Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 13-19, United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 
(1941) (No. 245) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1202, at 1 (1934)). 
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be necessary.353 In a case on bank robberies, the government explained that the 
DOJ had initially proposed a bill with broad liability, only to have Congress cut 
it back before enacting it. This led to bad results, showing that DOJ’s original 
proposal had been wise, and Congress, realizing its error, acceded to DOJ’s 
recommendation for an amendment. The legislative history (said the 
government’s lawyers) showed that “the prime purpose of the amendment . . . 
was the same as that of the [DOJ] in recommending it,” so it should be read 
broadly, in line with DOJ’s explanations of its original and later proposals.354 In 
another case, on whether a recent statute empowered the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to impose standard definitions of food products that 
manufacturers had to follow, the government noted that the FDA, prior to the 
statute, had enjoyed the power to impose such definitions for a select category 
of products, which the FDA Chief had held up as a model when urging 
Congress to pass the statute at issue.355 In yet another case, defending the 
decision of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to impose a cost-based 
accounting method on utilities, the government pointed to statements of FPC 
officials during deliberations on a predecessor bill to the relevant statute, 
announcing their plan to follow the cost-based method.356 In a separate case 
under the same statute, the government, arguing for a broad reading of FPC 
jurisdiction, cited the explanations that FPC officials had given Congress on 
how the bill (which the officials themselves had drafted) would operate.357 In a 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) prosecution against certain chain-store 
practices in the confectionary industry, the government urged the Court to 
construe the Robinson-Patman Act to prohibit such practices, since a major 
study by the FTC—“[f]oremost among the studies relied on by the sponsoring 
committees of the bill”—had concluded that those practices were major causes 
of the problems Congress wished to solve, particularly among confectioners.358 
 
353.  Brief for the Petitioner [Brooks] at 46-47, Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941) (No. 718). 
354.  Brief for the United States [Respondent] at 24, Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) 
(No. 325); see also id. at 11-29 (setting out the argument from legislative history). 
355.  Brief for the Federal Security Administrator [Petitioner] at 43 & n.32, Fed. Sec. Adm’r v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943) (No. 424). 
356.  Brief for the Federal Power Commission [Respondent] at 41 n.29, Nw. Elec. Co. v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 321 U.S. 119 (1944) (No. 195). 
357.  Brief for the Federal Power Commission [Respondent] at 33-35 & n.35, Conn. Light & 
Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515 (1945) (No. 189). 
358.  Brief for the Federal Trade Commission [Respondent] at 68-70, Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. 
FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945) (No. 680). For other arguments in this vein, see Brief for the 
United States [Respondent] at 31, Arenas v. United States, 322 U.S. 419 (1944) (No. 463); 
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In all these cases, federal lawyers contended that Congress, in passing a bill, 
had been won over by the agency’s view of that bill, which the Court should 
therefore honor. 
This pattern of argument went to the extreme in Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n (1942), on whether the 
Transportation Act of 1920 permitted the ICC to require that a railroad 
preserve its employees’ jobs when abandoning lines. The ICC wanted a free 
hand in fostering railroad reorganizations, without the bother of protecting 
employees, and it construed the ambiguous Act to confer no such authority. 
When Congress in the late 1930s considered amending the statute to confer 
such authority expressly, the ICC lobbied hard against the proposals and won. 
In its brief, the government essentially argued that, since Congress had bowed 
to the ICC’s insistence against expressly conferring such authority, the existing 
1920 Act should not be read to confer it, either. The brief gave an epic 32-page 
narrative of Congress’s failure to enact the proposals of the late 1930s, 
prominently featuring the ICC’s victorious lobbying (through hearings and 
letters to congressmen). The brief contended that the congressmen who 
supported employee protection, by proposing the bills they did, had implicitly 
conceded that the 1920 Act did not allow for such protection.359 
It was also common in 1940-45 for the federal government to argue that the 
agency had construed a statute in a certain way and that Congress, apprised of 
the agency’s practice (as shown by legislative history), had consciously gone 
along. A key example is the regulation of labor organizing. Under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, President Roosevelt had created a 
National Labor Board and then (under further statutory authority added in 
1934) a National Labor Relations Board. This second agency proved quite 
aggressive and creative but had only shaky authority for its actions, leading to 
proposals for a new statute.360 This push became especially urgent after the 
Court struck down the NIRA in spring 1935, and so Congress enacted the 
Wagner Act that summer, creating a second NLRB (superseding the “old 
NLRB” established in 1934). Importantly, the staff of the old NLRB worked 
closely with Wagner and his allies in designing the new-and-improved 
 
and Brief for the United States [Respondent] at 31-32, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 
(1939) (No. 42). 
359.  Brief for Appellant, Interstate Commerce Commission at 9-41, Interstate Commerce 
Comm’n v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942) (No. 223), especially id. at 23-30, 39. 
360.  A GUIDE TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8-9 
(Gordon T. Law, Jr. ed., 2002). 
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statute,361 and once the new NLRB was created, the staff generally stayed on to 
work for it.362 In several cases on the new agency’s interpretations of the 
Wagner Act in 1940-41, federal lawyers argued that Congress in 1935 had been 
closely engaged with the old NLRB, had learned about its practices and 
experiences under the NIRA, and had embraced many of its views about the 
implementation of analogous provisions. “Congress had before it and relied 
upon the administrative practice under the prior legislation,” as one such brief 
said.363 Besides the NLRB, another group of bureaucrats who employed 
legislative history to legitimate their own practices were those at DOL, who 
administered the FLSA. When angry congressmen tried to amend the statute 
to override various DOL interpretations but failed to get their amendments 
passed, the government would then argue, in subsequent cases, that the failure 
effectively endorsed DOL’s view.364 In another case, involving the Shipping 
Board, the government made the striking admission that the Board had 
illegally deposited money in private banks that was required to go into the 
Treasury, but it then argued that Congress had been apprised of this fact (as 
evidenced in hearings and floor debates) and had effectively ratified it through 
subsequent appropriations acts.365 
Plus, in many of the cases (discussed earlier) in which the government 
invoked agency explanations of proposals to Congress, it also invoked 
subsequent congressional awareness and approval of agency practice. Thus, in 
American Trucking, federal lawyers cited floor debates on the FLSA indicating 
that, when Congress voted on the exception for ICC-covered employees, 
 
361.  Id. 
362.  JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 156 (1974). 
363.  Brief for the National Labor Relations Board [Respondent in No. 387, Petitioner in No. 641] 
at 27, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (Nos. 387, 641). Other briefs 
making this kind of argument were Brief for the National Labor Relations Board 
[Respondent] at 55-58, H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941) (No. 73); and Brief for 
the National Labor Relations Board [Petitioner] at 45-46, NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 
310 U.S. 318 (1940) (No. 588). 
364.  Brief for the Petitioner [Walling, Administrator] at 20-21, Walling v. A.H. Belo Corp., 316 
U.S. 624 (1942) (No. 622); Brief for the Respondent [Walling, Administrator] at 40-41, 
A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (No. 910). 
365.  Brief for the Petitioners [Inland Waterways Corp. et al.] at 68-69, Inland Waterways Corp. 
v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940) (No. 6). For a similar kind of argument, invoking statements 
to Congress not only by agency personnel but also by private interest groups, see Brief for 
the United States [Petitioner in Nos. 142-46] at 49-56, United States v. Myers, 320 U.S. 561 
(1944) (Nos. 142-46). 
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lawmakers knew the ICC was construing that coverage narrowly.366 In the case 
on oil shipments, the brief noted that, when Congress extended the oil 
regulation statute in 1937, it “had before it a report of the Department of Justice 
showing that prosecutions had been instituted under” the 1934 act that was 
presently being litigated.367 In the case on DOI regulations during the Taylor 
Grazing Act’s phase-in period, the brief emphasized that the agency had made 
the regulations known to congressmen, who had effectively approved them by 
subsequently appropriating money.368 
A chilling use of legislative history to legitimate a bureaucratic agenda came 
in the Japanese-American internment cases. In this litigation, federal lawyers 
cited both kinds of evidence described above: agency explanations of proposals 
before passage and congressional acquiescence in agency practice afterward. In 
Hirabayashi v. United States, the government invoked a textually vague 1942 
statute criminalizing disobedience to military orders as authority to require 
Japanese-Americans to register for relocation and comply with a curfew. The 
brief emphasized that Congress had been informed by letters from the War 
Department (printed in the Congressional Record) of exactly what the military 
planned to do with the power requested.369 Later, in Ex parte Endo, the military 
conceded that certain Japanese-Americans were loyal but insisted on 
continuing to detain them, since releasing them into the interior West might 
result in interracial violence. Insisting that it was authorized to hold concededly 
loyal persons, the government explained that “Congressional awareness of the 
nature of the War Relocation Authority’s regulations and procedures is 
evidenced generally by the reports and hearings,” and that “[t]he prompt 
release of the loyal evacuees . . . ha[s] at times been an object of concern in 
Congress. In the light of this awareness, Congressional ratification of the 
detention of loyal evacuees . . . may be judged.”370 Prior to the 1944 
appropriations, the government noted, such detention had been “mentioned in 
 
366.  Brief for the Appellants [United States et al.] at 44-45, United States v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940) (No. 713). 
367.  Brief for the United States [Petitioner] at 34, United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941) 
(No. 245). 
368.  Brief for the Petitioner [Brooks] at 51-55, Brooks v. Dewer, 313 U.S. 354 (1941) (No. 718). 
369.  Brief for the United States [on certificate] at 39-40 & n.59, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 870). 
370.  Brief for the United States [on certificate] at 66, Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (No. 
70). 
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both House and Senate committee hearings and on the floor of the House” and 
in a Senate committee report.371 
The several briefs described in this Section were only the most explicit 
efforts to use legislative history to bless the bureaucratic agenda. Given the 
thinness of congressional staff during this period and the consequent 
importance of agency personnel in helping congressmen to write bills, 
committee reports, and floor speeches,372 we can presume that a large portion 
of the legislative history appearing in federal briefs repeated the view of the 
bureaucracy without designating it as such, or at least reflected bureaucratic 
influence. 
Note that federal lawyers’ invocations of legislative history aimed primarily 
to legitimate bureaucratic power, not necessarily presidential power. As Witte 
noted, the “initiation of legislation in administrative departments is by no 
means the same thing as executive leadership in legislation,” for insofar as the 
President officially proposed legislation, he was often merely reacting to the 
initiative of bureaucrats, and not always in a very proactive or independent 
way.373 The President was practically dependent upon agency personnel, much 
as congressmen were. FDR’s professional White House staff numbered only 
three (increased to six in 1939), and he relied mainly on people detailed ad hoc 
from agencies.374 That said, at least one federal brief did begin to theorize the 
use of legislative history to further explicitly presidential views, anticipating an 
idea pushed aggressively by the Reagan Administration.375 FDR issued a 
statement on signing a 1940 act about alien registration, construing it broadly 
to preempt all state laws. Federal lawyers cited it in arguing for preemption: a 
“formal statement issued by the President upon completing his share in the 
legislative process is, we believe, of importance in determining the legislative 
intention to preclude or permit state action.”376 
 
371.  Id. at 66-67. 
372.  See supra notes 241-261 and accompanying text. 
373.  Witte, supra note 253, at 118. 
374.  MATTHEW J. DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE GROWTH 
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 63-66 (1997). 
375.  Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of 
Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 366-70 
(1987). 
376.  Brief for the United States, Amicus Curiae at 29, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) 
(No. 22). 
 
leviathan and interpretive revolution 
375 
 
Though it may be unknowable whether the administrative state’s use of 
legislative history actually succeeded in bending the Justices to governmental 
will, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest it might have. For one thing, 
there were several cases in 1940-45 in which (1) the federal government briefed 
far more legislative history than did any other lawyers and (2) the Court, citing 
a large amount of legislative history, ruled for the government.377 Further, it 
seems that in 1940-41—the first two years in which both the government and 
the Court cited large amounts of legislative history—the government had 
excellent reason to associate legislative history with victory. Of the 21 federally 
briefed cases in which the majority opinion had eight or more citations to 
legislative history in those years, the government won 19. At a more granular 
level, there were cases in which the Court followed the exact government 
arguments described earlier in this Section, citing not merely congressional 
statements that matched the government’s preferences, but congressmen’s 
acceptance of agency proposals and of agency understandings designated as 
such. This occurred in American Trucking,378 in one of the key NLRB cases on 
pre-1935 practice,379 in the case on whether the Interior Department could 
regulate grazing during the Taylor Act’s long phase-in,380 in the case on the 
FDA’s power to impose standard definitions of food products,381 and in one of 
the Japanese-American internment cases.382 (As noted earlier, such explicit 
 
377.  E.g., Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634 (1944); Fed. Sec. Adm’r v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (ruling for the 
federal government on the issue accounting for the majority of legislative history citations, 
that being the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act); United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Fed. Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber 
Corp., 314 U.S. 95 (1941); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
378.  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 547-50 (1940) (Reed, J.). 
379.  H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 523-26 (1941) (Stone, C.J.). 
380.  Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1941) (Roberts, J.). 
381.  Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 at 232 & n.8 (Stone, C.J.). 
382.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-90 (1943) (Stone, C.J.). Technically the Court 
held that the 1942 Act was consistent with the nondelegation doctrine since the legislative 
history was so explicit about what Congress contemplated the military would do. Id. at 86-
91, 102-05. This holding rests on the exact same evidence that the government cited in its 
brief to show that the 1942 Act specifically authorized the military’s actions. See Brief for the 
United States [on certificate] at 37-42, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81 (No. 870). 
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references were only a subset of the larger universe of legislative history that 
was agency-influenced.383) 
B. The Court Learns to Fight Fire with Fire 
Despite legislative history’s major contribution to a more agency-centered 
regime of statutory interpretation, it did not lead to wholesale government 
dominance of the judiciary. At least on the Supreme Court, the Justices 
retained a degree of autonomy by taking up legislative history themselves, 
learning to use the weapon that administrators had brought to the arena. The 
Justices could do this in part because of the Supreme Court’s institutional 
features—the clerkocracy, the small docket, the big library. Moreover, many of 
the Justices were veterans of the administrative state and thus were personally 
familiar with legislative history. In this way, the Justices of the 1940s, despite 
being friendlier to bureaucratic power than their predecessors, preserved the 
U.S. judiciary’s characteristic tendency to stand apart from the federal 
bureaucracy and sit in judgment upon it.384 
The most spectacular example of the Court’s independent scrutiny of the 
federal government’s use of legislative history was Helvering v. Griffiths, a 1943 
tax case written by Justice Jackson, the former tax administrator.385 Back in 
1920, the Supreme Court had held, in Eisner v. Macomber,386 that stock 
dividends were not “income” within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, so Congress could not tax them. Liberals hated this decision, and 
 
383.  For another case in this vein, see United States v. Myers, 320 U.S. 561, 571-73 (1944) (Reed, J.) 
(resting the holding on understandings expressed to Congress by both agency officials and 
private interest groups). 
384.  On the advent of the present model of judicial review of administrative action in generalist 
U.S. courts around the year 1900, see JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 245-50 
(2012); and Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the 
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (2011). On the English 
courts’ far more recent shift toward aggressive judicial review of agencies, see Paul Craig, 
Administrative Law, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS 1876-2009, at 524 (Louis Blom-Cooper 
et al. eds., 2009). In continental systems, administrative action is reviewed by specialized 
courts more attached to the bureaucratic state. E.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, 
FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 44-58 (5th ed. 1998); Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Subject 
Matter Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 27, 31-34 (1981). 
385.  318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
386.  252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
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as Roosevelt’s appointees filled the Supreme Court bench, it seemed ripe for 
overruling. The federal government asked for just that in Griffiths. But the 
most recent Revenue Act, of 1936, was ambiguous as to whether Congress 
meant to tax stock dividends (and challenge Macomber) to begin with. Indeed, 
the Treasury Department, from 1936 to the time of the case, had construed the 
Act not to cover such dividends.387 Nevertheless, the government briefed a 
formidable amount of the 1936 legislative history—far more than any other 
party—in an effort to show that Congress indeed wanted to challenge 
Macomber.388 The opinion was assigned to Jackson, whose experience placed 
him in a unique position to question the government’s use of the history. He 
had been Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Bureau in 1934-36 and head of 
the DOJ Tax Division in 1936. Like any liberal, he hated Macomber, telling his 
clerk that “whenever it is properly reconsidered it should be overruled 
pronto.”389 But the idea of upsetting seven years of taxpayer reliance made him 
blench.390 Further, he believed the government was being opportunistic in its 
use of history. Jackson had been there in 1936, and he did not think there had 
been a plan to challenge Macomber.391 Because none of the private lawyers in 
Griffiths answered the government’s use of history, Jackson took it upon 
himself to answer it. In his majority opinion rejecting the government’s 
reading of the statute, he cited a record-breaking amount of legislative history, 
more than half of it his own (and his clerk’s) original research. Much of it 
clearly drew on his own memory. One of his most extensive supporting 
citations was to the 1936 testimony of Arthur Kent, acting Chief Counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Bureau, before the House Committee.392 One can guess how 
Jackson knew about Kent’s testimony: Kent had been Jackson’s assistant at the 
Bureau; Jackson had left the Bureau only a month before the House hearing 
 
387.  Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 387-88, 395, 402. 
388.  Brief for the Petitioner [Helvering] at 9-16, Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (No. 467). The 
government also cited far more legislative history than the parties or amici in the related 
cases (which were decided a month later, with a different alignment of Justices from 
Griffiths) in Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). 
389.  Memorandum from “R.H.J.” [Jackson] to “Johnny” [John F. Costello], Clerk 1 (1942-43), 
Box 127, Folder 5, Jackson Papers, supra note 166 [hereinafter Griffiths Memo]. 
390.  Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 399. 
391.  He told his clerk: “It is my impression that Congress and the Committee again and again 
recognized that E. vs. M. was law notwithstanding their belief wrong [sic].” Griffiths Memo, 
supra note 389. 
392.  Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 378 & n.14. 
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and was probably the man originally scheduled to testify;393 and Jackson had 
continued to work closely with Kent upon moving to the Tax Division.394 
Administrators might try to leverage their special knowledge of legislative 
history, but if the judge possessed the knowledge of an administrator, he could 
fight fire with fire. 
Another example of the Court attempting to check government 
opportunism was Viereck v. United States, decided that same year. A statute of 
1939 required every foreign agent to disclose his or her propaganda activities 
“as agent,” suggesting that propaganda activities on one’s own account did not 
have to be disclosed, though the government contended they did. A subsequent 
statute of 1942 clearly did cover activities on one’s own account, but it was 
unclear whether this later act declared the meaning of the prior act, or changed 
it. When a case under the 1939 act reached the Court, the government 
extensively briefed the legislative history, while the other side briefed almost 
none.395 The committee reports on the 1942 act suggested (at least arguably) 
that the new language was declaratory. This helped the government. However, 
Chief Justice Stone wrote a majority opinion rejecting the government’s case. 
He thought the 1939 text was clearly against the government. And he 
discounted the 1942 committee reports, in part because he discovered that their 
language was taken verbatim from an analysis (reprinted in a hearing 
transcript) by an official at the DOJ Special Defense Unit who drafted the 1942 
bill. The DOJ analysis seemed to tell the congressmen that the new language 
was merely declaratory, but (as Stone said) it “did not point out to the 
committee the explicit [textual] limitation” of the 1939 act “to the registrant’s 
activities ‘as agent.’”396 As Stone apparently saw it, the DOJ had tried to have it 
both ways. For the 1942 bill, DOJ drafted clearly broad text, but it ghost-wrote 
a committee report stating that the old 1939 act was just as broad as the new—
and it assumed that congressmen would neglect to read the old act and so 
 
393.  On Jackson’s March 1936 move to DOJ, see 11 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 764, 765 
(John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999) (entry for Robert H. Jackson). For the April 
date of Kent’s testimony, see Revenue Act, 1936: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 74th Cong. 541, 593 (1936). 
394.  Jackson Oral History, CUCOHC, supra note 197, at 409-10. 
395.  Compare Brief for the United States [Respondent] at 38-42, Viereck v. United States, 318 
U.S. 236 (1943) (No. 458), with Brief for Petitioner, Viereck, 318 U.S. 236 (No. 458). As to the 
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would not realize how implausible the ghostwritten committee report seemed 
in light of the textual change. 
In a few opinions, the Justices marshaled legislative history to show that an 
agency, by its action, was flouting the understandings that it had reached with 
congressmen. In one case, a 1940 statute granted the ICC jurisdiction over 
barge lines, and the agency proceeded to issue an order that, as the barge lines 
alleged, unfairly favored the railroads. In dissent, Black indignantly catalogued 
all the assurances that proponents of the bill had given to pro-barge 
congressmen, promising the ICC would never issue such a discriminatory 
order. He particularly emphasized the guarantee offered by one ICC 
commissioner, which the proponents quoted “as a closing, clinching 
argument” on the House floor, that amendments to protect the barge lines 
were unnecessary.397 In another case, on whether the FLSA empowered DOL to 
ban home-work across a whole industry if necessary to enforce the minimum 
wage, Roberts argued, in dissent, that the congressmen who passed the FLSA 
had reached a deal that precluded a ban on home-work—which the DOL itself 
had recognized, after FLSA’s passage, by helping to draft an amendment to 
authorize such bans, which failed.398 
C. The “Washington Lawyer” as Adjunct of the State and User of Legislative 
History 
U.S. institutions of governance have long been characterized by an 
extraordinary degree of porousness with civil society. Given the historic 
weakness of the political parties, industry-specific and cause-specific “pressure 
groups” have exerted greater influence in U.S. legislative and administrative 
decision-making than in other wealthy democracies.399 Also, U.S. agencies, 
more than in other developed countries, have tended to trade personnel back 
 
397.  Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 700 (1943) (Black, 
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and forth—through the proverbial “revolving door”—with private 
organizations that lobby the government and advocate before it.400 
Even though the U.S. administrative state was primarily responsible for the 
rise of legislative history, the porousness of that state (and of the U.S. 
legislative process) meant that no institution could maintain a monopoly on 
this source. As noted in Section III.E, lawyer-lobbyists of the late 1930s and 
early 1940s demonstrated some capacity to brief legislative history, usually on 
statutes for which they themselves had lobbied. This provided an opportunity 
for private interest-group representatives to claim that Congress had blessed 
their programs, much as the agencies often claimed. A striking example was J. 
Ninian Beall, general counsel of the American Trucking Associations. In 1937, 
during the joint House-Senate committee hearings on the FLSA, Beall testified 
that the trucking industry should be regulated by one agency, not two, for two 
might impose conflicting mandates. Shortly after his testimony, the 
committees adopted the exception to the FLSA for “employees” already covered 
by the ICC. A few years later, Beall wrote the brief for the Associations in 
American Trucking, and he argued that the committees’ adoption of the 
exception had been a ratification of his testimony, which he quoted for a full 
three pages of the brief. The word “employees” should be construed to cover all 
employees of the trucking industry, since that would produce unified 
regulation of the industry by a single agency—the very thing Beall had 
recommended in the remarks that (he said) so deeply moved the 
committees.401 
The practice of lawyer-lobbyists for particular industries or causes helping 
to shape legislative history and then quoting it during subsequent litigation 
would continue, but it would become more institutionalized and 
concentrated.402 The private lawyer-lobbyists who briefed legislative history 
circa 1940 had relatively narrow bailiwicks: each would lobby for a particular 
interest on a certain statute, then brief that statute’s legislative history if it 
happened to reach the Supreme Court. The way of the future was to be found 
in the emergent “Washington law firms” that came into their own during the 
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1940s and 1950s: Covington & Burling; Shea & Gardner; Arnold, Fortas & 
Porter; and the like. Staffed by veterans of the federal administrative state, 
these firms became lobbying powerhouses for big regulated companies, both 
with Congress and with the agencies. Their growing size allowed them to 
collectivize and systematize lobbying as never before. Their size also provided 
them with the economies of scale for a closely related task: maintaining large, 
trans-substantive collections of legislative history—the kind of collections that 
once had existed only inside the federal government. The biggest such private 
operation was at Covington, run by Finley. Having arrived at the firm in 1943, 
she and her assistant systematized the gathering of legislative history and 
assembled scrapbook volumes on more than 600 federal statutes over the next 
twelve years.403 At Covington, explained Finley in 1947, “counsel is expected to 
keep in such close contact with Congress that one of the library assistants 
devotes almost full time to attending hearings on the ‘Hill’ and securing bills 
and reports as soon as they are released.”404 The Covington approach to 
collecting legislative history would become the model for other large 
Washington firms.405 
The word lobbying may be too narrow and mundane to describe what firms 
like Covington did: they were, in some sense, adjuncts of the administrative 
state. Charles Horsky—a onetime OSG staff lawyer and Covington partner—
wrote in 1952 of “The Washington Lawyer,” a type of advocate who had 
recently emerged to serve as “principal interpreter” between the business world 
and the federal government, “explaining to each the needs, desires and 
demands of the other,” thus promoting compliance by businesses and 
“interpreting . . . the client’s problems to the government.”406 This was the 
lawyer as public/private mediator—a duality in keeping with the importance of 
the “revolving door” between business and government, through which 
Horsky passed multiple times, and which he stoutly defended as an institution 
that served the interests of both.407 
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404.  Finley, supra note 76, at 180-81. 
405.  Margeton, supra note 61, at 86. 
406.  See HORSKY, supra note 402, at 9-10, 16-17, 122-23, 125-26, 129 (1952). For later treatments of 
the Washington firms, see JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE SUPER-LAWYERS: THE SMALL AND 
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D. Critics of Legislative History Statism: Frankfurter and Jackson 
By the mid-1940s, the Court, driven primarily by the agencies and DOJ, 
had normalized the use of legislative history. Once that was done, two leading 
progressive Justices who had played a part in the process, Frankfurter and 
Jackson, began to have misgivings about the approach they had fostered, 
particularly its potential for abuse within the context of a fully-matured federal 
bureaucracy and the private lawyer-lobbyist apparatus that had grown up with 
it. 
Of the two Justices, Frankfurter made the more mild critique. It came in 
1948 in Shapiro v. United States.408 The case concerned one of the most 
intrusive statutes in U.S. history: the World War II Emergency Price Control 
Act, passed in 1942 and administered by the giant Office of Price 
Administration (OPA). The Act empowered the OPA to force people to 
disclose information about their business, but it gave them immunity from 
prosecution for any “transaction, matter or thing” about which they were 
forced to make disclosure. The question was whether the immunity provision 
applied to forced disclosure of records that OPA required businesses to keep. 
This made a huge difference, since OPA required businesses to keep all records 
that they would “customarily” keep, so long as the records related to prices.409 
On this fraught question of bureaucratic power over millions of private 
entities, the Court ruled for the government 5-4, relying heavily on legislative 
history that was created exclusively by government lawyers and then briefed 
exclusively by government lawyers. Back in December 1941, Congress had been 
considering the bill that became the 1942 Act. OPA was already in existence and 
was deeply involved in the deliberations. The House had sought to weaken 
OPA investigative powers. But then came Pearl Harbor, after which OPA 
persuaded the Senate committee to strengthen those powers. In so doing, the 
general counsel of the agency gave the Senate committee a twenty-page memo 
analyzing the bill, which was reprinted in the middle of a 2,300-page hearing 
transcript. The OPA memo included two pages on required record-keeping 
that supported the narrow view of the immunity provision,410 although nobody 
at the hearing said anything about the issue orally.411 Seven years later, in 
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Shapiro, the government’s lawyers cited this 1941 OPA memo to argue that 
Congress meant for the required records to serve as a basis for prosecution. 
(The attorneys for the accused businessman did not cite the memo, nor even 
the hearing.412) Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the majority, was quite taken 
with the OPA memo, emphasizing it heavily in his opinion.413 
In dissent, Frankfurter expressed his fear that lobbying and litigation—
particularly when done by federal bureaucrats and their lawyers—would 
collapse into each other if the judiciary were not careful. Vinson’s reliance on 
the OPA memo was “so attenuated . . . as to discredit the whole paraphernalia 
of legislative history.”414 There was not “the slenderest ground for assuming 
that members of the Committee read [OPA] counsel’s submission.”415 The 
Court’s “task is to determine, as best we can, what Congress meant—not what 
counsel sponsoring legislation, however disinterestedly, hoped Congress 
would mean.”416 Noting that “it is the common practice to allow memoranda 
to be submitted to a committee of Congress by interests, public and private, 
often high-minded enough but with their own axes to grind,” Frankfurter 
worried that judicial reliance on such memos would give “great 
encouragement” to “the temptations of administrative officials and others to 
provide self-serving ‘proof’ of congressional confirmation for their private 
views through incorporation of such materials.”417 
A stronger reaction against legislative history came from Justice Jackson. 
To him, the problem was more sweeping than Frankfurter thought it, for 
judicial reliance on legislative history inevitably reinforced the concentration of 
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power in the federal administrative state and in the private lawyers most closely 
attached to it. 
To understand Jackson’s critique, we must begin with some background on 
the man himself. He spent his whole life in rural New York state until 1934, 
when he moved to Washington to become Chief Counsel of the Internal 
Revenue Bureau and then rose through the DOJ before joining the Court in 
1941. In the course of his rise, Jackson became a renowned advocate for the 
New Deal, but he supported its policies only selectively. At heart, he was a 
Jeffersonian and a civic republican, averse to any concentration of power. He 
supported the New Deal policies that broke up such concentrations (like 
antitrust enforcement and taxing the rich) but opposed those that had the 
opposite effect (like the NRA and other corporatist regulatory initiatives). 
Insofar as Jackson supported the rise of the federal administrative state, he 
viewed it as a necessary evil—a concentration of public power to counter the 
more dangerous concentration of private power in big business.418 
At first, Jackson had embraced legislative history as much as any 
progressive, presiding over its increasing use by federal lawyers during his 
tenure as SG in 1938-40 and citing it copiously during his early years on the 
Court. But his most extensive early use of it was in Griffiths, where (as we saw) 
he leveraged his own personal administrative knowledge of the Revenue Act of 
1936 to check the government’s opportunism. This experience may well have 
disturbed Jackson. He must have realized that not every poor litigant facing a 
barrage of legislative history from the federal leviathan would be so fortunate 
as to have a judge who knew the history from his own prior job. 
Within five years, Jackson began denouncing legislative history as a 
weapon of the strong and well-connected—a tool usable only by the federal 
government or by law firms with the largest resources. As he said to the 
American Law Institute in 1948: 
Only the lawyers of the capital or the most prosperous offices in the 
large cities can have all the necessary legislative material available. The 
average law office cannot afford to collect, house and index all this 
material. Its use by the Court puts knowledge of the law practically out 
of reach of all except the Government and a few law offices.419  
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Knowledge of legislative history, originally concentrated in the administrative 
state, was now somewhat more widespread, thanks to the expansion of firms 
like Covington, with systematic operations for monitoring Congress and 
assembling the relevant documents. But firms like Covington were no help to 
individuals or small businesses unconnected to big organized interests. 
Jackson also worried that legislative history dissolved the distinction 
between judicial and legislative processes. He recognized that judges 
interpreting statutes had to engage in some degree of policy choice.420 Yet he 
was also a skeptic of judicial power and keenly sensitive to the limits of judicial 
competence, so he wanted as many value choices as possible to be made in the 
political branches, not the judiciary.421 Further, Jackson disliked what American 
politics had become—a pluralist struggle of organized and concentrated 
interests that excluded the unorganized and unconcentrated—and he was 
appalled to see that Supreme Court litigation now resembled that pluralist 
political struggle. In a handwritten draft of his 1948 speech, he included this 
passage, which he deleted from the public version: 
Important cases no longer are between John Doe and Richard Roe, two 
individuals in controversy. . . . If such appears from the title the 
individuals usually are but symbols of groups in conflict. All fights in 
court become fights between classes, or races, or interests, usually with 
a government agency on one or the other side. Then come the pressure 
briefs usually labeled quite falsely “Amicus Curia[e].” These “friends of 
the Court,” who recently have been allowed to file their pleas with little 
regard to whether they can contribute to the case tend to convert a 
litigation into a political issue.422 
Given the prevalence of legislative history in briefs of the federal government 
and of lawyer-lobbyists—and the tendency of those briefs to quote legislative 
statements made, ghostwritten, or influenced by those interests—one can 
perhaps understand why Jackson felt the courtroom was beginning to look like 
a committee hearing room. Spectacles like the one in American Trucking—of 
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the trade association’s general counsel briefing lengthy quotations from his 
own congressional testimony—must have made it seem that litigation had 
become the continuation of congressional politics by other means. 
Jackson reiterated his critique of legislative history in two concurrences on 
the Court. The first came in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp. (1951), 
on how far the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted state legislatures to go in 
insulating certain kinds of contracts from antitrust liability. This was exactly 
the kind of case that disturbed Jackson: legislative history was copiously 
briefed by the federal government (as amicus) and by numerous private 
entities (including a few dozen trade associations as amici), many of them 
represented by Samuel Rosenman, a close advisor to FDR and Truman and a 
powerful lobbyist,423 and by Herbert Bergson, who had worked in DOJ’s 
legislative office (possibly on Miller-Tydings itself) and as head of its Antitrust 
Division before leaving to start a private antitrust practice (which would soon 
lead to his indictment for violating conflict-of-interest laws, though he was 
acquitted).424 Concurring, Jackson reiterated his concern that legislative history 
was practically not usable by most lawyers and that its use tended “to involve 
the Court in political controversies which are quite proper in the enactment of 
a bill but should have no place in its interpretation.”425 
The second of Jackson’s critiques from the bench came in United States v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California (1953), on the line between federal and 
state authority in electricity regulation. Both the federal government and the 
California agency briefed legislative history from the 1930s, but Reed’s 
majority opinion ended up relying on legislative history from the 1920s that 
appeared in neither brief. Jackson was especially disturbed by the obscurity of 
this older legislative history, which the California lawyers said they had been 
unable to obtain at any libraries near their San Francisco offices, nor even 
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through inter-library loan requests to Harvard and the Library of Congress. 
The lawyers had finally accessed the material “only four days before [oral] 
argument, in Washington at the Library of [the U.S. Supreme] Court.”426 It 
seemed that, while the federal lawyers might easily have accessed the material 
on which Reed was relying, the California lawyers could not have. “The 
practice of the Federal Government relying on inaccessible law has heretofore 
been condemned,” declared Jackson, recalling the days before the Federal 
Register was established, when the executive branch had issued orders without 
publishing them.427 
Jackson’s critique drew diverse reactions. Horsky thought he might be onto 
something: “To the extent that [Jackson’s] criticism is warranted, the 
Washington lawyer, in Washington, at least, has an enormous advantage.”428 
Finley sought to rebut Jackson by arguing, based on her own inquiries, that the 
materials in Public Utilities Commission were far more accessible than the 
California lawyers had said, although her answer in some ways proved 
Jackson’s larger point. The committee reports and floor debates, she noted, 
“were in several San Francisco libraries.”429 But she admitted that the hearings 
would have required loans both from UC-Berkeley and from the California 
State Library in Sacramento (ninety miles away). She also failed to note that 
the California lawyers had inquired at Berkeley, which (they said) had been 
“unable to supply” the material.430 Finley suspected the problem was that the 
California lawyers did not know how to identify which hearings and documents 
constituted the relevant legislative history, and she said the California 
librarians could hardly be blamed for not finding the material if the lawyers 
could not come up with the references.431 But of course, the fact that 
professional law librarians in California were incapable of identifying the 
relevant documents was itself significant. It underscored how opaque 
legislative history was to lawyers and librarians who (unlike Finley) were not 
in a professional position where it paid to monitor Congress on a regular basis. 
An even more obtuse response to Jackson was the rebuttal by Hart and 
Sacks. Though The Legal Process was shrewd and circumspect about some 
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aspects of legislative history, its treatment of the accessibility question was glib. 
Hart and Sacks simply cited the federal regulations for depository libraries 
(barely pausing to note that those regulations had key exceptions and might 
not be followed), and they concluded that some depository library in San 
Francisco “might reasonably have been expected to have the material” cited in 
Public Utilities Commission.432 This ignored the question of whether lawyers 
could use legislative history on a regular basis if doing so required assembling 
materials from multiple depository libraries. And of course it also ignored the 
problems of identifying the relevant documents and of wading through their 
unindexed vastness. We might attribute Hart and Sacks’s refusal to grapple 
with these issues to their own experience as lawyers, which was confined to the 
rare institutions that made legislative history easy to use: Hart’s only practice 
experience had been at DOJ and OPA in 1937-45,433 while Sacks’s only practice 
experience had been at Covington in 1950-52,434 by which time Finley had built 
much of her tremendous library. Hart and Sacks were insiders, and that status 
gave them a blinkered view of the problem. This, in turn, reflected the status of 
legislative history as an insider’s source.435 
v. conclusion: then to now 
Whether courts should rely upon legislative history is the most contested 
practical question in statutory interpretation. This Article’s documentation of 
the statist origin of that reliance draws our attention to a neglected aspect of 
the politics surrounding the question, which we typically think of as 
concerning judges and legislators, when in fact it may concern the executive 
branch just as much, or more. My hope is that we will ultimately reach a well-
informed understanding of how legislative history and judicial interpretive 
method interact with executive-branch power in our own era. Reaching that 
understanding will require primary research on how our interpretive practices 
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have evolved from the 1940s to the present. Here I note some early data and 
offer some hypotheses about that evolution. 
It seems that, once legislative history became normal at the Supreme Court 
in the 1940s, its level of use did not shift dramatically in the 1950s or 1960s, but 
it did intensify greatly in the 1970s and early 1980s. Then came the reaction: 
usage dropped steeply from the mid-1980s through the 1990s and has 
remained low.436 Similarly, according to Bridgman’s study of the U.S. circuit 
courts, usage in those tribunals rose greatly in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
followed by a major decline.437 
It would appear that federal agency litigation in Washington, D.C., has 
remained the driving force behind shifts in legislative history usage. According 
to Bridgman’s data, in 1950-69, the U.S. Supreme Court accounted for 47% of 
all citations to legislative history in that court and all U.S. circuit courts 
combined.438 In about 1970, the D.C. Circuit rapidly transformed into a de 
facto specialized court for agency litigation,439 and during 1970-85—the years 
of heaviest legislative history usage—the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit 
(despite their low caseloads) together accounted for 44% of all citations to 
legislative history in those two courts and all other U.S. circuit courts 
combined.440 Further, as Bridgman shows, the reduction in use of legislative 
history from the mid-1980s onward was more pronounced in those two courts 
than anywhere else.441 
Why did the use of legislative history intensify in 1970-85 and decline 
thereafter? And, given that these shifts were most pronounced in the Supreme 
Court and D.C. Circuit, what did the shifts have to do with the federal 
administrative state and with the D.C. establishment built up around it? 
 
436.  A key study of the Supreme Court in the postwar period reports that the proportion of its 
opinions in statutory cases citing any legislative history hovered between about 30% and 
50% in 1953-69; hovered between 50% and 70% in 1970-85; declined steeply in 1985-95; and 
averaged about 30% in 1995-2006. Law & Zaring, supra note 1, at 1716. In my data, the 
annual percentage of opinions in statutory cases citing any legislative history averaged 38% 
in 1940-45 and was 40% in 1950. (Note that this metric is different from the percentage of 
cases citing any legislative history, reported supra Figures 3 and 6.) 
437.  Bridgman, supra note 343 (manuscript at 25). 
438.  This calculation is mine, using Bridgman’s data, which he generously shared with me. 
439.  See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 23-46 (1999). 
440.  This general point is made in Bridgman, supra note 343. The exact figure is my own 
calculation, using Bridgman’s data. Bridgman’s count does not include the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which began operating in 1982. 
441.  Bridgman, supra note 343 (manuscript at 12-15, 24). 
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Begin with the intensified use of legislative history in 1970-85. I 
hypothesize that this reflected two developments that occurred circa 1970. 
First, a rising disenchantment with bureaucracy led the judiciary and especially 
the D.C. Circuit to become far more independent, willful, and aggressive in 
reviewing the actions of agencies than in the preceding generation.442 Second, 
the “game” of producing, influencing, and briefing congressional discourse 
came to include a larger and more diverse set of players, beyond the familiar 
agency personnel and the Covington-style firms connected with them. These 
new players included a new cadre of D.C. activists who opposed industry and 
fought for the environment, consumers, and the like;443 a larger, better-
organized, and more confrontational corps of D.C. business lobbyists who 
emerged in response to the anti-industry activists;444 and a huge number of 
new professional congressional staffers, hired mainly by Democratic lawmakers 
to reduce Congress’s dependence on agencies at a time when Republicans 
usually held the presidency.445 As these new players forced their way into the 
game, the legislative record became more likely to include a wider diversity of 
statements about a statute’s meaning, beyond those of the agency, and the 
non-agency briefs in a case were more likely to delve into the legislative record 
and to put forward pieces of it that did not fit the agency view. The 
bureaucracy’s advantage in shaping legislative history and presenting it to 
courts diminished (thought it did not disappear).446 Judges, in their 
 
442.  This new judicial activism was typified by (though broader than) the idea that courts would 
now take a “hard look” at agency reasoning. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the 
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in 
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1295-1315 (1986). 
443.  Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1189-95 (2009). 
444.  JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ELITES, SPECIAL INTERESTS, AND 
THE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST 109-36 (2000). 
445.  JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 402-14 (1981). 
446.  Legislative history also became somewhat more accessible beyond agencies due to the 
growth of new research technologies. The private Congressional Information Service was 
started in 1970 and provided, for each federal statute, a new level of detail and 
comprehensiveness in providing citations to bills and other legislative history documents. 
GWENDOLYN B. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LAWS 73-74 (1972); Identifying and Acquiring Federal Government Documents, 65 LAW LIBR. J. 
415, 416-17 (1972) (statement of James B. Adler); Margeton, supra note 61, at 96. The later 
advent of Westlaw and Lexis made it possible to obtain documents electronically that once 
had been available to the public only in a subset of depository libraries. Most recently, the 
Thomas Database, established by Congress, provides fairly comprehensive references and 
easy access to many documents, albeit with significant limitations, though it has the added 
virtue of being free. For a given statute, the Thomas Database provides references to related 
 
 
leviathan and interpretive revolution 
391 
 
heightened scrutiny of agency action, took advantage of the greater diversity in 
congressional discourse (and in the briefing thereof) to find and marshal 
statements of meaning to challenge the agency view and impose their own. 
Judges had to cram more citations into their opinions to refute the 
understandings of the hitherto-dominant agencies. Even when agencies won, 
they now needed to provide the courts with more comprehensive histories to 
refute the readings urged by new players in the more diverse environment. 
This, too, resulted in more citation-heavy opinions. 
What of the judicial reaction against legislative history that occurred from 
1985 onward? I hypothesize that the intensified use of legislative history proved 
exhausting and overwhelming to judges. They became tired and cynical after a 
few years of trying to process and marshal the disparate pieces of an 
increasingly diverse and incoherent legislative record—a task judges found 
especially onerous now that they were less inclined to rely upon the 
bureaucracy as a guide to that record. But at the same time, judges did not 
want to relinquish the authority over the bureaucracy that they had asserted 
since 1970. Textualism was an attractive new means for retaining that 
authority. Narrowing the materials of decision to statutory text (and related 
sources like canons of construction and dictionaries) placed judges on a more 
equal footing with agencies than was the case with legislative history. Whereas 
legislative history was so voluminous and complex that judges could never 
approach the mastery that agency personnel achieved through their continuous 
interaction with Congress, statutory text was circumscribed enough that 
generalist judges could process it relatively easily—and could thus more easily 
justify defying the agency view. This was even more true of canons and 
 
bills, but these do not extend to previous Congresses; it provides easy access to committee 
reports and floor debates but not hearings; and its holdings are very thin if one goes back 
farther than about 15 years. 
          While all these new technologies have some value—mitigating the problems of 
identifying documents and obtaining copies of them—I am skeptical that they have solved 
the accessibility problem. The challenge of finding relevant material within documents is 
probably the greatest of all, and it has probably gotten steadily worse. As noted supra notes 
443-445 and accompanying text, the discourse is written by more diverse actors and so is less 
coherent. Further, the documents have grown more voluminous. E.g., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 (1998) 
(running to nearly 11,000 pages). And “using them effectively remains difficult and costly 
because of the large number of possibly relevant documents, because they are poorly 
indexed internally, and because of the difficulties of determining in advance which parts of 
the history may be deemed relevant to questions of interpretation.” Danner, supra note 12, at 
194. 
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dictionaries, which were as legible to generalist judges as to anyone else. Thus, 
textualism reasserted the omnicompetence of the judiciary and of generalist 
judging, despite the enormously complex and subject-specific processes of 
policy formulation that actually characterize the administrative state. Just as the 
shift toward legislative history in the 1940s was statist, I suspect that the turn 
against it has been anti-statist, in that it has been a means to maintain judicial 
power against the bureaucracy.447 
 
447.  To be sure, my hypothesis is superficially in tension with the fact that the period of 
textualism’s rise also saw the rise of the Chevron doctrine, which says courts must defer to 
any reasonable agency interpretation of a statute. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But I suspect that Chevron’s rise to prominence did 
practically little to hold back the heightened judicial aggressiveness toward agencies that has 
been with us since 1970. As the leading history of Chevron notes, there was substantial case 
law counseling judicial deference to agency interpretations long before the Supreme Court 
handed down Chevron in 1984; the Court, when it did hand down the opinion, did not 
intend to alter deference doctrine in any way; and the case’s rise to landmark status was 
caused by the D.C. Circuit in 1984-87, during which time “there is little evidence” that the 
case “caused the judges of the D.C. Circuit to become more deferential.” Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW STORIES 398, 425 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006). Indeed, the whole question of “whether 
Chevron has had any impact on the degree of deference judges actually give to agencies 
remains unresolved.” Id. at 426. I suspect Chevron has had no such impact. For one thing, 
the case’s supposed principle is in tension with the larger doctrinal structure that has 
characterized administrative law since circa 1970, which emphasizes strong judicial scrutiny, 
particularly of the agency’s fact-finding, policy choices, and reasoning processes. If judges 
were to shift meaningfully into a deferential mindset when reviewing agency interpretations 
of law, it would cause them much cognitive dissonance, and I suspect they typically do not 
do so. (On the tension in the doctrine, see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law 
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).) Further, application of the Chevron formula is 
entirely within the control of the judiciary and is “highly manipulable,” Thomas W. Merrill, 
Confessions of a Chevron Apostate, ADMIN. L. NEWS, Winter 1994, at 1, 14, to say nothing of 
the looseness and confusion that reign when it comes to the question of whether Chevron 
applies at all, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron 
as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference 
Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010). And textualism, by its nature, may offset whatever 
increase in agency power Chevron would otherwise permit. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference 
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (“[A judge] who finds more 
often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its 
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for 
Chevron deference [i.e., ambiguity] exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require 
me to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.”); 
see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 351, 371-73 (1994) (suggesting that textualism puts a premium on the judge’s linguistic 
cleverness and ingenuity that may be psychologically inconsistent with deference). 
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appendix i :  methodology 
Data. All data produced for this project is available online at the Yale Law 
Journal’s website (http://www.yalelawjournal.org). 
Why I Did Not Use the Supreme Court Database. In conducting this project, 
I did not use the Supreme Court Database (SCD) originated by Harold Spaeth. 
Though this database is frequently used in quantitative studies of the Supreme 
Court, it currently goes back only to 1946, so it was not usable for the period I 
wanted to study. Scholars are currently extending the database backward in 
time, but it is estimated that the data on 1930-46 will not be released until 
2014.448 Since I began this project in mid-2011, waiting for the Spaeth Database 
would have required a two-and-a-half year delay (possibly more). I decided 
such a delay was not worth it, for two reasons. First, the SCD does not include 
any information about citations (even for the years that it does cover and will 
cover). Its only use for me would be that it distinguishes cases interpreting 
federal statutes from other cases. Thus, even if I had delayed starting my study 
until the SCD data was released for the relevant years, I would nonetheless 
have had to gather most of the data for my study independently. Second, I 
think the data I have gathered can be retrofitted to the SCD fairly easily, if any 
future scholars want to combine my data with the SCD. There may be a few 
cases where my categorizations (of cases as statutory versus not) diverge from 
those in the SCD, but I think my cite-counting method is explicit enough that 
counts could be done for any cases that are counted as statutory by the SCD 
and not by me. 
Identifying Federal Statutory Cases. I defined federal statutory cases as cases 
decided by the Court with a full, signed opinion that involved the 
interpretation of a federal statute, including any federal constitutional 
challenge to a federal statute. One research assistant (RA) categorized cases (as 
statutory versus not) for the years 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930-41, and 1950. A 
second RA categorized cases for 1942-45. To check objectivity and reliability, I 
had the first RA take a 25% random sample of all cases decided by the Court 
with a full, signed opinion from 1942-45 (yielding 144 cases) and categorize 
them as statutory versus not. There was 93% agreement between the two RAs, 
and disagreements were about even in both directions.449 A third RA 
 
448.  E-mail from Theodore Ruger, Primary Investigator, Supreme Court Database, to author 
(Jan. 18, 2013) (on file with author). 
449.  There were 101 cases that both RAs designated as statutory and 33 cases that both RAs 
designated as non-statutory. There were 10 cases on which the RAs disagreed: for 6 of 
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categorized the cases for 1900 and 1905. I personally categorized the first 60 
cases in 1900 (by order in the U.S. Reports), and there was 93% agreement 
between the RA and me, and the disagreements were even in both directions. 
Counting Citations in Federal Statutory Cases. RAs performed all counting 
of citations by hand, not by electronic means. I considered this necessary 
because citation formats in the early twentieth century were less formal and 
consistent than they have now become.450 
There are many possible ways to define a “citation” to legislative history for 
purposes of counting. Let me explain the method I chose. 
First, one must decide exactly which kinds of materials to count. On this 
point, I included what I think most lawyers would say are the conventional 
materials: House bills, Senate bills, House committee reports, Senate 
committee reports, House hearings, Senate hearings, House documents (in the 
serial set, including House Executive Documents), Senate documents (in the 
serial set, including Senate Executive Documents), all conference reports, the 
Congressional Record (since 1873), Congressional Globe (1833-73), Register of 
Debates (1824-33), and Annals of Congress (1789-1824), plus joint hearings. This 
includes all genres that Carro and Brann included and found in more than 
negligible amounts.451 
Second, one must decide what sort of reference to any of the materials 
above counts as a “citation.” I had my research assistants count any reference to 
any of the materials above where a formal document title and/or document 
number was given, such as “S. Rept. No. 76, 72nd Cong.,” “41 Cong. Rec. 
3401,” or “Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on Estate 
Taxes (1935).”452 If a single document (such as “S. Rept. No. 76, 72nd Cong.”) 
 
these, the first RA designated the case statutory and the second RA designated it non-
statutory; for the remaining 4, it was vice versa. 
450.  See Law & Zaring, supra note 1, at 1686 n.119. 
451.  See Carro & Brann, supra note 29, at 304 tbl.II. 
452.  My chosen method did not account for informal mentions of legislative history, as when an 
opinion simply said something like, “the reports of the relevant committees confirm this 
point,” without ever giving a document title or number. I do not think this made a 
substantial difference. To see whether the failure to count such informal mentions might 
have substantially depressed the pre-1940 numbers, I performed Westlaw searches of all 
Supreme Court cases for the years 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, and 1930-39, with the 
following terms: “committee! OR debate!” Across the 16 years, these searches yielded 15 
informal mentions in cases that had no formal citations, plus 6 informal mentions in cases 
that did have formal citations. The year 1910 had three informal mentions (of which all 
three were in cases with no formal citations); the year 1935 had four informal mentions (of 
which two were in cases with no formal citations); the year 1937 had three informal 
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was cited once and then cited again later in the opinion, that would count as 
two cites. If it were cited a third time, that would count as three, and so on. 
Similarly, the use of “id.” would count as a cite in itself. 
For each reference, I had the research assistants count one cite for each 
individual page number or hyphenated set of page numbers. If the document 
was cited with no page number, I had them simply count the reference as one 
cite. My reason for counting page numbers is that, when a reference to a 
document gives several specific pages, this generally reflects greater research 
into the document and engagement with what it said. There is a big difference, 
in research time, between citing one page in a volume of the Congressional 
Record and citing six pages. Likewise, there is a big difference, in research time, 
between citing one page in an 800-page hearing and citing six pages.453 
To give an example, say an opinion contains this sentence: “The committee 
chair emphasized this point repeatedly. Cong. Rec., 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 
7897, 7912, 7914-15, 8131.” That would count as four citations, since four pages 
and/or hyphenated sets of pages are given.454 
One RA counted the years 1920, 1925, 1932-41, and 1950. A second RA 
counted the years 1942-45. To check objectivity and reliability, I had the first 
RA count citations in a random sample of cases from 1942-45 (which sample 
totaled 101 cases, with 167 opinions). There were some deviations up and down 
between the two RAs in individual cases, but apparently these were random, 
 
mentions (of which two were in cases with no formal citations); and no other year had more 
than two informal mentions. In no year would including the informal mentions have 
increased the percentage of cases using legislative history by more than two percentage 
points, except 1910, which would have increased from 0% to 4%. In no year would 
including the formal citations have increased the citations per case by more than 0.1. (In 
counting informal mentions, I excluded passages in which the opinion mentions an item of 
legislative history only to say it is inadmissible.) It should also be noted that at least some 
cases in 1940-45 included informal mentions with no formal citations. 
453.  E.g., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 425 n.2 (1943) (Reed, J.) 
(citing eight discrete page ranges in the Congressional Record and relying upon that citation 
for a global characterization of the whole debate on a bill). 
454.  At times, an opinion would cite consecutive pages of a document and join them with a 
hyphen, as in “S. Rept. No. 76, pp. 2-3.” At other times, an opinion would cite such pages 
and join them with a comma, as in “S. Rept. No. 76, pp. 2, 3.” To avoid artificially inflating 
the number of citations in the latter situation, we adopted a rule of always counting a series 
of consecutive pages joined by a comma (or commas) as a single cite, as if it were a 
hyphenated series of pages. Thus, “pp. 2, 3, 4, 7” would be counted as if it read “pp. 2-4, 7”; 
that is, as two cites. 
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with almost no bias. The first RA produced a total of 304 citations, the second 
297 citations, a difference of less than 3%.455 
A third RA counted the years 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1930, and 1931. To 
check objectivity and reliability, I had a fourth RA do a duplicate count on 1931 
(which had 111 cases, with 128 opinions). Again, there were some deviations up 
and down between the two RAs in individual cases, but apparently these were 
random, with almost no bias. The third RA produced a total of 111 citations for 
1931, the fourth 116, a difference of less than 5%.456 
Measuring the Proportion of Cases Citing Any Legislative History. The data 
on which cases contained any citation to legislative history were a by-product 
of counting the number of citations in each case. 
As noted above, one RA counted the years 1920, 1925, 1932-41, and 1950. A 
second RA counted the years 1942-45. To check objectivity and reliability, I had 
the first RA count citations in a random sample of cases from 1942-45 (which 
sample totaled 101 cases, with 167 opinions). There was agreement in 100 cases 
(99%) as to whether the case contained at least one citation to legislative 
history or none. 
As noted above, a third RA counted the years 1900, 1905, 1910, 1915, 1930, 
and 1931. To check objectivity and reliability, I had a fourth RA do a duplicate 
count on 1931 (which had 111 cases, with 128 opinions). There was agreement 
in 108 cases (97%) as to whether the case contained at least one citation to 
legislative history or none. 
Calculating Citation/Opinion Ratios for Individual Justices. In calculating 
citation/opinion ratios for individual Justices, we confront the question of how 
to define “opinion.” In the first half of the twentieth century, it was common 
for a Justice to concur or dissent with only a very brief statement, sometimes 
 
455.  To break down the agreements and disagreements opinion-by-opinion: in 119 opinions, the 
RAs agreed there were zero citations; in 28 opinions, they agreed on a nonzero number of 
citations; in 15 opinions, their citation counts differed by one (with the first RA giving the 
higher count in 7 opinions and the second RA in 8); in 2 opinions, their citation counts 
differed by two (with the first RA giving the higher count in 1 opinion and the second RA in 
1); and in 3 opinions, their citation counts differed by 3 or more (with the first RA giving the 
higher count in 2 opinions and the second RA in 1). 
456.  To break down the agreements and disagreements opinion-by-opinion: in 110 opinions, the 
RAs agreed there were zero citations; in 11 opinions, they agreed on a nonzero number of 
citations; in 2 opinions, their citation counts differed by one (with the third RA giving the 
higher count in 1 opinion and the fourth RA in 1); in 2 opinions, their citation counts 
differed by two (with the third RA giving the higher count in 1 opinion and the fourth RA 
in 1); and in 3 opinions, their citation counts differed by 3 or more (with the third RA giving 
the higher count in 1 opinion and the fourth RA in 2). 
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only a sentence (perhaps written in the third person), giving no reasoning, 
cursory reasoning, or simply citing the reasoning of the lower court’s opinion. 
Deciding which of these short utterances to count as “opinions” is difficult. I 
therefore adopted the somewhat arbitrary but happily objective method of 
excluding all separate opinions that did not exceed one paragraph. I felt 
comfortable adopting such a method in this study because, for the whole 
period 1930-45, no opinion that did not exceed one paragraph cited any 
legislative history. 
Locating Briefs for Cases. In locating briefs, we sought filings that went to 
the merits of the case and contained legal argument. This included the regular 
merits briefs, reply briefs, supplemental briefs, and appendices under separate 
cover, as well as amicus briefs. We did not count petitions for certiorari, briefs 
in opposition to certiorari, petitions for rehearing, or any filings that contained 
no legal argument (e.g., filings concerning purely factual matters). If a case was 
decided after reargument, then, for all purposes, we counted only the briefs on 
reargument, not the initial briefs. 
The project required locating three distinctly defined (but in some ways 
overlapping) sets of briefs. First, it was necessary to locate briefs for all cases in 
the sample from 1940-45 used for the opinion/brief citation-matching exercise. 
Second, it was necessary to locate all federal briefs for all statutory cases in 
1930-45. Third, it was necessary to locate all briefs (not only federal but also 
non-federal) for all statutory cases in 1938-41. 
In locating all three of these sets, we used Gale Cengage Learning’s 
database, The Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, 
1832-1978 (which is drawn, for the period in question, from the collection of 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York). For all cases in all three 
sets, we also checked for the relevant kinds of briefs in the hard-copy collection 
housed at the Yale Law Library. According to an order of the Supreme Court, 
the ABCNY and Yale have been official repositories of Supreme Court briefs 
since June 1931, and they were already receiving briefs from the Clerk’s office 
before then.457 
To gauge the completeness of the results of our search of these two 
repositories for the three sets of briefs, consider the following: 
As to cases in the opinion/brief matching sample in 1940-45: We found a 
facially complete set of briefs (i.e., at least one full merits brief on each side in 
every docket-numbered dispute decided within the case) in 68 of 69 cases, and 
 
457.  See Order [of the Supreme Court Regarding Supplying Briefs to Various Institutions] 
(1930), printed in 24 LAW LIBR. J. 166 (1931). 
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the one case that was facially missing any briefs contained only one legislative 
history citation. (I therefore excluded this case from the matching exercise.) 
As to federal briefs in all statutory cases in 1930-45: We found federal briefs, or 
other evidence that a case was federally briefed, in well over one thousand 
cases. In 1,086 of these cases, the federal briefs that we found constituted a 
facially complete set. That is, we found at least one full federal merits brief 
corresponding to every docket-numbered dispute decided within the case that 
included a federal party. There were only 15 cases in which one or more federal 
briefs were facially missing. 
As to federal and non-federal briefs in all statutory cases in 1938-41: We can 
divide our findings between federally briefed cases and non-federally-briefed 
cases. As to federally briefed cases: there were 267 of these. In them, we found 
a facially complete set of federal briefs in 263, which is 98.5%. And we found a 
facially complete set of non-federal briefs in 258, which is 96.7%. That is, we 
located at least one non-federal brief on each side in every docket-numbered 
dispute decided within the case (excluding the federal side of a dispute that 
included a federal party). As to non-federally-briefed cases: there were 91 of 
these. In them, we found facially complete sets of briefs in a disappointingly 
low proportion of cases (about 80%); I therefore say nothing about this 
category of briefs in the study. 
Dividing the Population of Statutory Cases Citing Legislative History in 
1940-45 into Strata and Drawing the Sample. I divided the population of 
statutory cases citing legislative history in 1940-45 into strata and drew a 
sample for purposes of opinion/brief citation matching. The process of 
dividing the population and taking the sample is recounted in the body of the 
paper, supra Section III.A.458 
 
458.  It should be noted that I divided the population into strata and drew the sample at a 
relatively early stage of the project. At later stages, when the work of opinion/brief citation-
matching was already well underway or complete, I made certain refinements and 
corrections to the data. Had these refinements and corrections occurred before drawing the 
sample, they would have altered the drawing, though not substantially. The refinements 
and corrections would have affected the four strata as follows: 
          (A) “Heavy” federally briefed cases (which numbered 15, all included in sample). In the 
original counting of citations in the opinions, I had research assistants count and separately 
itemize certain citations that were arguably legislative history (such as law review articles 
discussing legislative history). At a later stage, after drawing the sample, I decided these 
arguable citations should be excluded for all purposes. This meant that 4 cases had their 
counts reduced from slightly above 25 to slightly below 25. In drawing the sample, these 
cases were treated as part of the “heavy” federally briefed stratum and were therefore 
“sampled” at 100%; had the sample been taken after the reduction, they would have been 
 
 




treated as part of the “regular” federally briefed stratum, which was sampled at 20%. This 
would bias the results only if these cases somehow differed from other cases with slightly 
less than 25 non-arguable citations but not enough arguable citations to put them over 25 in 
the original count. I have no reason to think there was any such difference. 
          (B) “Heavy” non-federally-briefed cases (which numbered 1, included in sample). The 
refinements and corrections would have had no effect on this stratum. 
          (C) “Regular” federally briefed cases (which numbered 214, of which 20% were drawn for 
sample). Had the sampling occurred after all refinements and corrections, this stratum of 214 
cases would have included 15 cases that it omitted, and it would have omitted 5 cases that it 
included. Of the 15 cases that it omitted: 3 are by reason of the fact that I originally planned 
to skip cases missing from the Gale database but later figured out that I could obtain these 
briefs in the Yale Library’s hard-copy collection; 6 are by reason of the fact that we initially 
categorized a case as non-federally-briefed on the basis of the Gale database but later 
discovered a federal brief in the Yale collection or by some other means; and 6 are by reason 
of human errors. Of the 5 cases that it included: 3 are by reason of the fact that all of their 
legislative history citations were in the separately-itemized “arguable” category that we 
initially counted but later decided to exclude (on which see paragraph (A) above); and 2 are 
by reason of human errors. I have no reason to think the inclusion of the cases that would 
have been omitted caused the cases drawn for the sample to differ systematically from what 
they would have been in terms of the Justices’ relative tendency to rely on federal lawyers, 
non-federal lawyers, or the Court’s own research. Nor do I have any reason to think the 
cases that were omitted and would have been included differed systematically from the rest 
of the stratum in terms of the Justices’ relative tendency to rely upon federal lawyers, non-
federal lawyers, or the Court’s own research. I therefore do not think the results were 
biased. We drew one case for the sample whose citations were all “arguable” and thus had 
no legislative history by the later, refined definition; we therefore refrained from using it 
and randomly drew another case in its place. 
          (D) “Regular” non-federally-briefed cases (which numbered 46, of which 20% were drawn for 
sample). Had the sampling occurred after all refinements and corrections, this stratum of 46 
cases would have included 2 cases that it omitted, and it would have omitted 7 cases that it 
included. Of the 2 cases that it omitted: 1 is by reason of the fact that I originally planned to 
skip cases missing from the Gale database but later figured out that I could obtain these 
briefs in the Yale Library’s hard-copy collection; and 1 is by reason of human error. Of the 7 
cases that it included: 6 are by reason of the fact that we initially categorized a case as non-
federally-briefed on the basis of the Gale database but later discovered a federal brief in the 
Yale collection or by some other means; and 1 is by reason of human error. I have no reason 
to think the inclusion of the cases that would have been omitted caused the cases drawn for 
the sample to differ systematically from what they would have been in terms of the Justices’ 
relative tendency to rely on federal lawyers, non-federal lawyers, or the Court’s own 
research. Nor do I have any reason to think the cases that were omitted and would have 
been included differed systematically from the rest of the stratum in terms of the Justices’ 
relative tendency to rely upon federal lawyers, non-federal lawyers, or the Court’s own 
research. I therefore do not think the results were biased. We drew two cases for the sample 
for which we later discovered federal briefs in the Yale collection; we therefore did not use 
those two cases and randomly drew two others in their place. 
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Matching Citations in Cases to Citations in Briefs. In attempting to match a 
case’s citations to the corresponding briefs, we first isolated the individual 
citations in the case and made a list of them. In isolating individual citations for 
purposes of the list, we followed the same method as for counting citations in 
cases. For example, say an opinion included this passage: “See House Rept. 
No. 131; Sen. Rept. No. 76, pp. 13, 27; 43 Cong. Rec. 2713-16, 2942-45.” This 
would be broken down into five citations, and for each one of those citations, 
we would search for “matches” in all the briefs. The breakdown would look 
like this: 
 House Rept. No. 131 
 Sen. Rept. No. 76, p. 13 
 Sen. Rept. No 76, p. 27 
 43 Cong. Rec. 2713-16 
 43 Cong. Rec. 2942-45 
If the opinion referenced any document, giving no page number, and the 
brief referenced that same document, giving a page number or not, then we 
counted a “match.” 
If the opinion referenced a document and did give a page number, the 
process of counting matches was somewhat more complicated. For committee 
reports, conference reports, and bills, we counted a match whenever the brief 
cited the same document, regardless of whether the brief gave a page number, 
and regardless of what page numbers the brief gave. The rationale for this is 
that committee reports, conference reports, and bills were typically short and 
relatively easy to use, since they usually had detailed sub-headings. However, 
in the case of hearings, House Documents (in serial set), Senate Documents (in 
serial set), and floor debates (Congressional Record, etc.), we counted a match 
only when the opinion cited a certain page of a document and the brief cited a 
page of the same document that was within five pages of the page cited in the opinion. 
The rationale for this is that hearings, House Documents, Senate Documents, 
and floor debates are generally long and often desultory, so that a brief, in 
citing such material, is useful to the Justice and his clerk only if it points to 
specific passages they can use. (Similarly, if the opinion cited a hyphenated set 
of pages in a document, we would count a match if the brief cited a page of the 
same document that was within five pages of any page in the opinion’s 
hyphenated set of pages.) 
In looking for citations in briefs, we looked at every page of the brief. We 
did not simply rely upon the brief’s Table of Authorities, which (we found) 
was often unreliable. 
For the work of matching, the cases were divided about equally between 
two RAs. To check objectivity and reliability, I had the two RAs duplicate each 
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other’s work for four sets of cases, corresponding to the four strata of the 
population: 
(A) “Heavy” federally briefed cases (15 cases, all included in sample). The two 
RAs duplicated each other’s work for 13 of the 15 cases.459 In the duplicated 
cases, I was able to compare the percentages reported by the two RAs for the 
four categories of citations: those matching federal and non-federal briefs; 
those matching federal brief(s) only; those matching non-federal brief(s) only; 
and those matching no briefs. For these four categories, the differences 
between the first and second RAs were very small: 1.0, -1.8, -0.8, and 1.5 
percentage points, respectively. 
(B) “Heavy” non-federally-briefed cases (1 case, included in sample). The two 
RAs duplicated each other’s work for this case. I was able to compare the 
percentages reported by them for the two categories of citations: those 
matching a brief and those not. For the two categories, the differences were 
small: 0.4 and -0.4 percentage points, respectively. 
(C) “Regular” federally briefed cases (214 cases, of which we drew a 20% sample 
amounting to 43 cases). I had the two RAs duplicate each other’s work for a 
random subset of this part of the sample (which was 15 cases out of 43, or 
34%).460 For the four categories listed for stratum (A) above, the differences 
were very small: -1.8, -1.2, 2.5, and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. 
(D) “Regular” non-federally-briefed cases (44 cases, of which we drew a 20% 
sample amounting to 9 cases). I had the two RAs duplicate each other’s work for 
a random subset of this part of the sample (which was 4 cases out of 9, or 
44%).461 For the two categories listed for stratum (B) above, the differences 
were very small: 1.5 and -1.5 percentage points, respectively. 
Counting Citations in Briefs. When counting citations in briefs, we 
followed the same method as for counting citations in cases. Within any given 
brief, we always counted all legislative history citations, whether they appeared 
in the body of the filing or the appendix. 
 
459.  Of the two cases that I did not have duplicated, one was because we possessed most of the 
briefs only in hard copy, and the other involved a unique citation scheme in which most of 
the legislative history citations were to the district court record, so I personally made the 
matching designations. 
460.  This subset was drawn only from the years 1940-44, not 1945, since cases in 1945 had not 
been through the necessary preparatory work at the time we did the duplication exercise. 
461.  This subset was drawn only from the years 1940-44, not 1945, since cases in 1945 had not 
been through the necessary preparatory work at the time we did the duplication exercise. 
 
the yale law journal 123:266   2013  
402 
 
One RA counted federal briefs for the years 1930-40 and 1945 and non-
federal briefs for the years 1938-40. A second RA counted federal briefs for the 
years 1941-44 and non-federal briefs for the year 1941. To check objectivity and 
reliability, I had the second RA perform a duplicate count for the federal briefs 
in 1938, which had 92 statutory cases.462 As with the citation-counting for the 
cases, there were some divergences up and down in individual cases, but these 
were apparently random, with almost no bias. For 1938, the first RA identified 
67 cases with federal briefs and counted 286 citations in those briefs; the 
second RA identified 68 cases with federal briefs and counted 295 citations in 
those briefs. (Sixty-six of the cases were identified by both RAs as having 
federal briefs.) The two RAs thus produced citation/brief ratios of 4.27 and 
4.34. These ratios are within 2% of each other.463 
Matching Citations in Supreme Court Cases to Citations in Lower-Court 
Cases. For every case, we sought matches with the corresponding lower-court 
opinion. We looked only to the opinion of the court immediately below. For 
example, if the case was decided by a U.S. district court and then by a U.S. 
circuit court, we looked only at the latter’s opinion. We looked at lower-court 
opinions only if they were published in a reporter. (We did not attempt 
matches with, say, a never-reported opinion that was printed in the transcript 
of record.) Across the whole sample (68 cases), all but three had corresponding 
lower-court opinions for us to process. 
 
462.  Some of these cases were later excluded from the dataset after we made a global decision not 
to include cases decided by per curiam opinions, but for the purpose of testing the 
objectivity of our cite-counting method and the reliability of the RAs, there is no reason to 
think the inclusion of these cases in the inter-coder exercise made any difference. Also, the 
inter-coder exercise occurred before we made a global decision to count citations in briefs’ 
appendices (and we later found that inclusion of appendix cites for 1938 increased the total 
by 14%). But the exclusion of appendix cites from the inter-coder exercise makes no 
difference, I think, to the exercise’s value in gauging the method’s objectivity and the RAs’ 
reliability. 
463.  Here is a breakdown of agreements and disagreements, case-by-case, among the 66 cases 
that were each identified by both RAs as federally briefed: in 1 case, the RAs agreed that the 
federal brief existed but was unavailable in the Gale database; in 26 cases, the RAs agreed 
there were zero citations; in 16 cases, they agreed on a nonzero number of citations; in 14 
cases, their citation counts differed by one (with the first RA giving the higher count in 8 
cases and the second RA in 6); in 6 cases, their citation counts differed by two (with the first 
RA giving the higher count in 4 cases and the second RA in 2); and in 3 cases, their citation 
counts differed by 3 or more (with the first RA giving the higher count in 1 case and the 
second RA in 2). 
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For the work of matching, the cases were divided about equally between 
two RAs. To check objectivity and reliability, I had them duplicate each other’s 
work for four sets of cases, corresponding to the four strata of the population: 
(A) “Heavy” federally briefed cases (15 cases, all included in sample). The two 
RAs duplicated each other’s work for 13 of the 15 cases.464 In the duplicated 
cases, I was able to compare the percentages reported by the two RAs for 
matches with lower-court opinions. One RA got 6.1% and the other 5.3%, a 
very small difference of 0.8 percentage points. 
(B) “Heavy” non-federally-briefed cases (1 case, included in sample). The two 
RAs duplicated each other’s work for this case. Both found zero matches with 
the lower-court opinion. 
(C) “Regular” federally briefed cases (214 cases, of which we drew a 20% sample 
amounting to 43 cases). I had the two RAs duplicate each other’s work for a 
random subset of this part of the sample (which was 15 cases out of 43, or 
34%).465 Both found zero matches across all cases. 
(D) “Regular” non-federally-briefed cases (44 cases, of which we drew a 20% 
sample amounting to 9 cases). I had the two RAs duplicate each other’s work for 
a random subset of this part of the sample (which was 4 cases out of 9, or 
44%).466 One RA got 10.6% and the other 10.9%, a very small difference of  
-0.3 percentage points. 
 
464.  Of the two cases that I did not have duplicated, one was because we possessed most of the 
briefs only in hard copy, and the other involved a unique citation scheme in which most of 
the legislative history citations were to the district court record, so I personally made the 
matching designations. 
465.  This subset was drawn only from the years 1940-44, not 1945, since cases in 1945 had not 
been through the necessary preparatory work at the time we did the duplication exercise. 
466.  This subset was drawn only from the years 1940-44, not 1945, since cases in 1945 had not 
been through the necessary preparatory work at the time we did the duplication exercise. 
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appendix i i :  lobbying connections of lawyers and 
litigants on non-federal briefs heavily citing 
legislative history, 1938-41 
¶ 1. Brief for Petitioners, Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 
(1938) (No. 636). 37 cites. This case concerned the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935. Brief-signing attorney John F. MacLane had represented 
the Committee of Public Utility Executives in Senate hearings on the bill. 
Public Utility Holding Company Act: Hearings on S. 1725 Before the S. Comm. on 
Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong. 287-88 (1935) (statement of John F. MacLane). 
¶ 2. Brief for Appellees, United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, 304 
U.S. 119 (1938) (No. 707). 72 cites. This case was a claim by Klamath Indians 
for a taking by the federal government, particularly concerning a treaty of 1864, 
a statute of 1906 under which the taking occurred, a statute of 1920 providing 
jurisdiction to hear the suit, and a statute of 1936 amending the jurisdictional 
statute. Of the legislative history in the brief (pp. 3-4, 14-15, 34, 41-42, 57-59, 
66-67, 74, 78-79, 84, 112-14, 131, 139), more than half the citations pertained to 
deliberations specifically concerning the Klamath tribe in the 70th Congress 
(1927-29) or later. By the time of that Congress, brief-signing attorney Daniel 
B. Henderson had become a lobbyist for the Klamath tribe on their claims 
against the federal government and had begun testifying before Congress on 
the tribe’s behalf. Indians of the Klamath Reservation, Oreg.: Hearing on S. 3006 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 70th Cong. 4-5 (1929) (statement of 
Daniel B. Henderson); see also Interior Department Appropriation Bill, 1929: 
Hearings on H.R. 9136 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 70th 
Cong. 130 (1928) (same). 
¶ 3. Brief for Respondent, Helvering v. Nat’l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 
(1938) (No. 723). 47 cites. No evidence of lobbying. 
¶ 4. Brief for Respondent, Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) (No. 330). 
38 cites. This case concerned immigration statutes from 1900 through the 
1930s, on which the brief’s legislative history focused. I have found no evidence 
that any of the attorneys lobbied on those statutes. However, brief-signing 
attorney Carol Weiss King had worked as a full-time left-wing activist 
(including on immigration issues) since about 1920. See ANN FAGAN GINGER, 
CAROL WEISS KING: HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER, 1895-1952 (1993). She had 
written a brief for the ACLU on deportation law that was inserted in a 
congressional hearing transcript in 1926. Deportation of Alien Criminals, 
Gunmen, Narcotic Dealers, Defectives, Etc.: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Immigration and Naturalization, 69th Cong. 77-86 (1926). King would testify 
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before Congress repeatedly in the years shortly after submitting the Strecker 
brief. GINGER, supra, at 308-09, 432-33, 502. 
¶ 5. Brief for Pure Milk Ass’n [Appellee], United States v. Borden Co., 308 
U.S. 188 (1939) (No. 397). 48 cites. This case concerned (apart from the labor 
issues discussed supra notes 313-314 and accompanying text) the Capper-
Volstead Act of 1922 (CVA), particularly the exemption from the antitrust laws 
that it granted to farmer cooperatives. The brief’s discussion of legislative 
history pertained to CVA. One of the interest groups to lobby for CVA had 
been the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), represented by its 
Secretary, Charles W. Holman. Authorizing Association of Producers of 
Agricultural Products: Hearings on H.R. 2373 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 169 (1921) (statement of Charles W. Holman, 
Secretary, National Milk Producers Federation). Holman remained ensconced 
as Secretary of NMPF through the 1940s, continuously lobbying Congress on 
cooperative legislation. E.g., Agricultural Marketing Agreements: Hearings on S. 
3426 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 76th Cong. 
129 (1940) (same). Meanwhile, one of the litigants in Borden Co. was Don N. 
Geyer, manager of the Chicago Pure Milk Association and a major participant 
in NMPF, through which he surely knew Holman. From the late 1920s 
through the 1930s, Geyer gave papers at conferences organized by Holman. 
E.g., AM. INST. OF COOPERATION, AMERICAN COOPERATION: A COLLECTION 
OF PAPERS AND DISCUSSIONS COMPRISING THE FIFTH SUMMER SESSION OF 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF COOPERATION 7, 105 (1930). As of 1935, Geyer 
served on the ten-member NMPF executive committee. Oleomargarine: Hearing 
on H.R. 5586 and H.R. 5587 Before a Special Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on 
Agriculture, 74th Cong. 146 (1935). 
¶ 6. Brief for Robert G. Fitchie et al. [Appellees], United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (No. 397). 64 cites. See supra note 313 and 
accompanying text for more details. 
¶ 7. Brief on Behalf of Leslie G. Goudie [Appellee], United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (No. 397). 35 cites. See supra note 314 and 
accompanying text for more details. 
¶ 8. Brief for the Borden Company et al. [Appellees], United States v. 
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (No. 397). 33 cites. Perhaps the attorneys 
briefed such material in response to the initiative of other parties in the case 
(see ¶¶ 6, 7), including the federal government. 
¶ 9. Brief for Respondent Mrs. Julia Caroline Sponenbarger, United States 
v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939) (No. 72). 422 cites. This was a test case 
for Fifth Amendment and statutory claims to compensation by numerous 
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landowners for alleged losses from flood-control projects arising from the 
Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928. The legislative history in the 
landowners’ unbelievably long and repetitive brief consisted mainly of two 
kinds of citations: floor debates on the 1928 Act (which appeared at pages 105-
18 and in Appendix B, at pages 303-49, and accounted for about three-fourths 
of the legislative history citations in the brief) and committee hearings in 1934-
38 (which were scattered throughout and accounted for about one-fourth of 
the legislative history citations). Brief-signing attorney Lamar Williamson had 
become the chief advocate for the claimants by 1934 and had begun testifying at 
congressional hearings on their behalf at that time, pursuing the goal of 
compensation through the alternative means of congressional lobbying and 
litigation simultaneously. Flood Control on the West Side of the Mississippi River 
in Arkansas, and on the South Side of the Arkansas River: Hearings on H.R. 8146 
and H.R. 8048 Before the H. Comm. on Flood Control, 73d Cong. 9 (1934) 
(statement of Lamar Williamson); see also Flood Control in the Mississippi Valley: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Flood Control, 74th Cong. 592, 602, 611 (1935) 
(same). Also, as of 1935, Williamson “worked closely with” U.S. Senator John 
Overton of Louisiana on related compensation legislation, advising him on 
drafting. MARTIN REUSS, DESIGNING THE BAYOUS: THE CONTROL OF WATER 
IN THE ATCHAFALAYA BASIN, 1800-1995, at 183 (2004). I have found no 
evidence that Williamson or his co-counsel lobbied on the 1928 Act; their 
research on that phase of the congressional process may have been purely 
retrospective. 
¶ 10. Appendices to Brief for Respondent, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio 
Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (No. 499). 236 cites. This case concerned the 
Radio Act of 1927 and amendments and other legislative activity relating to it, 
up to and including the Communications Act of 1934. Brief-signing attorney 
Louis G. Caldwell had represented a leading commercial broadcaster in the first 
lawsuit ever to win recognition of a common-law property right in radio 
frequencies, in autumn 1926. The “radio industry applauded [the decision] 
instantly,” and broadcasters across the country began filing similar suits. 
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 
33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 149-52 (1990) (discussing the decision); see also Radio 
Board Chief Counsel Elected Amherst Trustee, WASH. POST, July 1, 1928, at A5 
(noting Caldwell’s role). Within a few weeks, Senator C.C. Dill, later an author 
of the Radio Act, had the decision reprinted in the Congressional Record. 68 
CONG. REC. 215-19 (1926). The decision “ignited legislative activity in 
Washington,” Hazlett, supra, at 151-52, 160, and was one of two key cases that 
“created an incentive for [federal] radio broadcasting legislation,” GERALD W. 
BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 38 (2003). Congress passed 
the Radio Act in 1927, “[w]ith the support of the broadcast industry.” Id. at 39. 
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As of 1928, Caldwell was considered “one of the leading commercial 
broadcasting attorneys in the nation.” In July of that year, he was hired by the 
new Federal Radio Commission as its first general counsel, partly because he 
had privately developed an impressive plan for implementing the 
Commission’s (extremely pro-broadcaster) policies. Robert W. McChesney, 
Free Speech and Democracy! Louis G. Caldwell, the American Bar Association and 
the Debate over the Free Speech Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 1928-1938, 35 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 351, 356-58 (1991). Returning to the private sector in late 
1928, Caldwell immediately became the first chairman of the ABA’s new 
Standing Committee on Radio Law (the main source of legislative proposals in 
the field going forward) and served as the principal lobbyist for the 
broadcasters (hired by the “entire industry” to represent it at congressional 
hearings in 1931). Id. at 358, 365-66, 370, 374. This constitutes direct evidence 
that Caldwell lobbied on amendments to the Radio Act from 1928 onward and, 
in my view, strong circumstantial evidence that he lobbied on the 1927 Radio 
Act itself. 
¶ 11. Brief for Respondent, United States v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 
310 U.S. 16 (1940) (No. 587). 68 cites. This case concerned the Raker Act of 
1913, which authorized San Francisco to use the Hetch Hetchy valley for 
hydropower, under certain conditions. Brief-signing attorney Robert M. Searls 
was San Francisco’s “special counsel for the Hetch Hetchy project and a key 
representative of the city during the legislative process” that led to the Raker 
Act. JOHN WARFIELD SIMPSON, DAM!: WATER, POWER, POLITICS, AND 
PRESERVATION IN HETCH HETCHY AND YOSEMITE NATIONAL PARK 245 
(2005); see also M.M. O’SHAUGHNESSY, HETCH HETCHY: ITS ORIGIN AND 
HISTORY 52 (1934). 
¶ 12. Brief for Respondents, Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 
(1940) (No. 593). 295 cites. This case concerned steel companies’ challenge to 
the DOL’s interpretation of the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, which imposed 
wage and hour regulations on all firms that had supply contracts with the 
federal government. Brief-signing attorney O. Max Gardner (the former 
governor of North Carolina and a personal friend of President Roosevelt) was 
perhaps the single most powerful and widely connected lobbyist in 
Washington; from 1933 onward, he established and ran a whole firm that 
systematically monitored congressional committee proceedings and floor 
debates on a daily basis. JOSEPH L. MORRISON, GOVERNOR O. MAX GARDNER: 
A POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA AND NEW DEAL WASHINGTON 142, 189-90 
(1971). Gardner’s main client was the textile industry, and he was also highly 
engaged in labor issues. Id. at 142, 149-50, 172, 179-80, 190. The textile industry 
had more workers subject to the Walsh-Healey Act than any other industry. 
Edward F. Denison, The Influence of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act Upon 
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Labor Conditions, 49 J. POL. ECON. 225, 231 tbl.1 (1941). I think this is extremely 
strong circumstantial evidence that Gardner must have been involved in the 
lobbying process that led to the Act. 
¶ 13. Brief for Respondent, United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 
371 (1940) (No. 613). 29 cites. This case concerned the tariff. The brief’s 
discussion of legislative history, id. at 41-48, covered a tariff bill passed in 1922, 
another passed in 1929-30, and a third rejected in 1933. Marion De Vries, 
formerly a judge on the U.S. Court of Customs Appeals, was from 1922 to 1939 
a leading tariff lobbyist, representing fourteen interest groups in the landmark 
revision of 1929-30. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURE, AND THE 
TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS 
SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF 197-98 (1963); see also 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3319 (last visited Sept. 25, 2013) 
(entry of Marion De Vries). Brief-signing attorney Frank L. Lawrence 
corresponded with De Vries in 1928, reporting to him on the willingness of 
about a dozen importing and manufacturing companies to pay for securing a 
certain tariff policy; Lawrence and De Vries ultimately divided fees with each 
other. 3 Lobby Investigation: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 71st Cong. 2776, 2790-91 (1930) (statement of Marion De Vries). 
¶ 14. Brief on Behalf of Congress of Industrial Organizations [as] Amicus 
Curiae, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (No. 638). 74 cites. 
See supra note 316 and accompanying text for more details. 
¶ 15. Brief for Respondents, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 
(1940) (No. 638). 64 cites. See supra note 317 and accompanying text for more 
details. 
¶ 16. Petitioner’s Brief in Reply to Briefs of Respondents and Amici Curiae, 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (No. 638). 25 cites. See supra 
note 318 and accompanying text for more details. 
¶ 17. Brief for Appellees, United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 
534 (1940) (No. 713). 32 cites. This case concerned the interaction between the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The 
legislative history in the brief covered both statutes, plus post-1938 
developments. Id. at 25-38, 53-54. Brief-signing attorney J. Ninian Beall had 
represented the American Trucking Associations at the 1937 joint House and 
Senate hearings on the FLSA. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings on 
S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor and the H. Comm. 
on Labor, Pt. 2, 75th Cong. 743 (1937) (statement of J. Ninian Beall, General 
Counsel, American Trucking Associations). Past representatives of the 
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Associations had played a similar role with respect to the Motor Carrier Act. 
E.g., To Amend the Interstate Commerce Act: Hearings on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 
1635 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, Pt. 1, 74th Cong. 305 (1935) 
(statement of William G. Fitzpatrick, American Trucking Associations). 
¶ 18. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940) 
(No. 13). 39 cites. This case concerned the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, on 
which the brief’s legislative history focused. I have found no evidence that 
Stewart or any of the attorneys lobbied for that Act. However, brief-signing 
attorney Ernest L. Wilkinson was experienced at congressional lobbying more 
generally, most famously for Indian tribes, frequently testifying at committee 
hearings and drafting bills and committee reports since the mid-1930s. 
WOODRUFF J. DEEM & GLENN V. BIRD, ERNEST L. WILKINSON: INDIAN 
ADVOCATE AND UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT 129, 155-56, 196-201 (1982). His 
clients also included trade associations. Id. at 100. 
¶ 19. Brief for Respondent, FCC v. Columbia Broad. Sys. of Cal., 311 U.S. 
132 (1940) (No. 39). 32 cites. This case concerned the Communications Act of 
1934. Brief-signing attorney Duke M. Patrick had written an analysis of the bill 
that was inserted in the transcript of the Senate hearings by the chairman of 
the Legislative Committee of the National Association of Broadcasters. Federal 
Communications Commission: Hearings on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm. on 
Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong. 68-69 (1934). Sixteen months earlier, Patrick 
had been General Counsel of the FCC’s predecessor agency and had testified 
before Congress on related issues. See Fees for Radio Licenses: Hearing on S. 5201 
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 72d Cong. 20 (1933) 
(statement of Duke M. Patrick, General Counsel, Federal Radio Commission); 
To Amend the Radio Act of 1927: Hearings on H.R. 7716 Before the S. Comm. on 
Interstate Commerce, Pt. 2, 72d Cong. 35 (1932) (statement of Duke M. Patrick, 
Assistant General Counsel, Federal Radio Commission). 
¶ 20. Brief for Appellees on Reargument, United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 
311 U.S. 317 (1940) (No. 3). 25 cites. This case concerned the vast federal land 
grants to the Northern Pacific Railway Company. The legislative history in the 
brief, id. at 15, 44-45, 69-80, was about the acts pertaining to these grants, 
mainly a Joint Resolution of 1870, which was specific to the Northern Pacific, 
and for which it obviously must have lobbied. Brief-signing attorney Lorenzo 
B. daPonte was general counsel to the Northern Pacific and would have had 
access to the company’s records and institutional memory. 
¶ 21. Brief for Petitioner, Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 313 U.S. 
270 (1941) (No. 90). 48 cites. This case dealt with several statutory provisions 
related to farm bankruptcies. The brief’s discussion of legislative history 
focused overwhelmingly on congressional activity on bankruptcy from 1937 
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through 1940. Id. at 35-63. Brief-signing attorney Elmer McClain had testified 
in favor of farmer-debtors before the House Subcommittee on Bankruptcy 
(chaired by Walter Chandler, of Chandler Act fame) in December 1937. Farm 
Mortgage Moratorium: Hearings on S. 2215 and H.R. 6452 Before Special 
Subcomm. on Bankruptcy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 53 (1938) 
(statement of Elmer McClain). Also, McClain since at least 1937 had been 
connected to U.S. Senator William Lemke, a champion of farmer-debtors, 
having served as his co-counsel in defending the constitutionality of Lemke’s 
signature legislation, the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Moratorium Act of 
1935. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 
440, 442 (1937). 
¶ 22. Brief for Respondent, Benitez Sampayo v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 313 
U.S. 270 (1941) (No. 90). 52 cites. I have found no evidence of lobbying. 
Perhaps the attorneys briefed such material in response to the initiative of an 
opposing party, represented by a lawyer-lobbyist. See ¶ 21. 
¶ 23. Brief for Respondents, Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941) (No. 
718). 44 cites. This case concerned the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. I have found 
no evidence that any of the attorneys lobbied on this Act. But brief-signing 
attorney Milton B. Badt was experienced in testifying to Congress on Indian 
affairs. See Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings Before 
a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, Pt. 28, 72d Cong. 14841 (1934) 
(statement of Milton B. Badt). Also, as of 1940, he was being contacted by U.S. 
Senator Patrick McCarron regarding congressional investigation of federal 
grazing administration. Margaret Patricia McCarron, Patrick Anthony 
McCarron, Part II, NEV. HIST. SOC’Y Q., Spring 1969, at 3, 9-10. 
¶ 24. Brief for the Petitioner, Textile Mill Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 
326 (1941) (No. 34). 49 cites. Lobbying was the very subject of this case. The 
litigant itself (Textile Mills Securities Corporation) lobbied for passage of the 
Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, and one of the issues in the case was 
whether the company could deduct its expenses for that lobbying, which 
arguably turned on whether the Act was “favor legislation” or “debt 
legislation.” The legislative history appearing in the company’s brief pertained 
mainly to that Act and its nature. Id. at 53-76. 
¶ 25. Respondent’s Brief, United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 
339 (1941) (No. 23). 58 cites. In this case, the federal government prosecuted a 
land claim against the Santa Fe Pacific Railroad on behalf of the Walapai 
Indians. The large majority of legislative history citations in the Railroad’s 
brief were to an unusual genre of legislative history: a Senate Document titled 
The Walapai Papers, S. DOC. NO. 74-273 (1936). This was a huge cache of 
historical records on Walapai land rights from federal agency files that had 
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been assembled and printed by Congress in 1936 at the behest of the Railroad’s 
patron, U.S. Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona, as part of his deliberate effort to 
help the Railroad’s case. Hayden enthusiastically distributed the Papers to the 
Railroad’s attorneys even before they were published. CHRISTIAN W. 
MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE AND THE BIRTH 
OF ETHNOHISTORY 139-40 (2007). 
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